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ABSTRACT
In Athens in the period of the orators, eyybri was a legal term used to refer 
to an oral contract made between two parties. Having the basic meaning of 
"pledge" or "promise", eyybri takes the meaning of "suretyship”, "guaranty”. 
The situations in which the term eyybq was used were marriage and 
suretyship.
During the classical period the eyybn (the "promising" or "pledging of the 
bride") was the essential element of marriage; it was a prerequisite, without 
which a marriage was not valid. It was an oral, private contract of marriage 
(legally valid) concluded with the bridegroom by the woman's Kbpiog (father, 
brother or nearest male relative). The most important effect of marriage, the 
legitimacy of children, depended on the existence and propriety of the eyybri.
*Eyy<>Ti as surety was employed, in classical Athens, in a wide range of 
cases:
‘Eyyoqxcd (guarantors) were required in loan transactions, in many private 
agreements and in arbitration proceedings.
‘Eyyoqxod appear also to play a significant role in the function of the banks 
in relation to loans paid out by the banker.
Contracts made between the state and (an) individuals) who bought the 
right to collect a tax or leased public property could not exist without the 
existence of eyyuqxcd.
The initiation of a legal action in some cases could lead into the 
precautionary imprisonment of the accused man until his case came before the 
appropriate magistrates for trial, unless eyyonxcd were nominated by him who 
would guarantee his appearance in court for trial.
*Eyybq was the means for the attainment o f an act at a future day.
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PREFACE
The subject of this thesis is eyyuT] in Athens in the period of the orators. 
*Eyy\)t\ means "pledge", "surety”, "guarantee"; it was a term used to refer to an 
oral contract made between two parties and the situations in which this term was 
used were marriage and suretyship.
Starting with an account of the epic verb EYYuaA.t£a> found in Homer (because 
I think that there is an etymological connection with the verb eYYvfr v from which 
the noun eyY^U derives), I examine the word eyY^U and its derivatives where they 
occur horn Homer to Thucydides, concentrating on the meaning of the word 
EYY^ 1! which it may have in each passage.
In my discussion about eyy^t], both in the context of marriage and of 
suretyship, I have concentrated on the period from Perikles to Demosthenes 
(approximately 435 to 322 B.C.) because that is the period about which the Attic 
orators tell us. My chief source of information is the texts of the relevant law- 
court speeches, in which the speakers either discuss a case of eyYbil in some 
detail or just briefly mention something relating to These are
supplemented by allusions in comedy, history or even philosophy. Sometimes, 
when 1 think that it is necessary, I discuss in detail the context in which a 
referrence to eyY^H is found, in order to understand better the nature and the 
purpose of the eyy^H m that particular case.
In part n  I discuss the eYYbq in the context of marriage. I start with the earliest 
appearance of eyY^H hi this context (Herod. VI, 130) trying to define what 8YYbTl 
was and who had the right to exercise it. I have incorporated a discussion about 
the dowry trying to see if there was a connection between eYYbi] and dowry. 
Finally, I examine the significance of the kyyiyq for a union of a man and a woman 
and the consequences of that union on their offspring. I concentrate on how the
formality of marriage, or lack of it, affected the children of a union and especially 
whether those whose parents were both Athenian, but not united by eyyhri (or 
87n5iKa(ria), were excluded from citizen rights, equally with the children of 
mixed marriages according to Perikles's citizenship law.
In part m I discuss the cases where eyybTt as surety was employed: loan 
transactions, arbitration proceedings, the banking system, collecting a tax or 
leasing public property were all cases in which the appearance of eyyoTyiod 
(guarantors) seem to be necessary. I have, though, concentrated on the eyyoT] with 
the meaning of "release on bail" attested in cases of eioayyeXtoc, §v5eil;i<;, 
<pdcn<;, 5xkt[ fcipaipfcaeax;, 5xxt| which were all legal procedures
employed (according to the alleged offence) by a prosecutor to initiate legal 
action against an alleged offender.
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PARTI
THE VERB ETTYAAIZn
The verb eyyD<xA.i£<D is an Epic and Lyric verb which means literally "to put 
into the palm of the hand", as it derives from the word ybo&ov compounded with 
the preposition ev; so, cv + yi>a3t- > eyyvcdt- .
T6 ybo&ov means "hollow", "the hollow of the hand" and 8yyuc&t£a> means 
"to put into the hand" and generally "to give, grant, commit, bestow”, as it seems 
from the use of this verb in Homer.
In the Iliad this verb is found eleven times and in the Odyssey three times. It 
also appears twice in the Homeric Hymn to Hermes.
The quotations from the Iliad are the following:
- pfjxep, ercei p' ixexfct; ye pivov0dc5t6v nep e6vxa, 
xipfp? Tifcp poi 6<peM.8v ’OX.fyi7tio<; eyynaXi^ai 
Zeix; bijfiPpepfcxTn;- vbv 5* o(>56 pe xox06v Sxexoev.
[1.352- 354]
- ’AxpexSq xbSxoxe, &val; &v8p(5v ’Aydpepvov, 
pqx&xx vfcv 5ti0* a$0x Xey6pc0af pqS* Ixx 5qp6v 
6cp|3(&Xd>pe0a ipyov, 5 0e6^ eyynaXi^ci.
[2. 436]
- Nfcoxcop . . .  dcyopfiaaxo xal pex^exnev 
"'AxpeiSq k 6 5 xox8, ftval; 6cv5pSv ’Ay&pepvov,
ev ool p&v Xf£a>, a&o 5’ &p!;opax, obvexa 710M.&V
Xa&v eooi ficvai; xod xoi Zsix; eyyv&Xi^e
axf]7ixp6v x’ f|5^ 0£pioxai;, Iva oqnox PovXe<)fla0a ..." .
[9. 98]
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- aftx&p e n d  x* f[ Soopi x\)7isi<; f[ PA.fuiEvo<;
si<; Xnnoxx; &A.exoi, x6xe oi xpdcxo<; EyyvaX l^ai 
x x e iv e iv ,. . .
[11. 192]
- x6xe xoi xp&xo<; EyyvaXi^Ei xxeIveiv
[11.207]
- £v0a Zeon; noAxoiai jifcya xp&xot; cyyv&Xi^e*
[11.753]
- psia  8’ Scpiyvcoxo^ Ax6<; &v8p<5tax yiyvExax AXxfi, 
f[p.^v 6x6oxaxv x$8o<; \)7i6pX£pov cyyuaX i^fi
f|S’ fixxva^ jixvtiGfl xe Kort ofcx £06A.flaxv tyifcvexv, 
vftv ’ApyEicov }ixv60ex ji£vo£, fyijix 8* Scp^yEx.
[15.491]
- 6<; p a  x60’ "Exxopx xfl8o<; imfcpxEpov eyyvdcXi^E.
[15. 644]
- 6txdp xoi vftv yE jifcya xp&xot; EyyuaXi^ai.
[17. 206]
• 71e£6<; y&p x& Tipcbxa Xxucbv v£a<; 6tjiqn£A.xaaa<; 
fjA.D0£, xax xe Tpcoal jifcya xpdxo<; EyyodtXt^ev, 
s i p.fi xolpavcx; coxa noS<bxEa<; fjX,ao£V Itxtioxx;.
[17. 613]
- Ioxe y&p fiaaov Ejiol Apexft 7i£pxpdM.EX0v Ititiox- 
AGdvaxox xe ydcp eion, noaex5&a)v 8£ x6p’ afcxoxx; 
naxpi Eji$ nrjX.ftif 6 S’ a m  Ejiol Eyyv&Xi^EV.
[23. 278].
The quotations from the Odyssey are:
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- &Xk& oqxoe 86Xoq xod 5eoji6<; &p6£ei,
ei<; 6 x6 p.01 p&A.a n&vxa naxijp &7io8<$cnv £eSva,
S a a a  ol eyyx»&Xi£a xovdmiSos elvexa xobpTjt;
[8. 319]
- vftv ax> eeanpcoxaW 6tv8paW nap& vt\6$ dcnoSpft^ 
fjA.o0’ ep6v np6<; axa0p6v, eycb 56 xoi eyyuGrili^ar 
£p!;ov Snax; e06keii;* lx6xq<; 86 xoi ebxexai etvai.
[16. 66] 
ev0a 8’ Sneixa 
(ppaoo6pe0’ 6xxi ice x6p8o<; ’OXfyimoi; eyyuaX ll^i.
[23. 140].
Finally, the two quotations from the Hymn to Hermes are the following:
- &<; eincbv d&pe£\ 6 8’ eS6^axo <Dotpo<; 'AiioM.a)v,
*Eppfi 8’ eyyu&Xi^ev £ x°°v p&axiya <paeivf[v,
PooxoAAat; x’ e7i6xeM,ev*
[Hymn to Hermes, 496-498]
Kai x& p£v *Eppfte 
AqxotSqv eqnXqae Siap.nep£<; dbt; £xi x a i  v$v, 
ofijiax’ enei id0apiv p£v *ExT|P6A.q> eyyudX i^ev 
ipepxfiv, SeSadu; 6 8’ eTKoXiviov xi0<5cpi£ev.
[id. 507-510].
In these quotations the subject of the verb eyyoaAA£a> is Zeus (eight times) and
only4wice is another person (not Zeus). As far as the objects are concerned, they
vaiy (xp&xog - five times; x$So<; - twice; oxffaxpov, xiufjv, ipyov, Inrcooq-^  
— \ b^oyupAM^ Afs e lse  *
once eacn)7 but they are not far away from the idea of power and glory given in
most cases by Zeus.
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Therefore, the verb £YyuaA,i£a) seems to have a meaning more dignified and 
powerful than the verb SiSoopi used to express mainly and simply the act of giving 
something to somebody. Perhaps it is like the English 'bestow" rather than "give", 
and comes closer to the idea of promising and committing oneself to somebody
for doing something and seems, more or less, to have a meaning not very different
from the meaning of cyywi).
Probably they derive from the same root [yuaA. - (from the word y<xxA.os)] 
with the loss of A, from the latter and so we have:
* ev + yuaA. + i£a> > eyyuaA.i^ cn
* ev + yooA. + eg > eyyudA.cn > eyyud® > eyyuffi.
*  *  *
THE WORD EITYH FROM HOMER TO THUCYDIDES.1 
HOMER
The earliest appearance of the word is in Homer Od. 8. 351. Aphrodite and 
Ares have been surprised in the act of adultery by Hephaistos who then holds 
them bound. Poseidon intervenes between them and asks Hephaistos to release 
Ares:
A ftoov eycb 86 xoi ai>x6v brciaxopai, «b<; a h  KeA.etieK;, 347
1 In this chapter I examine the word eyywi and its derivatives where they occur in the Greek texts from 
Homer to Thucydides. First of all, I have concentrated on the meaning of the word eyyot) (or its 
derivatives) which it may have in each passage, and sometimes I have tried to interpret the context within 
which the word occurs, in order to shed light on the function (where it is possible) that the word eyym) 
might have. However, many questions remain unanswered, and maybe others arise.
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xiaeiv odoipa x&vxa pex* &8av<5cxoiai 800101. 
Hephaistos replies:
pfl pe, IloaetSocov yonfioxe, xaflxa x&.ei)e*
Seized xoi SeiXffiv ye xod eyyfcon eyyodcaaOoci. 
nGx; &v eyd) 00 S&oipi pex’ ftOocvricxoiai Geotaiv, 
eli Kev vApT]5 ofyoixo Xp£°S Seapbv 
And then Poseidon says:
^Hcpaiox*, el Tiep y6p Kev "Apiis XP^0  ^ i>notA.i)i;GC<; 
otxrixon, <pe6ya>v, atix6<; xoi eyd> x&8e xiaco.
351
350
353
352
348
355
356
Then Hephaistos releases the lovers and Ares takes himself off to Thrace and 
leaves fav 
Aphrodite^Cypms.
Poseidon's first undertaking is that Ares will pay up: ”eyd) 8£ xoi ori>x6v 
()7iiaxojiai . . . xiaeiv. . "I promise that he will pay”. Hephaistos refuses 
Poseidon's offer here by saying that "SeiXod xoi SeiXffiv ye xod eyyfxxi 
eyyudaoGoci" There has been much controversy on this line. Some scholars think 
that SeiXftv refers to Hephaistos and others think that SeiX&v refers to Ares. The 
Scholia are perplexed whether to refer SeiXcov to Ares [cd imkp xcov xaxaW xod 
8eiX6 v eyytioci xod ocftxod xctxod eioi, xfjv xtoxiv fcnfcp xffiv xoioOxoov 
pi|5ev6^ xqpetv Sovapfcvoo, ("pledges given on behalf of a worthless fellow")] 
or to Hephaistos [od 7ip6^ xoix; SeiXodoix; xod dcoOevefc; yiv6pevoci eyytioci 
o6S£v Stivavxoci, x&v &8ixoop£vcov ene^eXGeiv p.f| 8ovap6vcov 81 a a 86veiocv, 
("pledges given to one of low status")]. But the reason for their perplexity is that 
SeiX&v may refer to both of them at the same time.
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On the one hand, Hephaistos is pretty sure that Ares will avoid paying the 
poiX&Ypta2 because he is 8eiA.6<; and so pledges given on behalf of a worthless 
fellow are worthless. On the other hand, Hephaistos wonders how he would be 
able to keep Poseidon (the guarantor) bound, if Ares who is 5ei^6<; went off, 
Hephaistos is 5eiA.6<; too ( weak) to do this, so pledges given to one of low status 
are weak.
However, Hephaistos' weakness becomes evident only in case of Ares going 
off. If Ares stays and pays his debt, Hephaistos' weakness does not play any role, 
because he has no need to keep Poseidon bound. Therefore, 5eiXa>v first refers to 
Ares (as a "wretched" person) who will go off and then, as a result of Ares 
escape, to Hephaistos (as a "weak" person) who will not be able to keep 
Poseidon bound.
But what is it that makes Hephaistos reply in this way? In my opinion, this is 
the form of guarantee that Poseidon offers. Poseidon gives surety for a third party 
(Ares) and the surety he offers consists of Ares paying. So, it is Ares who must 
carry out the iyyi>T\. But, if Ares goes off, how can Hephaistos bind Poseidon to 
pay the debt? For this reason Hephaistos refuses this form of surety which 
Poseidon offers. Then Poseidon alters the form of his undertaking. He promises 
that he will pay himself, if Ares goes off and evades his debt. In responce to this 
second promise, Hephaistos releases Ares and Aphrodite.
This second promise is complementary to the first; the extra element here is 
Poseidon's promise that he will pay himself. This is what makes Hephaistos 
accept the guarantee. When Hephaistos refuses to accept the first guarantee by 
saying SeiXai xox 5eiXSv ye xod eyytoi eyyudtaa0ai, he has a reason for that
2 p<x%dypia: the penalty for having been taken in adultery, from |ioi%6q 'adulterer- and ctypeo) 'seize, 
take'.
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rejection; the reason was the form of the eyyhri which shifted the responsibility to 
Ares first and then to Hephaistos. But now Poseidon's second undertaking is 
accepted by Hephaistos who while in the first case said SeiXai xoi SeiX&v ye 
Kori eyyuai eyyu&aaOai in the sense that "pledges given on behalf of a worthless 
fellow to one of low status are worthless", now may think that dyaOat roi 
dyaOSv ye Kcd iyytiai iyyvdaoOai in the sense that "pledges given by good 
men on behalf of themselves are good to accept".
Let us turn now to line 352:7ifi)£ &v eyd) ae 56oij±i \izx 6c0ocv&xoiax Oeoicnv;
S&oijn means "put you in chains" and, as Merry and Riddell have properly said 
in their commentary on Homer's Odyssey, it must not be diluted to some such 
meaning as "keep a hold on you". Thus, according to line 352 we may suppose 
that a guarantor will be arrested by an accuser if an accused for whom he has 
stood surety does not carry out the provisions of the surety.
Therefore, the giving and receiving of sureties for a third party was risky. In
this spirit, probably, on the temple of Apollo at Delphi was inscribed the warning
"■Eyybry n&pa 5’ 'Disaster is close to pledging”, (cf. Epicharmos, fr.268).
* * *
PINDAR
A derivative of the word syy<)T| is found in Pindar Olympian 11; this is the 
verb eyyo&aopai at line 16,
Olympian 11 and Olympian 10 were both written for the victory of 
Agesidamos of Epizephyrian Locri in the boys' boxing contest at the Olympic^ 
Games of 476 B.C. These poems have been the subject of extremely 
controversial interpretation. Most scholars (except E.L. Bundy, Studia Plndarica 
I, The Eleventh Olympian Ode) believe that there is a relation between 0.11 and 
0.10. According to Scholia (Scholia O 11 inscr. b x$ auicb . . . t 6 k o v )  0.11 is 
the "interest" referred to in the poem of 0.10. That is why the Alexandrians
9
placed the Eleventh after the Tenth in their editions, because the word t 6ko£ in 
0.10  seemed to designate 0.11 as interest paid on a debt long overdue.
Modem scholars3 have tended to reverse this relationship, making the eleventh 
earlier than the tenth. They base their aiguments on the brevity of 0.11 and a 
couple of future tenses that appear in its final stanza. The brevity of the poem 
(0.11) would indicate that Pindar composed it at Olympia immediately after the 
victory (such miniatures as 0.11, 12 and 14, and P. 7 have been categorized as a 
special type of epinicion, sung at the place of victory during the festival of the 
games)4 and the future tenses would mean that Pindar will go to Western Locri 
sometime later and celebrate Hagesidamos' victory on a grander scale, as he 
eventually did with Olympian 10. In other words, they argue that 0.11 was 
written and performed at Olympia immediately after the victory and it contains 
the promise of a longer ode (0 .10) to follow, a promise kept after some delay.
But this interpretation has been rejected by Elroy L. Bundy in the first of his 
Stadia Pindarica. Bundy argued that the future tenses do not refer to anything 
outside the ode in which they occur. Bundy's argument is basically that the poem 
ought to be taken on its own merits, by which it must stand or fall.
The future tenses which occur in this ode are xeXaSfjoa) (14) and eyYodaopai 
(16); eyyudaopai: In this context when Pindar says eyYodaojiat '1 will 
guarantee" the good qualities of the Locrians, he means "I guarantee them now for 
the future". When we are promising or committing ourselves now to some future 
action, by a natural emphasis the verb of promise or committal is sometimes 
stated in the future tense.
3 L.R. Famell, Works o f Pindar, Vol.2, Critical Commentary, London, 1932; G.S. Conway, The Odes 
o f Pindar, London, 1972.
4 See, C.M. Bowra, Pindar, Oxford, 1964
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However, xeA.a5fjaa> does not mean "I am singing now”, as Bundy argued, but 
"I will sing" and it may refer outside its ode. KeXaSfiaco, then, may hint that he 
knew that he would be writing the second ode (0.10). Lines in both odes indicate 
that 0.11 was composed at an earlier date than 0.10  :
- O lym pian
14 xbopov £7ti oxetpdvcp xpuofcat; &,oda<;
6t5upeX.fl KeAaSfjoat,
15 Zecpupicov Aoxpfiv yeve&v dAiycov.
2v8a auyxa)p.dl;ocx’- iffo&oopca
|ir| p£v, <B Motaon, qwyb^evov axpaxbv 
PUS’ dneipaxov xo&ffiv 
dxp6oo<p6v xe xod aixpaxdv dqnl;e- 
aGoti. x6 ydp ep<pu£<; obx’ odOaw 
20 obx' epiPpopox A.6ovxe<; Sxc&A.d^aivx’ dv i^ 0o<;.
- Olympia 10
3 yA.uxb ydp afcxtj) p£A.o<; 6<peiA,a)v
e7nA.£A.a0\
7 §xa0ev ydp eaeXOcbv 6 p£M,cov xp6voq
8 ep6v xaxodaxwe Pa0i) xp£°S-
9 5pax; 5& XOaoci 8uvax6<; 6^eiav empojKpdv
x6 x o q -
Therefore, Pindar in 0.11 promises another ode (xeA,a8f|aa>) which will follow 
this one. He invites the Muses to go to Locri "£v8a  auyxa>pd!;ax’", "Go there 
and join the revels, Muses”. The laudator assures (eyyudaopon) the Muses that
11
among the Locrians they will be well received and understood; <poy6l;eivov points 
to the hospitality they will enjoy, and pf\x faieipaxov xcxXcav to the frequent 
experience their audience can be presumed to have had of enkomia.
Thus, the poet guarantees the Locrians' credentials to his listeners. 
’Eyyo&aopai is a powerful word which makes his promise stronger. It is as if he 
says that it will be worth while to compose a beautiful ode suited to the audience. 
Finally, he bases his guarantee on the opinion that an inborn nature cannot be 
changed.
* * *
HERODOTOS, L 196
There is another passage from Herodotos where two derivatives of the word 
eyyuTi are mentioned: eyyuTixfca) and eyyuTixd^.
exSofcvai 5£ xijv eoooxoQ duyax&pa 6xe<p PotiXono §xaoxo<; ot»x 
otiSfc &veo eyyuqx^co 6wiayay6a 0ai xiyv 7iap06vov npi&pevov, 
i&X eyya)T]xdt(; XP^V xaxaaxfiaavxa p£v auvoixfiaeiv atixf],
obxco 6c7idcyeo0ax. [Herod. I. 196, 3-4].
They are used in connection with the procedure of marriage as it took place in 
Babylonia and the Illyrian tribe of the Eneti. It is obvious that the procedure of 
marriage here was a procedure of purchase, since the bride was literally sold and 
the bridegroom bid and bought her. The father was not allowed to give his 
daughter in mairiage to a man of his choice.
However, the surprising thing here is that, although the mairiage was one by 
purchase, the presence of guarantors (eyyuqxdi;) was essential in order to 
guarantee that the bridegroom truly intended to keep the girl as his wife 
(oovoixeiv). Otherwise, the bridegroom could not take away the bride. The
12
guarantors were appointed by the bridegroom (&XX eyyDTfidu; xpfjv 
Kaxaaxfiaavxa). We are not told who might be the eyyuiixori, or what role they 
would play if the bridegroom failed to carry out his responsibilities.
* * *
HERODOTOS, VI. 57
Another example of the word eyyuTi occurs in Herodotos. Herodotos, in VI. 57 
of his history, relates the privileges and the rights which the kings had in Sparta.
According to Herodotos (VI. 57, 4-5) the kings by themselves judged only 
three kinds of case:
5iicric£eiv 5£  p o f tv o ix ;  xob<; P aaiA .£a< ; xooricSe j io f iv a -  T ia x p o tiy o o  x e  
n a p 0 & v o u  nfcpi, k<; x 6 v  iK v fc ex a i 5 x e iv f fjv  p t j  n e p  6  n a x i jp  a fcx fiv  
e y y u f |a n ,  koA 65aW  5 T p o o iig > y .i t6 p i.  koci fjv  x iq  0 e x 6 v  T iod5a 
n o x ^ e o S a i  e0^X.nf paaxA.£a>v e v a v x io v  T io i^ e a 0 a i.
M They have the whole decision of certain cases, which are these, and 
these only: when a maiden is left the heiress of her father's estate, and 
has not been betrothed by him to anyone, they decide who is to marry 
her, in all matters concerning the public highways they judge; and if a 
person wants to adopt a child, he must do it before the kings.”
Therefore, among the kinds of case which the kings judged were those 
concerning the marriage of a heiresses. If a father died leaving no sons but only 
one or more daughters, she was named 87iiicXTipo<;. ’EtiIkA.tipo^  means not that 
she was the heiress, but that she passed with the inheritance to the nearest male 
relative, whom she married in order to bear a son who would inherit the estate. A 
father, if he gave an only daughter in marriage, had to give her to the nearest 
relative or to an adopted son. If the father died without betrothing his only
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daughter, the nearest male relative could claim the hand of the daughter and the 
inheritance. If there were several claimants someone had to decide who had the 
right to her according to the law. To this procedure this sentence may refer 
(naxpohxoo xe nap0£voo n£pi, e<; x6v Ixvfcexai f\v p.f[ rcep 6 naxfip
afcxfiv eYT°^a Il)' We leam from Aristotle that the number of females so situated 
was very great at Sparta, [Arist. Polit. 1270a, 23-25: loxi 5£ xcd xcbv yovaixc&v 
axe56v xffe ndain; xd&P0^  n£vxc pepftv x& 56o, xffiv x’ CTnxXfipcov 
noXkfov yivopfcvcov, xod Side x6 npoficaq 5i56voa peyd&ai;.].
In Sparta this duty (to decide who is the nearest male relative to eidxXripoi;) 
was undertaken by the kings. In Athens, the same duty had been transferred from 
the ancient kings to the archon Eponymos.
However, as far as the eyyin^ is concerned, it is uncertain whether or not the 
eyyuT] was a precondition for a legal marriage, as it was in Athens, [details on 
this matter, see D.M. MacDowell, Spartan Law, (Edinburgh)1986, pp.77-82].
* * *
HERODOTOS, VI, 130
The word eyy6t] is also found in Herodotos VI, 130.2 and it is also used here 
in the context of marriage.
Agariste, the daughter of Kleisthenes of Sikyon, was to be given in marriage by 
her father to the best husband that he could find in the whole of Greece. A great 
number of men came to Sikyon as suitors and Kleisthenes had to chose one of 
them for his daughter's husband (Herod. VI, 126-130). He did so and gave his 
daughter as a wife to Megakles by saying: x$ 5£ 'Atoqifccovos Meyax>.£i eyyo6  
notfSa xfiv epfiv ’Ayapiaxriv v6poi<n xoicn ’A0T]vaia)v, '1 betroth my daughter,
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Agarista, to Megakles, the son of Alkmaeon, according to the law of Athens". 
Herodotos continues: <pap£voo 5& eyyoSaGocx MeyccxA.6o<; exexbparco 6 y&po<; 
0.exa8£vex, "when Megakies said that he accepted the engagement the marriage 
was ratified by Kleisthenes".
In this passage there is an agreement between Kleisthenes (the father of the 
bride) and Megakles (the bridegroom). The verbs used here are eyyuco (on the 
part of Kleisthenes) and eyy\)$o0<xi (on the part of Megakles). Therefore, a 
bride's father eyyx)$ xivi xfiv doyax&pa and a bridegroom eyyu&xcd xiva.
Furthermore, the fact that Kleisthenes does not say only "I betroth my daughter 
to Megakles" but he adds vdpoioi xotox ’AOqvcricov, "according to the Athenian 
law", implies two things: first that eyyfn] - the formula of betrothal- was a 
prerequisite, without which a marriage was not valid, because otherwise there 
would have been no point in mentioning Athenian law; and second that mairiage 
between an Athenian citizen and an alien woman was at that time (in the first half 
of the sixth century) recognized as legitimate by Attic Law, while by a law of 
Perikles in 451B.C. this was changed and a citizen could not marry an alien (Plut. 
Perikles 37,3).
* * *
AESCHYLOS EUMENIDES 898
Another instance of the word eyyuq is found in Aeschylos Eumenides 898: 
xod. pox 7ip6navxo£ eyybqv 0fjafl xP^voo;
"will you give me a security (will you guarantee) 
that this privilege shall last for all time?"
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The word eyybTi is used here in the sense of promise, suretyship. The verb 
eyybqv xiGepai is equivalent to eyyuqv TioietoQon and means "to give a pledge, 
to guarantee".
Let us see how the word functions here. After Orestes has been acquitted by 
the tribunal to which Athena chose to refer the conflict between Orestes and the 
Erinyes, it remains for Athena to restrain the Erinyes from carrying out their 
threats of destruction against Athens. Athena succeeds in this difficult task by 
offering them the consolation of a special cult in Athens. But the most difficult 
task for Athena was to persuade the Erinyes to accept her offer.
At first the Furies are blinded by pride and passion to Athena's offer, but 
Athena does not give up. The Furies repeat their maledictions ignoring Athena's 
words, but Athena continues to stimulate them by reccounting the honours which 
they will receive, if they agree with her.
The process of persuading is difficult but finally successful. At line 892 the 
chorus, through their leader, begin to speak in dialogue with Athena and ask: 
&vaoo’ ’AG&va, xiva \lz <pf£ SSpav;
"Queen Athena, what seat do you say shall be mine?”
This indicates that the chorus become more willing to discuss Athena's offer. 
At line 898 the chorus ask Athena if she will guarantee that they will keep the
honour for all time. Athena does not give a straight answer to this question but
answers by saying that her word is her bond. Her power makes her word to be her 
bond.
From this point of the play the chorus changes its attitude and replies:
6&2;£iv \l goncai;, real pe0taxap.on k6tox>
"You seem likely to persuade me, and I am shifting from my anger".
But what is it that finally makes the chorus accept Athena's offer? The lines 
898-9 (Xo. icon pox 7ip6aom:o<; eyytiqv Gfiajl xP^voo; /A8. ££eoxi 7&P I101 l11^
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X6yeiv 6t jj.f\ xeXft.) are the key lines which open the door for the agreement 
between Athena and the Furies. It is interesting to see how this agreement is built 
and how Athena solves the problem. Athena could deal with the Erinyes by force 
(Pia), if she wished, as it seems at lines 826-8:
K&yd) 71671018a  Zqvi, Kai xi Set Xtyziv;
Kort KA.fi5a<; oT5a 86paxo<; p6vq Qecov 
ev cp xepauvdc, eaxxv eaq>payiap6vo<;.
"I alone among the gods know the keys of the house 
where is sealed the lightning.”
But she has no need to do so,
&XV 068&V afrtoft Set (829)
"But there is no need of it".
She turns away from it to \6yo$  and TieiOtb,
oi) 8’ etiTtiOfu; ejiol (829)
"let me persuade you",
and
(&X ei p£v 6cyv6v eaxi aoi Ilei0ofc<; a 6pa<; (885)
"if you revere Persuasion's majesty", 
and through the %.6yo<; she promises and offers them the consolation of a 
special cult in Athens. Finally the eyyhq comes to ratify the treaty and a solution 
has been found. The route to the solution can be shown as follows:
A.6yo<;: offers, promises }
+ } (794-897) = >  iyybi] (898-9)
718106 }
Solution (900 ff.)
The eyyOT] is a prerequisite, without which the solution cannot be achieved.
Finally, from this appearance of the word eyy<)Ti we do not get any information 
about the eyytiq and its function as a legal term in Athens in the fifth century B.C. 
However, we may assume that Aeschylos, who used this word at this point of his 
play where a solution was required, had in his mind certain examples of Athenian 
practice where eyyOq had functioned in a positive and effective way for 
conclusion of an agreement.
* * *
SOPHOCLES OEDIPUS COLONEUS 94
Another derivative of the word eyytiq is found in Sophocles Oedipus 
Coloneus:
aq jie ia  8’ fgsiv  t6ov56 poi 7iapqyy(>a, (94) 
f\ aeiapdv f\ Ppovxfiv, f\ Ai6q a£A.a<;. (95)
At lines 84-110, Oedipus says that when he inquired at Delphi concerning his 
parentage, Apollo predicted the calamities; which awaited him; but also promised 
him rest, so soon as he should reach a seat of the Awful Goddesses. There he 
should close his troubled life and when his end was near, there should be a sign 
from the sky.
The verb napeyyo&Q) is often used as a military term and means "pass on" (the 
watchword or something like this), [e.g. Xen. Cyr.3.3,58 aGvOqpa napeyyofjaou; 
”Zei>£ aajxfip’”; Polyb.7.18,4 anefcSovxei; napeyyufrv eni xivai;; XsnA n  4.7,24 
Po6vxoov xffiv oxpaxiooxcbv "0<5&axxa, 0<5&axxa”f xod napeyywbvxcov].
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According to Jebb5 the word TtapTiyytia in this passage cannot mean "pledged", 
"promised" (Tjyyvdxo), but only "passed the watchword to me", i.e. "told me, as 
a sign".
The same verb (rcapEyyvdca)) is also used in Euripides Supplices 700, as a 
military term meaning "pass the word" (news, encouragement or commands): 
k&o pioov &7iavT0t oujiftai&^ttVTE^ axpaxdv 
Sxxexvav exxeIvovxo xod napT]yy<)a)v 
X£A.eoaji6v 6tXXf|X.oxcn abv rcoA f^l pofl.
*  *  *
EURIPIDES IPHIGENIAINAULIS 703.
The verb Eyyodca) (f\yyi>T\ae, past tense) is found in Euripides Iphigenia in 
Am Us 703.
After Klytaimnestra's desire to get information about her prospective son-in- 
law, Agamemnon speaks of Achilleus' ancestors. His mother is Thetis whom Zeus 
betrothed to Peleus, while her father (guardian) just gave her in marriage to him: 
Zeb<; fiyy{)T|aE xcd 5i5<DOs 6 xupxoq 703
The fact that in this incident Zeus is the person who performs the eyyf)T] and 
not the bride's guardian who just gives (SiScoo*) his daughter in marriage, must be 
regarded as an exceptional case within the framework of mythology and not as an 
example of an Athenian practice in the fifth century B.C.
At Athens the eyyf)T] (formal betrothal) of the bride by her guardian (xhpiog)6 
was a necessary preliminary to a legal marriage. The historic present (5x5000s)
5 R.C. Jebb, Sophocles: Oedipus Coloneus, (Cambridge) 1889, p. 27.
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following the past tense (i\yyi>r\az) marks that the betrothal preceded the 
wedding.
In the same context (of marriage) the word kocit]yy<)T]g’ is used in Euripides} 
Orestes 1079:
Y&pcDv 5& xffe p£v 5uo7i6xpou xfloS’ eo<p&X.Ti<; 
fjv ooi Kaxi]YY^TlG* exaipxav a&Poov.
*  *  *
THUCYDIDES III, 70.1
Thucydides IE, 69-85, gives a detailed account of the events at Kerkyra (the 
great stasis).
After the battle of Sybota the Korinthians kept two hundred and fifty 
Kerkyraian prisoners. These prisoners according to Thucydides (I 55.1) belonged 
to some of the most influential families in Kerkyra and thelforinthians planned to 
use these men in order to bring Keikyra over to their side.
After some time, in 427 B.C., the Korinthians arranged for the release of their 
Kerkyraian prisoners:
oi y&P Kepxupaxox eaxaoxa^ov, enexSfi oi aixp<&.a>xox fjXOov auxoi^ oi ex 
xoov xept ’EniSapvov vavpaxxa>v i>rc6 KopxvOxcov pe86vxe<;, x$ pfcv X6y(p
6 The natural Kupio; was the father, in case of his death or absence the duty devolved upon the brother
of the bride, or her grandfather on the father's side, (see Harrison, The Law ofALhens, Vol. I, pp 97ff.).
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6xx(XKoot(Dv TO&dcviCDv xoi<; npo^vot^ 5iTiYy,oTip.^voi, §py<p 5£ nsneiapfcvoi 
KopivOion; KfcpKopocv upoanoifiaai [Thuc. m, 70,1].
xov; Tipo^voiq: A proxenos was the "guest-friend" of a city-state. It was his 
duty to look after the interests of a foreign state in his own country, for example, 
the Spartan proxenos in Athens was an Athenian citizen.
Jowett thinks that xofc; npo^votq refers to Korinthian citizens who were the 
representatives of Kerkyra in Korinth.7 But it may also refer to the Korinthian 
proxenoi in Kerkyra (who were Kerkyraian citizens). If it is so, then, they (the 
Korinthian proxenoi in Kerkyra) probably raised a sum of money (800 talents 
according to Thucydides)8 which was required for ransoming the kerkyraian 
prisoners. So, the Kerkyraian prisoners were released with ransom on the security 
of their proxenoi and went back to Kerkyra.
The verb Sieyy^&cd in the passive voice means "to be bailed by anyone”.
* * *
As we have seen the word Ejytr[ and some of its derivatives are found at least 
eleven times in the Greek texts from Homer to Thucydides.
Four of them have occurred in the context of suretyship [Homer Od. 8.351/ 
Pindar O. 11.16/ Aeschylos Euttl 898/ Thucydides HI. 70.1]; another five in the 
context of marriage [Herodotos 1.196; VI.57, 130/ Euripides I.A  703; Orestes
\i _____________________________
|
7 B. Jowett, Thucydides II p.201.
8 For the amount of the money see T. Arnold, Thucydides II p.441.
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1079], and twice the word with nap- has the meaning of a military term 
[Sophocles OC 94/ Euripides Supp. 700].
* * *
Apart from the word eyyuri itself, there are some other instances of adjectives 
deriving from the word Eyytii], such as (pepfcyyuos, E%£yyx)o<;, 6cvEx£yyx)o<; and 
xHifcyyoo .^
The adjective <p£p6yyuo<; is found nine times: five times in Aeschylos, once in 
Sophocles, twice in Herodotos and once in Thucydides.
The quotations from Aeschylos are the following:
-xlv’ &vxxx6I;£x<; i<p5e; xxq IIpoxioo nx)A.ffiv 
xXfiOpcov A.u0£vxcov npooxaxexv ipcpfcyyoo^;
[Septem contra Thebas 395-6]
- dtvfip 5’ en auicp, xex ax6papy6<; eox* &yav, 
afttov xfcxaxxax kfjpa, IloXwpdvxou pta, 
qrepfeyyuov (ppoftpqpa npooxaxqptaq 
*Apx£]ix5o9 Euvoxaiai ax>v x' cxM.ox<; 0eov;.
[id. 447-450]
- x a i x$5e cpcoxi nfcjircE x6v qrepfcyyoov 
7i6A.£(D^  dtndpyExv xf]o5£ 5o6A.xov £uy6v.
[id. 470-1]
-  axfcyE x 5 £  n t i p y o s ,  x c r t  ntiA ,a<; f m p e y y t i o x ^
E(pap^ 6pEa0a povop^xoxax npoaxdxax .^
[id. 797-8]
- &va^ ’'A n o so v , ofo0a p&v x6 pfi &8xx£tv
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enei 5* Eiriaxoci, xod x6 pf[ dcpeketv p.<5c6e. 
o86vo£ 5£ noxetv eu qrepfeyyuov x6 c f6 v .
[Eumenides 85-7]
In Sophocles the adjective <pep6yyoo<; occurs in Elecira, 942: 
xi y&p xeXeOev; c&v eydb fEp&yyoo^;
It is also found in Herodotos, V 30.15 and VII 49.8:
- Ai>x6<; p&v bpiv o(> 9Epfcyyu6q eipi 56vapiv napaaxetv xoaabxriv <2kjxe 
xaxdtysiv dcexdvxcov xffiv xfiv x6tov e x 6 v x c o v  Nagicov
[Herod. V 30]
- ofixe y&p xf|<^  0aA.doaT|9 Eaxi Xipfiv xoao0xo<; ofcSapoOi, <b<; eyd> eixdi^a), 
6oxi<; syeipopfcvoo xe*pftvo<; 5e!;6pev6<; aeu xoOxo x6  vocoxixbv 
(pepfcyyoot; loxai 5xaacoaai xfo; v£a<;.
[id. VII49]
In Thucydides it occurs in VIII68, 4.1:
710A.6  x e  xp6<; x& Seivdc, £7i£ t5 fp i£p  x>nioxr[, q rcpE yyurfrcczT og  Etp&VTj.
The adjective (pEpfcyyooc, literally means "one who can give surety either for 
himself or for another", "guarantee-bringing" (<pep£yyoo<;<<p6peiv + eyyOrj) and 
generally "trusty”, "assuring", "responsible", "sufficient".
The adjective ex6yyx)o<; is found five times: once in Sophocles, three times in 
Euripides and once in Thucydides.
In Sophocles it occurs in Oedipus Coloneus, 284: 
dikX dooTiep IXaPet; x6v Ix^xt^v ex^yyvov, 
pboo jie x&xqrf&ocaae- 
hi Euripides, it is found in Medea, 387: 
xod 5f| xsOv&ar xi<; pe S^excci x6Xk;; 
xiq yf]v 6touA.ov xod 56pou<; cxcyy^01®^ 
i;6vo<; napaax<bv puaexon xof>p6v 56pag
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in Andromacha, 192:
efoi\ ffi ve&vi, x$ a exsYT&tP Z6yq>
7i8io08ia 671000© yvtioiqv voptpeupdxajv.
and in Phoenissae, 759:
x^v 56oiv 5’ cx^TTT>ov
xt\v 7ip6o08 Tioioo vfiv 87i* 8^65ok; spat*;.
Finally, it occurs in Thucydides III 46,1.1:
ouxouv xp l^ oftxe xofi 0avdcxou xfl ^Tipiqi ^ZCT7^<P niaxeuaavxa^ 
Xetpov pouZs^oaodai.. .
■Exfcyyooq (<lx8iv + cyyuTi) generally means "able to give a pledge”, "having 
a good security (eyyhri) to give", and so "trustworthy", "secure" (like 
(pepfcyyoot;), as inJl^.387,.4/i</rcw»il92, Phoen.159, Thuc. IH.46.
However, in Oedipus Coloneus 284, c%6yyi)ov means "having received a 
pledge" (it is the promise of 176-7); it takes the meaning of "one who holds a 
pledge given by another person".
In Phoenissae 759 it is connected with eyyurjon;, formal betrothal. But 
generally it is said of those who hold or are able to give sureties for their conduct. 
The adjective UTi^ yyuoc; is found three times: 
in Aeschylos Choephoroi 39: 
xpixcct xe x<j>v8’ 6veip6xflov 
08608V IXcckov fmfcyyuoi 
in Euripides Hecuba 1027: 
x6 yfcp fcxfcyyuov 
Alxgt xcd 0eoioiv ofc ^ujintxvei,
6X60piov 6Ai0piov kok6v , 
and in Herodotus V 71,7:
xoOxoix; fcviax&oi p£v oi Tipuxdvie^ xffiv vauxpftpcov, oX Tiep §vepov x6xe
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x&<; ’ASfivca;, fcxeyyfcouq nZfiv 0av&xou.
“YTifcyyuoi; means "one who is under surety". When it is said of persons, it 
means "having given surety", "liable to be called to account or punished”. When 
it is said of things, it means "legitimate”, usually connected with y<5cpo<; (yftpoc; 
bn^yyoot;) in contrast with Y<xpo£ 6v£y yuo<;.
Finally, the adjective fcvex^yyooq occurs only once, in Thucydides IV 
55,4,3: 6xoZp6xepox 5£ 81 ai>x6 xdu; p6xa S fjaav, xod ti6cv 5,xi xxvfiaeiav 
tpovxo 6papxf[aea0cci 5ia x6 xfjv yv6pr]v dvex^YYuov yeyevf\a0oci 
ex xffc Ttplv 6T]0eia(; xo$ xccxorcpayeiv.
'Avex^yyi)o<; is the opposite of exfcyyuo^ and means "unwarranted”.
PART II
THE ETTYH IN THE CONTEXT OF MARRIAGE
As a result of the fact that marriage was essential for the preservation of 
the otxoi,9 because it ensured the continuation of the family through legitimate 
children, and the preservation of its property through proper inheritance 
procedures, every Athenian man and woman was expected to be married. The 
fulfilment of the female role was marriage and motherhood, while a man could 
choose not to marry. 10
In many modem societies manage is brought into being by the consent of a man 
and a woman to live together as husband and wife. Both, man and woman, decide 
to join their lives, to share the same house and bed, in order to create a family. 
The act of living together is called marriage, the man is then qualified by the word 
husband; the woman by the word wife. This is regarded as a valid marriage, when 
both man and woman are the parties to the contract of marriage.
Did the same happen in Athens in the period of the orators? Certainly not. In 
Athens the woman's consent was not required since she was not a party to the 
contract but an object. She was given in marriage by her x\>pio<; through eyybTi or 
by £7n5iKocala. As far as the terminology of the institution of marriage is 
concerned, we leam from Aristotle that &v6vopov y&p yovaiKbc; xai &v5p6<;
"the union (syzeuxis) of a man and a woman is without name” [Politics:
9 For the different senses of the word oiXD^ see D.M.MacDowell, The oikcx; in Athenian Law", CQ 
39, 1989,10-21, espec. 15-16.
10 See Dem.44.10,47.38; MacDowell, Law p.86.
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1253b 9-10]. So there is not a single word for marriage. The words ydcpo<; and 
oovoxxexv are used in the context of marriage but they do not express the full 
sense of the institution as a well-defined legal, religious, or social institution; for 
y<5cpo<; means "the wedding” and ouvoxxexv means simply ”to live together", "to 
cohabit".
But what constituted marriage in Athens? Was there a single element to make a 
union into a valid marriage? Or, in other words, by what means did the Athenian 
community recognize that the "living together" (ouvoxxexv) of a man and a 
woman had validity?
The essential element of marriage during the classical period was the eyybri, 
(the "promising" or "pledging" of the bride).11 The verb eyyootv has the basic 
meaning "to pledge" or to "promise" with an etymological connection to a gesture 
involving the hand or hands, either pledging by putting something into the hand of 
someone or promising with a handshake. The father's act then at the eyyur] was 
to pledge or engage (eyyudv) his daughter to the bridegroom as wife, to promise 
her in marriage.
It is in Herodotus VI, 130 that we find for the first time in connection with 
marriage the term eyyfui with the verbs in active and middle forms. Agariste, the 
daughter of Kleisthenes of Sikyon, was to be given in marriage by her father to 
the best husband that he could find in the whole of Greece. A great number of 
men came to Sikyon as suitors and Kleisthenes had to choose one of them for his 
daughter's husband. He did so and gave her as a wife to Megakles by saying:
5£ ’AAxji6o)vo<; MeyaxA.6x eyyi)<& TiatSa xffv £pi)v ’AyapxaxTiv vdpoxax xotax 
’A0T]vaxoov- "I betroth my daughter, Agarista, to Megakles, the son of Alcmaeon, 
according to the law of Athens". Herodotus continues: (papfcvoo 5£ ayyuSaSopx
11 aaSttoaoxa was possible instead under certain circumstances.
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M£yoiKX.£o<; eKextipooio 6 y&po<; KA.£xa86v£i- "when Megakles said that he 
accepted the engagement the marriage was ratified for Kleisthenes”.
In this passage there is an agreement between Kleisthenes (the father of the 
bride) and Megakles (the bridgroom). The verbs used here are eyyoS (on the part 
of Kleisthenes) and eyyodaeax (on the part of Megakles). Therefore, a bride's 
father eyyu^ fc xxvx xi)v 8\)yax£pa and a bridgroom eyyuaxoci xiva. The verb 
Eyyo&co is used in the active voice to describe the action of the bride's xbpxoi;, 
who pledges to give her in marriage; in the middle voice by the bridegroom, who 
accepts the pledge; and it is also used in the passive voice to denote the woman, 
(Isai.VI,14 ndvo nd&ax aovoxxexv, eyyuqdetoav xax& x6v v6pov 
£7n8ncaa8eiaav).
Furthermore, the fact that Kleisthenes does not say only "I betroth my daughter 
to Megakles" but he adds "v6poxox xoxox ’AQrivodcov”- "according to the 
Athenian law”, implies two things: first that ayyori - the formula of betrothal- was 
a prerequisite, without which a marriage was not valid in Athens, because 
otherwise there would have been no point in mentioning Athenian law; and second 
that marriage between an Athenian citizen and an alien woman was at that time (in 
the first half of the sixth century) recognized as legitimate by Attic law, while by 
a law of Perikles in 451BC this was changed and a citizen could not marry an 
alien (Plut. Perikles 37,3).
But who had the right to give a woman in marriage through the act called 
ayyhq? Since the law refused to see women as independent beings, their position 
in it made them at all times dependent on men as their masters, protectors and 
representatives. A woman's status in Athenian law is indicated by the long 
supervision by a guardian, her xtipxoc. As Harrison observes: "there can be no 
doubt that a woman remained under some sort of tutelage during the whole of her 
life. She could not enter into any but the most trifling contract, she could not
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engage her own hand in marriage, and she could not plead her own case in court. 
In all these relations action was taken on her behalf by her xupio<;, and this was 
so during her whole life".12 In Demosthenes 44 Against Leockares 49: xod 6 
v6po<; xafixa jiapxopet A,6y<DV, "i\v &v eyyufiafl rcaxfip f| &8eX<p6<; f| mriinos, 
e x  x a u x T n ;  eTvai naTSa^ yvqaioo^", and in 46 Against Stephanas U 18: *Hv &v 
eyY'ofiayi erci Sixaiou; S&papxa eTvai f[ naxfip f| &5eA.q>6<; bjiondcxcop f| 
7id7i7io(; 6 np6<; naxp6<;, ex xai>XT|£ eTvai 7iai5a^ yvqcyioi)^, a law is quoted to 
show who has the right to give a woman in marriage. The categories of male 
relatives capable of giving a woman in marriage by eyybq are:
Father,
homopatric brother, 
and grandfather on the father's side. 
The last clause of the law (Dem. 46.18) is difficult to interpret:
e&v 5£ pqS eii; xobxcov, e&v p £ v  £7iixXTip6<; tk ;  
x6v x tip io v  ixexv , e&v 5£ \ii\ fj, 5xq> 6tv emxpfciirn, 
xoOxov x 6 p io v  eTvai.
"If there are none of these, if the woman is an epikleros 
(heiress) her x6pio<; shall have her, if she is not an epikleros, 
he shall be her x'Opiot; to whom (she?-her xupio<;?) has 
committed (herself?-her?)'\
In case there are none of these (father, homopatric brother, paternal 
grandfather) and she is an epikleros, then her xbpio^ will be the man who will 
marry her by the process of epidikasia. But in case she is not an epikleros, then 
5x<p &v Ercixpfciyfl, xofixov x*6piov eTvai. Harrison summarises the views of 
earlier authors and gives three different meanings which have been suggested for
12 AR. W. Harrison, The Law o f Athens: The Family and Property, (Oxford 1968) p. 108.
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the sentence 5xqp 6cv e7tixp6\|rn : either "he to whom she has committed herself', 
or "he to whom the archon has committed her", or "he to whom her father has 
committed her" shall be her master.13 The problem here is the subject of the verb 
emxp£r|rn. Since the woman would not have been allowed to choose her own 
xbpxoi;, Harrison assumes that a word has dropped out before ercixp£\|rxi and this 
word is probably 6 aaxfjp which will stand as the subject of ercixp6i|rn and the 
sentence takes the meaning "he to inborn her father has committed her shall be her 
master". However, there is a number of passages (Dem. 36.8, 28-30; 57.41; Plut. 
Perikles 24) which show that in some cases a woman was given in marriage by 
eyybri by her previous husband acting as her xbpxo^. The most famous case is 
that of Demosthenes' mother. Her husband, on his deathbed, engaged her to his 
friend Aphobos.14
The law quoted by Demosthenes (46.18) does not concern only the person who 
has the right to give a woman in marriage by eyytiq, but also qualifies the 
offspring of such a union as legitimate (yvf|aioi). Whether this law is one on 
marriage by eyybq or a law on legitimacy is not very clear. But it is clear enough 
to demonstrate that there is an important relationship between eyybq and 
legitimacy of children. To the question who has the right to give a woman in 
marriage the answer is: her xtipiot;- whoever is her xbpxo<;.
Therefore, the eyyuq was a contract of marriage concluded with the suitor not 
by the woman, but by her xtipxo^- father, brother or nearest male relative. It was a 
commitment rather between two domestic households, two ofxoi, than between 
two individuals, a man and a woman. The bride was the passive object of this 
contract and it was not legally necessary for her to be present or to consent to
13 Harrison,op.cit, 20.
14 Dem. 27 Aphobos 15; 1% Aphobos IT 15-16; 29 Aphobos HI43.
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it.15 The verb eyyu<B is used in the passive voice to denote the woman, since she 
is not a contracting party but the object of the agreement. As Sealey remarks: "an 
Athenian woman did not marry, she was given in marriage".16
The eyyuq resulted in the woman's becoming a yovfi eyyoTixfi- a pledged or 
promised woman (examples of the use of the term can be found in Isai. 3.8; 5.27; 
Dem.40.26; etc.). The eyyhq was a necessary step towards a full marriage but 
not constituting a marriage by itself. It did not complete the marriage; it needed to 
be followed by SkSook;. The eyyfcq was a necessary element in marriage, but not 
its sufficient condition. If it was not followed by cohabitation between the woman 
and her husband it had no effect. The case of Demosthenes' mother and sister is 
the best example to illuminate this point.
Demosthenes, the father of the orator, left at his death a considerable estate 
and a widow with two children, a son (the orator) aged seven, and a daughter aged 
five. By his will he appointed as guardians of his children Aphobos and 
Demophon (nephews of his) and Therippides, an old friend. At his deathbed he 
engaged his wife to Aphobos and his daughter to Demophon; so Aphobos should 
marry the widow and Demophon should marry the daughter when she came to 
marriageable age, that is, at least in nine years' time on reaching maturity. 
Although the eyyhq took place, neither of these marriages was ever consummated 
and the eyyoq by itself provoked no legal consequences. Therefore, from the 
example of Demosthenes' family, it seems that the eyyhq was simply a non­
binding betrothal which neither created the marital state nor required a formal 
dissolution.
15 Harrison, op.cit 21; Macdowell, Law, 86.
16 R. Sealey, Women and Law in Classical Greece, 1990, p.25.
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Another example, where the eyyuTi did not lead into marriage, comes from 
Isaios 6 On the estate o f Phibktemon 22-24. Euktemon arranged a contract of 
marriage (eyyuri) with Demokrates of Aphidna in order to take the latter's sister 
in marriage. Euklemon's purpose was to force his son to allow the recognition of a 
prostitute's sons as Euktemon's own legitimate sons. Finally, Philoktemon, the son 
of Euktemon, gave in and agreed with his father for the children's entering into the 
phratry. Then Euktemon who had succeeded in his goal, simply "gave up the 
woman"- dtrcqMfryq xfjq yuvcnxb^, (section 24). We can then assume that if it 
was difficult for Euktemon to dispose of the eyyuqxfi yuvfi or legal actions were 
brought against him in order to enforce him to complete the eyyuri with 2x5ooig 
and y&po<;, then probably he would have been more careful in binding himself to 
such a contract, since his initial aim was not to marry the woman, even though he 
engaged himself to her. Furthermore, considering the case of Demosthenes’ 
mother and sister, we can also note a few points in the form of a hypothesis: if 
there had been a way in which the mother or sister of Demosthenes could enforce 
the promise or pledge (the eyyuT]) through a legal action, they would have 
probably acted so. But no indication is given by Demosthenes that such a means 
really existed or that for the nullification of the eyyuT] a sort of divorce was 
required.
Therefore, we cannot regard eyyuq as in itself constituting a marriage. 
’'EkSogk; after eyyfcq was required to make a full marriage, since from that point 
(§x5ooi<;) the "living together" (ouvoixeiv) of the couple started. ’Eyyuq and 
gxSoou; usually were simultaneous acts but sometimes there was an interval of 
time between them, when it was needed, and the woman's entry into the house of 
her husband occurred whenever it was mutually convenient.17 hi very general
17 MacDowell, Law, 86.
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terms, as MacDowell observes, the legal difference between eyy\)r[ and y&po^ or 
Ix5oox<; was that kyyi>T\ was making a contract and y6cpo£ was carrying it out.18
So eyyuTi was brought to fulfil ment by thcSoou;. "ExSooxi; is the act of 
transferring the woman to the bridegroom's house after having been given in 
marriage to the bridegroom by her xbpxoi; through the act called eyyuT]. 
’ExSxSdvax is the verb which describes the act of "ExSooxq and is used of the 
xbpxog of the woman, and £x5oxo<; or ExSsSopfcvq are the words used of the 
woman who is given - transferred - to the bridegroom's house. A woman through 
the act of becomes a yuvfi eYyoqxfi and through the act of IkSoctk; she 
becomes a yuvij yapexf|. And while syybii was the first step and essential 
element towards a full marriage, the second step, after eyy<)T], which converted an 
eyyuTixfi into a yapexfi or ex5e5oji£vq, was the Ihc8oox<; and ydpo^.
Therefore, it was the factual living together (ouvoxxexv) of the pair as husband 
and wife after eyybT] and ex8oox<; that was required to make a marriage a 
complete and legally valid marriage.
Some passages from the orators, where eyyufrv and ex8xS6vai are very 
closely conjoined, have led Erdman19 to ai^ue that eyyuT] is not a simple betrothal 
but marriage itself. These passages are the following:
1. Isaios 3.70: oxe 5’ fiyyua xai e^eSxSoo 6 wEv8xo<; xfjv yuvaxxa . . .
2. Isaios 8.14: xxva<; 5’ exS£vax x& nepi xf^ v IxSoaxv xffe p.T|Xp6<; avdyxT];
xoix; eyYuqaap^voxx; xai xoix; exexvoxc; Tiapdvxa; 5xe fiYyoc&vxo.
3. Isaios 8.29: Sl<; ex8o0exoav, 8i<; EyyuqOExaav.
4. Dem. 57.41: £7ixxA.f|poo 8£ xXqpovopfiaa^ Exmdpoo, xf[v jiqx6pa Pou^q-
18 MacDowell, law, 86; see also S.C.Todd The Shape o f Athenian Law (1993) 210-15.
19 W. Erdmann, "Die Ehe im alten Griechenland", Munchener Beitrage Zur PapyrusForschung und 
antiken Rechtsgeschichte, 1934, p.233.
0ei<; ex5oOvai nelQei kaperv afcxfiv ©ooxpixov x6v Tiaxfcpa 
x6v £ji6v, 6v0’ £aoxo$ yv6pipov, x a i eyyudxai 6 xiaxfip xt)v 
p.T]x£pa xf|v 8p.f|v nap6t xofi 6c5eXcpoft aoxffe TipoKp&xotx;.. .
As it seems from the examples above there are cases where eyytn] and 
§k5oox<; occurred within a short period. Yet there is at least one case (the case of 
Demosthenes' sister) where the eyyorj took place long time (at least nine years) 
before the expected IxSoou;. If there was not the case of Demosthenes' sister it 
would seem that eyy&Ti and £x5o(n<; were very closely tied together, "two phases 
of the same act", as Erdman argued, and that eyy^T] and £k5ooi<; took place 
simultaneously, the same day and time. But the case of Demosthenes' sister 
shows that it was possible for the ey y'Ot] to precede the gxSoau;; the latter could 
follow the former even after many years. So it becomes clear that there could be 
an interval of time between Eyyfrq and t-xSoou; or y&jiot;. In addition, the same 
case shows that these two acts (eyyun - £x5ocn<;) were in principle distinct. 
Probably, when there was not a particular reason for these two acts to be 
distinguished, then they would take place within a short period, and this seems to 
be the most common practice.
The eyy^T] was an oral contract made between the woman's xtipioq and the 
bridegroom, and because of the absence of any form of registration the existence 
of an eyyuT] was not easy to prove or disprove. Not only the consent of the 
woman, who was to be married, was not required but also her presence at the time 
of the contract was not necessary. So, her xuproi; and the bridegroom were the 
only parties without which the contract could not be concluded.
However in many cases, where the eyyf)T] is mentioned, witnesses appear very 
often to play their own role. It is true that in all these cases witnesses are called to 
prove that the contract really took place. So Harrison recognizes that it was 
customary for both parties to bring their own witnesses to the transaction but he
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assumes that they were needed not to validate the act of the eyyuq but to prove, 
if the need arose that the eyyuT] had taken place.
That witnesses were necessary rather to prove a marriage than to give 
validation to it becomes clear from Dem. 30.21:
pfl y&p 5xi iipbq xofcxov xoiofixov 5vxa, &Xk’ o(>8£ np6<; 8&Xov o55’ &v eT<; 
ou56va xoxofcxov auv&M.aYpa noiotyievog fcpapxtipax; &v 2npal;ev 
xffiv xoiotixcov Svexa xai noiotyiev xai xoix; &vaYxaioxdcxoo<;
xapaxakofyiev, 5xi 06 xdpepyov, tOOC dt5eXq>6v xai OuYax^ poov Pxoo£ 
eYXeipi^opev, bafcp <dv xai; 6ca<paXeia<; pdfaaxa axorcofyiev.
Most likely family and friends were present at the undertaking of the 8YY‘ut1>
and witnesses derived from these two categories. Although witnesses were not
necessary for giving validation to the act of e y Y ^  the absence of them was used
in court to argue that a woman had not been given in marriage by eyY^ H* Not only
the entire absence of witnesses was used as a proof against the existence of the
eyy^1!, but sometimes even the number of them counted at proving the
and when the number was very small it counted negatively. So, when the speaker
of Isaios (3.29) is trying to prove that his uncle Pyrros was not married to Phile's
mother by eYY^ Ti, one °f  the arguments he uses is that when the act of the alleged
8YY^n took place (as Nikodemos claims), Nikodemos had only one witness,
although he was the contracting party of the bride's side: xai pdcpxupdci; Ye
noiXXfy  T iX eiou^ e ix b i;  fjv  x 6 v  eyY U & vxa r c a p a x o & e iv  f | x 6 v  e y Y w h p e v o v  x f |v
xoxauxTjv. This sentence shows that the x6pxo<; of a woman, who was given in
marriage by him through iyyx>T\y was or at least should be more interested in the
presence of witnesses (the more, the better) than the bridegroom.
* * *
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The dowry was not obligatory at Athens and it was a matter of custom rather 
than a legal requirement. The history of this institution in Athens is not very clear. 
It is probably a practice introduced after the time of Solon. In Homer we find the 
exchange of gifts between the bride's father and the bridegroom. These gifts 
called ISva were given to the bride's father by the bridegroom but they were 
requited by gifts - peiXia - from the bride's father to the bridegroom. These gifts 
were a component of a marriage in the heroic age, as the dowry was in Athens in 
the period of the orators. But they were not the same thing. As Harrison observes: 
* the ISva^were simply gifts while a dowry was rather a fund or an
estate created by the bride's relatives to give her as it were a stake in the otxot; to 
which she is by the marriage transferred*:20
Although the dowry was not obligatory at Athens, as it seems from some cases 
where men married women by eyytiq without a dowry [see Lys.19.14-15; Is.2.5; 
Dem.40.25-26], it was the social and moral, though not legal, responsibility of a 
xupioi; of a woman to give dowry with her to the prospective husband and it was 
generally accompanied the bride on her marriage, as it seems from several cases 
mentioned by the orators [see Lys.16.10, 32.6; Is.5.27, 10.19; Dem.27.17, 28.15, 
30.19f, 40.59, 41.5-6,26, 42.27, 45.28, 59.7-8,50-52,113]. But it does not seem 
from these cases that the fixing of the dowry was a normal component of the 
marriage. In spite of the fact that dowry was not an essential ingredient for a valid 
marriage, the absence of it could be used sometimes in court as evidence that no 
marriage by eyyfcq had taken place [Is. 3.8-9, 28-29, 35-39, 78].
The grantor of the dowry was the woman's xupio^ who had also given her in 
marriage by eyyuq. When the eyytiq took place, it was the natural moment for the
20 Harrison (1968) 45; see also S. C. Todd, The Shape o f Jitheman Law, pp 215-16.
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bestowal of the dowry.21 The woman's xupxot; either gave the dowry to the 
bridegroom at that point or, if not so, an agreement on the dowry was made by 
both parties (6poXoyxa 7ipoxx6<;). Sometimes a dowry was agreed upon at the 
eyyoT], but was not handed over at the time or was only handed over in part, as a 
passage from Demosthenes indicates:
6xi zi\v npoiK oi> Kopaofyievo<; &7iocacxv, 
&XX i)7ioA.£i<p0£ia<&v Spaxpffiv xai bpokoyTiOeiot&v dtno^apeiv 6xav
nok-ueuKTOt; &7io0dcvn [Dem. 41.5].
Another passage from Demosthenes indicates that witnesses were required at 
the procedure of bestowing the dowry:
xaxxox xq> xofi0’ ftp&v ttxgxov, 6<; 
xaXdvxou xffc xpoxx6<; obory; ftveu papxtipaw ’Ovfixcop xod TxpoxpdxTy; 
’A<p6p<p xogouxov apyupxov eve%£ipioav; [Dem. 30.20].
Their role probably would be to provide proof of the act of the bestowing the 
dowry rather than to give validity to it. They would also be the same witnesses 
who attended the act of the e y y s i n c e  the eyyxuy and the bestowal or the 
agreement of the dowry were simultaneous acts [see, Dem.41.6: p<5cpxx)pa<; 
iiap£i;opocx xoxx; Tiapayavopfcvoxx; 6x’ f[yyha pox noA.6£X)xxo<; xfjv 0oyax£p’ 
£iti xcxxapdxovxa pvau;.].
A dowry was usually in the form of cash [Lys.16.10: 8x>o p&v 6c8£X(p&<; 
e!;6Sa>xa £7ix5oi)(; xpx&xovxa pvcfc£ exaxfcpQt.] and when it was a house or 
something else except money, then it had to be valued in the presence of 
witnesses [Dem.45.28: xod upoxxot £itxSx8a>px ’ApxxnTin xd^avxov p£v x6 ex 
Il£7iapf|0ox), xdXavxov 8£ x6 aux60£v, ovvoxxxav £xax6v pvc&v] because only
21 Men. Dyskolos 842-7.
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what was included in the valuation was legally a dowry [Is.3.35: obx gl;eaxx 
7ip6^aa8cn xq> 86vxx 6 jj.fi ev Tipoxxl xxpfiaai; IScoxev].
Though the dowry was given for the benefit of the wife, it did not belong to her, 
it merely went with her. The word for bestowing a dowry was £7n5x56vax which 
very often is followed by the bride in the dative [see, Lys.16.10: £7tx8ob<; 
xpx&xovxa exaxfcpgc ; Is.2.5: xfjv Iotjv Tipoxxa £tuS6vxei; fJvTiEp
xod xfi apeaPux^ pQt &SsX.<pfl eti&Sojiev ; Dem.45.28: xai Tipoxxa ETnSxScopx 
’ApxxTiTifl xd&avxov ]. The bestowal of a dowry could also be expressed by 
phrases like Tipoxxa k n  abxfl 8i8coax (Dem.59.50) or IXaPev ETii xfi 6t8eXcpfl 
Tipotxa (Js.2.5). These phrases, where the meaning of the preposition with the 
dative indicating the bride is "for the bride”, have inclined Harrison to suggest 
that in this context (of the dowry) the simple dative of the bride with the verb 
£71x8x86vox means rather "for the woman” than "to the woman".22 Another 
passage from Demosthenes comes to indicate this sense of £7ixSxS6vax used in the 
context of dowry, as it is distinguished from the verb 8x86vox, in the same 
passage, in order to express two different things:
TdtSe SxfcOexo IlaoicDv ’Axotpveb^* SxScopx xfiv spauxofi yovaixa ’Apxxtititiv 
<Dopjii(Dvx, xod Tipoxxa emSxScopx ’ApxxTiTifl xd&avxov p£v x6 ex IlETiapfiQox), 
xdXavxov S£ x6 a6x60£v, auvoxxxav Exaxbv pvcov, 0Epa7iaiva£ xa i x& 
Xpuaia, xod x&M.a 5aa Eaxiv auxfl iv8ov, &7iavxa xafixa ’ApxxTiTifl SxScopx.
[Dem. 45.28]
This is a very good example to show the difference between SxScopx xxvx xx 
(when xxvx refers to the bride and xx is the object other than the dowry, and then it 
means ”I give something to the bride") and etixSxSgojix xxvx apoxxa (xxvx refers 
again to the bride and Tipoxxa is the object which is given).The difference is that
22 Harrison (1968)49.
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&Tiavxa xafixa 'ApxiTtTifl 5i5cojii means "I give all of them to Archippe (to have 
them personally)", while T ip o x x a  eTix5x8a)px ’ApxxTiTifl seems to mean "I give 
dowry for Archippe, on the behalf of her" and it is probably equivalent to eid 
’ApxxTiTin SxScopx. Otherwise, if there was not a difference between these two 
expressions, there would have been no point in using both of them at the same 
time, if Pasion did not want to say two different things. Another point which must 
be noted here is that on the one hand T ip o x x a ,  the object of emSxSoopx, includes 
things which are valued, on the other hand &Tiavxa xafixa, the object of 5x5copx, 
include things not valued. So, we have the pairs:
e7u5x5©|ix — Tipoxxa = valued objects and money,
5i5copx — other objects = not valued.
Both verbs, emSiScopx and SxSoopx have the same indirect object, Archippe, 
who was to take only what was not actually Tipoxxa, and merely to carry the 
npoxxa with her into the new household which she was entering.
And though the husband is described as xupxo<; of the dowry during the 
continuance of the union [Dem.42.27: xatixfl xpfcros <pqoiv 6(p£tt.ea0ax 
OaxvxnTiog xfiv Tipoxxa, ?j<; oi v6pox xupxov xofixov TioxoOaxv] and could use 
the income for the maintenance of the house, he was bound to return it or its value 
on the wife's death or divorce [Dem. 59.52: xax& x6v v6pov xeXsfiex, e&v 
&TiOTi£p.Ti,Q xfiv ynvaxxa, 6ctio5x56vox xf^ v Tipoxxa]. On the ending of the union 
the dowry passed back to the original xtipxoc, of the woman with her, if divorce 
was the reason of the ending, and her xupxot; could arrange a new marriage by 
eyybTi for her, giving the same dowiy. If death of the woman was the reason of 
the ending of the union, the dowry again went back to her original xbpxo<;, apart 
from the case when she had a son (or sons) of that marriage living, to whom the 
dowry went. The dowry may be regarded as a kind of protection of the woman. It
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intended to protect her interests within the marriage and it was the means of 
discouraging divorce on the part of the husband [see, Is.3.35].
* * ate
Let us examine briefly a case which will shed light on the significance of the 
for a union of a man and a woman and the consequences of that union on 
their children. This case comes from Isaios, or.3 On the Estate o f Pyrros.
The speaker is the son of Pyrros' sister. Before his death Pyrros had adopted 
the speaker's brother, named Endios, who inherited the estate and possessed it for 
twenty years without opposition. When he died, since he had not produced heirs 
for the estate, the property was claimed by his mother, Pyrros' sister, represented 
by the speaker. At the same time another claimant appeared, named Xenokles, 
acting on behalf of his wife Phile, the alleged legitimate daughter of Pyrros. The 
speaker maintained that Phile was not legitimate and therefore she had no place in 
the anchisteia', consequently she could not inherit the estate as the epikleros of it.
Although the title of this speech is "On the Estate o f Pyrros", the case itself 
concerns a charge of false testimony against Phile's maternal uncle, Nikodemos. 
His testimony was that he ''entrusted'' his sister to Pyrros, and so the union of 
Pyrros with Nikodemos' sister was legal, she was Pyrros' wife and the bearer of 
legitimate heirs to his estate.
The concern of the speaker in this speech is to show that this testimony was 
false, that eYY^ H never took place and Nikodemos' sister was not legally married 
to Pyrros and so Phile was not the legitimate daughter of Pyrros. If Phile was to 
inherit the estate of Pyrros, she had to be his legitimate daughter, to be his 
legitimate daughter, it meant that she had to be the offspring of the valid marriage
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between Pyrros and Nikodemos' sister, this marriage would be valid only in case 
it was based on the act of eyytiTi between Pyrros and Nikodemos, the xtipios of 
the alleged wife of Pyrros. Therefore, if the speaker managed to prove that eyybq 
never took place, then automatically he would prove that Phile was not to have 
any claims to the estate of Pyrros, since she would not be his legitimate daughter. 
The speaker uses primarily arguments from probability intending to convince the 
jury how unlikely it was that Nikodemos ever so entrusted his sister or that 
Pyrros ever received her. It is not my intention, at least at the moment, to examine 
all the arguments in this speech, but I should notice that the two crucial points on 
which the prosecutor concentrates are the witnesses and the dowry.
Although these two (witnesses and dowry) were not required by a law to be 
obligatory components of the eyytiq, the absence of these two is used here by the 
prosecutor (in court) to strengthen his arguments or even to prove by itself that the 
eyybq never happened.
Therefore, as it seems also from the case of Pyrros, according to Athenian law 
the eyybq was the necessary condition of a valid marriage (except in the case of 
an etukX.tipo(;). And it was on the existence and propriety of this procedure that 
the most important effect of marriage, the legitimacy of children, depended.
The connection between the eyytiq and the legitimacy of children is clear in the 
law quoted in Demosthenes' speeches, 44 Against Leochares 49 and 46 Against 
Stephanos II 18, [see also Hyper. 3.16]. So, according to the law yvfioxoq 
(legitimate) is that child who was bom from a yuvfj eyyuqxf|. And a yuvfi is 
"pledged” and given in marriage for the very specific purpose of procreating 
legitimate children:
eyyuffi rcaiScov kn &p6x<p yvqoicov
xfiv Ouyax^pa
"I pledge this woman to you
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for the purpose of the cultivation of legitimate children".
[Men. Dyskobs 842-3]
The son of Athenian parents was presented first to the phratry and later to the 
deme. On each occasion the father swore an oath. Several forensic speeches 
mention the oath, sworn by the father on presenting his son to his phratry, the 
content of which seems to be that the son was bom to him by a woman who was a 
citizen (&oxf]) and married to him under a contract of eyyOT].
* Is. 8.19: 6 xe naxfip fipffiv, erceidfi eyevdpeGa, ei<; xoix; cppdxepa<; fip&;
siafiyayev, dpdaai; xax& xoix; vdpoix; xoix; xexp£vou<; fj pfiv 
el; dtaxffc xod eyyuTixfv; yuvaixdi; eiadcyexv.
* Dem. 57.54: 6tXK& pfiv 6 naxfip cr6x6<; dpdaa<; xdv vdpipov xov;
ipp&xepaiv opxov eiaqyay6v pe, dcaxdv el; dcaxffe eyyuTixffe 
ai>x$ yeyevTjpfcvov eiddx; xod xaflxa pepapxdprixon.
* Dem. 59.60: rcpoxo&ofcvxoa auxdv oi yevvf[xai 7ipd<; x<j> diaxxrycfl dpdoax
xaQ’ iep&v xeXeioov i^  pf[v vopi^eiv etvai ai>xcp oidv el; 
dcaxf|<; yuvaixd<; xa i eyy\)Tjxf[<; xaxdc x6v vdpov.
However, two texts pG II 2, 1237 11.109-11, and Is.7.16] indicate that the 
wording of the oath could differ.
The inscription, which states the rules adopted by the phratry of the Dekeleieis 
early in the fourth century, reads at lines 109-11:
6pxo<; papxtipcov eni xfl eiaaycoyei xcov TiaidcDV
Mapxupfi) 6v eiadcyei eaux$ bdv etvai
xofixov yvfjaiov ey yapexf]^.
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Thus, we leam from this that when a father introduced his son to the phratry, 
his witnesses should swear that the son was yvfjoio<; and bom of a woman who 
was yajiExfj.23
The other text is from the seventh speech of Isaios, On the Estate o f 
ApoUodoros, where the speaker says that Apollodoros adopted and presented him 
to his genos and phratry for admission. In section 16 he mentions the law 
according to which one introduces his bom son or an adoptive son to the phratry; 
for both cases the law is the same:
£oxi 5’ aoxou; v6po<; 6 aux6<;, e&v x£ xxva <puoei yeyov6xa eia&yfl xi£ 
edv xe aoiT]x6vf E7ivxi06vai iriaxiv xaxd xfiv iepfiv f} jifiv e£ daxffc 
Etadyexv xai ysyovdxa 6p0fi<; xai x6v \mdpxovxa <p6a£i xai xdv 
tioit|x6v.
So, in these texts mentioned above, instead of the normal formula of the oath 
(that is, e£ daxTfc xai EyyoTix'fr;) we have ey yajiexf]<;, in the first text, and ei; 
&oxf]<; xai yeyov6xa 6p06g, in the second. Sealey24 supposes that ysyovdxa 
6p0&<; was a circumlocution for "bom to a woman united by eyyur] to the father”, 
something which seems very likely, though he had earlier25 made the hypothesis26, 
based on these passages, that in some phratries a father who presented his son 
was not required to swear that the parents were united by eyyuq; "a union of a 
different kind would suffice". And he draws the conclusion that sons bom in 
engyetic marriage were not the only sons admitted to membership in phratries.
23 On this inscription see C.W.Hedrick The Decrees o f the Demotiomdai (1990).
24 Sealey (1990)34.
25 R. Sealey, "On Lawful Concubinage in Athens* CLAnt 3 (1984), pp.l 11-133.
26 ibid 122
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There is, however, another passage bearing upon the topic of the introduction 
to the phratry which implies a different conclusion about the significance of the 
eyyuT] in relation to the acceptance of new members into the phratry. This 
passage comes from Dem. 59 Against Neaira. In sections 59-60, the prosecutor 
describes the unsuccessful attempt of Phrastor to introduce his son to his phratry. 
When Phrastor was asked to take the accustomed oath before the arbitrator, he 
refused to do so. His refusal to swear would probably be taken as a prima facie 
evidence that the boy did not fulfil the requirements of the law to be introduced to 
the phratry, because Phrastor had not manied the boy's mother with eyyuq.
* * *
In this chapter is examined how the formality of marriage, or lack of it, 
affected the children of a union; and especially whether those whose parents were 
both Athenian, but not united by ayyoTi or emSxxaoia, were excluded from 
citizen rights, equally with the children of mixed marriages according to Perikles' 
citizenship law.
Let us take first a taste of what scholars have concluded in works on this 
subject.
In a series of three discussions of Athenian manic*^ law^7 Ledl argued that the 
children who were bom out of wedlock were not citizens and emphasized the
^Ledl, "Das altische Burgerrecht und die Frauen ", WS 29 (1907) 173- 227; ibid 30 (1908) 1-46, 
173-230.
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significance of marrige in the Athenian polis by saying that " anchisteia and 
poliieia are inseparable"28.
In 1994, H. J. Wolff accepted Ledl's thesis, but the case of phile in Isaios or.3 
made him modify the argument for illegitimate children of two Athenian parents 
and he suggested that they were v66oi and lacked anchisteia and politeia, but as 
v66oi of two Athenians were classed among the doxox, not among the tioHtcxx 
(who were full c i t i z e n s ) ,29 and they had rights superior to those of aliens, such as 
marricK^with citizens. So Wolff suggested that the children bom out of wedlock 
but from Athenian parents enjoyed a lesser kind of citizenship. However, he 
insisted on the principle of the connection between anchisteia and politeia.30
On the other hand, Harrison assumed that v68oi whose parents were both 
Athenians were full citizens. He based his opinion on two arguments, which in 
fact are rhetorical questions. He asked : Why did Perikles' law not simply say that 
from then on the children of mixed marriages were to be v60ox, if legitimacy was 
required? And why did this law speak only of birth from two dcoxox and not of 
legitimate birth? And, finally, what was the object of Solon's law excluding 
bastards from inheritance? Eventually, he admitted that the children of citizen 
parents not united by were illegitimate and had only a limited capacity of
inheritance, but he maintained that such children had Athenian citizenship.31
MacDowell, in his turn, has accepted Harrison's reasons for believing that 
bastards were admitted to citizenship and found his arguments positive and
28 WS 30 (1908 ) 230.
29 In this distinction between dare*; and Wolff followed U. E. Paoli, Studi di diritto attico,
(Florence, 1930 ) chapt 3.
30 Wolff, EL J . , 1 Marrige Law and Family organisation in ancient Athens ", Traditio 2 ( 1944 ) 43-95.
31 AR.W. Harrison , The Law o f Athens : The Family and Property, (Oxford 1968 ) pp. 61-68.
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logical but not factual. So, in order to strengthen Harrison's arguments, he 
suggested that three tex ts^  provide more definite support for this conlusion.33 
But P.J.Rhodes has challenged the theses of Harrison and MacDowell and 
found himself not convinced by the evidence which MacDowell suggested.34 
Sealey, however, has argued that Athenian law on inheritance and citizenship 
was concerned solely with the identity and status of actual parents, not with the 
nature of the union between them.35
In very general terms, on the one side are those who argue that the basis of 
one's membership in the state was his membership in the children bom out
of wedlock were illegitimate and such people were formally outside this system 
CpV>V<x^ demos).
On the other side are those who held the opposite view that the phratries and 
the demes were separate systems, and that v60oi bom from Athenian parents were 
not barred from citizenship.
Thus, it is clear that there is not a general agreement about the answer to the 
que stion whether the children of unmarried but citizen parents were citizens or 
not. This is not without reason; as Todd has noted36 there is very little evidence 
to resolve this question and, indeed, what has caused this inconclusiveness of this 
debate is that most of the evidence is capable of varying interpretations.
* >k *
32 Each one of these texts will be examined later in this chapter.
33 D. M  MacDowell, "Bastards as Athenian Citizens", CQ 26 ( 1976 ) 88-91.
34 P. J.Rhodes, "Bastards as Athenian Citizens", CQ 28 ( 1978 ) 88-92.
35 R. Sealey, "On Lawful Concubinage in Athens", CLAnt 3 (1984 ) 111-33.
36 S.C.Todd, The Shape o f Athenian Law, ( Oxford 1993 ) p. 178.
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A rist A th  Pol 42.1 : MacDowell argues that illegitimate birth was not a bar 
to citizenship and suggests that three texts provide support for this view. 3? The 
first text comes from Aristotle's Athenaion Politeia, 42.1: psx£xouoxv P-^ v 
7ioA.xx£xa<; ol e£ tynpox6pa)v yeyov6xe<; dcaxc&v, £YYp6<povxax S’sii; xoxx; 
Sqpdxai; dxxcoxalSexa t-xq yzyov6xz<;. 5xav 5’ eyyP^V0^**1 8xa\|rr]qri£ovxax 
TiEpi ax>xa>v 6p6aavx£<; ol 8qp6xax, rcpftxov p£v ex Soxofcax Y£Y<>v6vax xf^ v 
f^xxlav xfiv ex xoft v6pou, x&v pfi S61;a>ax &7i£pxovxax TidXxv si<; 7iat8a«;, 
SsfrtEpov 8’ ex £A.£x>0£p6<; eoxx xai ykyovz Kaxdc xoxx; v6po\)£.
Here we do not have the law of citizenship itself, but a paraphrase of it by 
Aristotle. MacDowell argues that, since nothing is said here about marriage, the 
only requirement for citizenship was both citizen parents and the age of eighteen; 
nothing else. However, this argument from silence has been challenged by 
Rhodes^S who proves with examples that omissions in the Athenaion Politeia are 
very frequent, especially in the second part of it and concludes that Ath P o l's 
silence, even in such a passage as 42.1, is an insecure basis for argument.
Furthermore, the ensuing account of the procedure of registration contains two 
points which sould be considered carefully. The first is the clause ex eXei)8epo<; 
eoxI and the second is the phrase xai ytyovz *axdc xoix; v6pox)£.
ex &£i>d8po£ eaxl: MacDowell does not comment at all on this point, and 
from his silence it seems to me that he takes the adjective eXevGepoc; in its 
normal meaning as "free". However, there are texts in which eXe*60£po<; seems to 
mean something more than "free". Newman^ suggests that EXsoOepxa
37 D.M. MacDowell, (1976), 89.
38 Rhodes, (1978), 89; cf. A Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia, (Oxford, 1981), p. 
496.
39 Newman, The Politics o f Aristotle, vol. I, p. 248 a  1; cf. vol.IV, p. 173.
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occasionally seems to mean something more than "free birth", in fact "citizen 
birth", and that eA.e60£po<; is sometimes used in contradistinction to ££vo<;40 
passages he quotes are: Arist. PoUt., 1292b 39: xpixov 5’eT5o<; (Sqpoxpaxioci;) x6 
Tidcnv eleven, 6aoi 6tv eXsMepoi akn, pex^x^-v xffc 7ioA.iX£ia<;, pfi pivxoi 
pex^x^v 5i& xt\v Tipoeipqp^vqv aixxav, ©ax’ fcvayxaiov xcd ev xaOxq 
6tp%eiv x6v v6pov. Where EXefcOepoi seems to answer to rcoAAxqi; in 1292a 3 : 
§xepov 5£ et8o<; Sqpoxpaxiai; x6 navxi pExeivai xc&v 6tp%6v, e&v p6vov fj 
TioXixqi;, ftpxexv Se x6v v6pov. He also quotes Arist. Polit. 1290b 9 : obx’ &v ol 
eX.E'OOepoi 6^iyox 5vxe£ tiXex6v©v xai p.f| eXedQepcdv ftpxcoai.. . and 1291b 27 
: x6 pfj e!; 6qi<pox£pa>v notaxfijv £X.£<)0£pov. . . . I n  addition, Diogenes 
Laertius^l says that Antisthenes was bom not ex Suoiv ’ABqvcrioiv and later in 
another passage he says that he was bom not ex 5<>o £A,£o06pa)v. So it is clear 
from D.L.'s use of eX.£u0epo(; in this passage that &.£i)0epo£ has the meaning of 
citizen.
Furthermore, there are passages from the orators where the use of eXe\)0epo<; 
indicates rather the meaning of "citizen” than "free". For example, Dem. 57, 45 : 
oi>5£ Tiepi xb^qs o^5£ rcepl xpqpforov fyiiv e o x I v  6 rcccpcbv 6ty(bv, d&X \>n£p 
fk\ox>c,. 710M.& Soofoxft xcd xccTiEivdc jipdcypaxa xoix; £A,ED0£poo<; f\ nevia 
P i d ^ e x a i  t io i e x v .  . .  .
One could say that £X,£{)0£po<; here means only "free", because it is used in 
contrast with 5ooA.ix<5t. But the speaker in this speech claims his citizenship and 
defends (in this section) his mother against the accusation that she is not an 
Athenian citizen. The accusation was not that the speaker was a slave man by a 
slave mother, so that he had to prove that, altough his mother did a job which is
40 cf. Platonis, Ifnepfiafax^ Fr. 182, in Poetae Comici Qraeci by R. Kassel-C. Austin, vol. VH, p. 505.
41 Diogenes Laertius, Vitae Philosophorum, Liber VI, Antisthenes 1,4.
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fitting to a slave, she was not a slave but a free woman. As he claims citizenship, 
he uses the adjective eXeuGepoi; referring to the category of people which he 
claims that he belongs to - i.e. citizens.
This meaning of eA.euGepot; becomes more clear later in the same speech, in 
section 69: Dem. 57, 69: xai y&p 6xi xax& xoix; v6pou<; 6 rcaxfjp iyTTRSV kgA 
YapqXxav xoiq cpp&xepaxv eiofiveyxev jiepapxtipiixai. np6<; y k  xouxok; xai 
epaoxdv 87i£5eii;a xdvxcov p.ex8iX.T}<p6G’ 6aoov xpoafixex xoug 8X.euG£poo<;.
Here we have reference to the phratry. The speaker has proved in section 54 
that he was introduced to his father's phratry. So the speaker is a member of this 
phratry and participates in the 8<na xai iep6, things which suit xoix; 
eX.8uG£poo<;. Therefore eXeuGepot; here seems to mean something more than 
"free"; it rather takes the meaning of "citizen".
So, if we accept this meaning of 8A.e{>G8po£ in this passage of Aristotle (Ath 
Pol 42.1), then the second thing that the demesmen had to judge was whether the 
candidate was of citizen birth. Thus the clause si eX.8tiGepo<; aoxi, according to 
this interpretation, covers the standard required by the law for admission to the 
deme, the standard that pexfcxouaiv xffc noX.ix8ia<; oi k% &p.<pox£pa)v 
yeyovdxe^ &axa>v.
However, Rhodes^ finds that the requirement of citizen birth should be 
covered by the following clause- xai ykyo\z xax& xou<; v6jio\)<;- and tends to 
believe that 8X.e6Gepo<; has its normal meaning here, because of the fact that a 
candidate judged not to be eX.e6Gepo<; was sold as a slave. But it seems to me 
that a candidate, if it was found that he was not eXeuGepo  ^ (a "citizen"), was sold 
into slavery by the city, not because he was a slave but because it was a
42 P.J. Rhodes, A Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia, ( Oxford 1981) p. 499.
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punishment for seeking registration as a citizen in a deme, although he was not a 
citizen; he could either be a slave or a free alien.
Keel yfryove xaxdt xoi>£ MacDowell insists that the phrase xaxfit
xoix; vopoos must not be mistranslated "legitimately" and offers the Greek for 
"legitimate" which is yvfioio<;. He is correct not only at this point but also in 
saying that xax& xoix; v6po\x; means "according to the law", although I would 
say "according to the laws" which state the requirements for Athenian citizenship. 
MacDowell, followed by Rhodes who agreed with him at least at this point, finds 
that xccxfc xoix; v6pou<; refers to the law, that both parents must be Athenians, 
which has been stated in the erlier sentence.
However, in the earlier sentence it has been also stated that eyypaqjovxoci 5’ 
ei<; xoix; Sqpbxai; dxxajxaiSexa Ixq yeyov6xe<;. And when the demesmen had 
to take the decision about a candidate's introduction to the deme, they had to vote 
whether the candidate had reached the age required by the law. The wording of 
Aristotle is the following : . . .5ion|n]qn£ovxai. . . ol 5r|p6xcci . . .  si Soxoficn. 
yeyovfcvai xf|v f^iidotv xfiv ex xo$ v6poo. . . , where the phrase xfiv ex xoO 
vdjiou undoubtedly refers to the law stated above - eyyp&tpovxcn. . . 
6xxooxal5exa ixq yeyovdxei;. The phrase ex xoft v6pou is singular and implies 
only one law, and this one law is stated in this text. If we see the phrase xaxdc 
xou^ v6jiou<; as if it refers only to one law stated above (both Athenian parents), 
then, one could ask, why does Aristotle here use plural xax& xoix; vbpooi; 
instead of singular- xax& x6v v 6 j j l o v ?  Does this plural here indicate that there 
might be more than one law, which this phrase refers to? It is hue that A  P. does 
not mention legitimacy per se, but I cannot understand why these v6poi (xax& 
xouc vououq) should not include a further requirement of birth from parents 
lawfully married.
50
Here, I think, it is the proper place to consider Harrison's rhetorical question. 
Harrison asked : why did Perikles' law speak only of birth from "two astoi” and 
not of legitimate birth, if legitimacy was required for citizenship? First of all we 
should consider that we do not have Perikles' law per se\ we have a paraphrase of 
the law by Aristotle. Moreover, Perikles' law did not change everything 
concerning citizenship but simply put forth a new standard requirement for 
citizenship. And the new standard was "both parents citizens". So we can assume 
that everything else stayed unchanged. Until then a person was a citizen if his 
father was a citizen. It was not necessary for his mother to be a citizen also. But 
his parents had to be married by eYYtiq, as we leam from Herodotus VI, 130,2, 
for the marriage between Megakles, a member of the Alkmeonid family, and 
Agariste, daughter of Kleisthenes, the ruler of Sikyon: xa> 5£ ’AA.iqi6a>vo<; 
M8YockA,6x kyyvfb ncrtSa xfiv epfjv ’AYotpiaxqv vdpoxox xoxax ’AOqvaicov, 
where vdpoxax xoxax ’AOqvaxcov implies two things: first that eyY^H was a 
prerequisite, without which a marriage was not valid in Athens, because otherwise 
there would have been no point in mentioning Athenian law, and second that 
marriage between an Athenian citizen and an alien woman was at that time 
recognized as legitimate by Attic law and the offspring of such a union would be 
legitimate children, recognized as Athenian citizens. Megakles' and Agariste's 
children included Kleisthenes, the reformer of the Athenian constitution.
On this view, if the whole hypothesis above is correct, we may interpret the 
clause ex eXe^Oepo  ^ eoxi Kort yiyovz Kaxct xoix; vdpoxx; as '^whether he is of 
citizen birth and bom in lawful wedlock". Therefore, although in Ath. Pol 42,1 
there is not mention of legitimacy per se, we can find, in some way, ground to 
base cm it the assumption that the phrase "according to the laws" might include a 
requirement of legitimacy.
* * *
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A tim ufi^  is one of the most difficult topics in the study of Athenian law. 
Alimia was a penalty for various offences and it affected a citizen's status; a 
person who had been punished with atimia lost rights and privileges. In the sixth 
and early fifth centuries atimia was outlawry: if a man was atimos, anyone could 
kill him or plunder his property without becomig liable to prosecution or penalty. 
Hence this would make it impossible for him to remain in Athenian territory and 
such alimia was nearly equivalent to expulsion from Attica and it could be 
imposed on aliens as well as Athenians. However, by the late fifth century atimia 
had come to mean less than this. In general terms, it meant expulsion from the 
privileges of Athenian public life, and it was a penalty imposed only on citizens, 
not applicable to aliens. It is translated "disfranchisement".^
The formal condemnation of Arkheptolemos and Antiphon for their part in the 
oligarchy of 411 B.C., quoted in [Plut.] Ethika 834 a-b, is suggested by 
MacDowell as another piece of evidence that the Athenians admitted bastards to 
citizenship. Among others, one of the condemnation's stipulations is : ftxipov 
eTvoci ’Apxenxdkepov xai ’Avxupftvxa xai y£vo<; x6 ex xouxoiv, xai v66oo«; 
xa i yvqaiorx;. Their descendants are to be disfranchised, both bastard and 
legitimate. And MacDowell concludes that illegitimate descendants of Athenians 
normally have citizenship, because otherwise there was not point this decree
43 In general on this topic, see: M. H. Hansen, Apagoge, Endeixis and Ephegesis against Kakourgoi, 
Atimoi and Pheugontes: A Study in the Athenian Administration o f Justice in the Fourth Century B. C. 
(Odense 1976) pp. 54-98.
441 am indebted to D. M  MacDowell, The Law in Classical Athens, (Londonl978) pp. 73-75, for 
most of this paragraph.
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declaring Antiphon and Aikheptolemos to be atimoi to include both categories of 
their children, gnesioi and nothoiy if in fact nothoi were not citizens.
However, Rhodes has challenged this evidence arguing that everything here 
depends on the meaning of ficnpov. As it has been mentioned before, in early 
Athens dtxipxa denoted total outlawry and only later in the fourth century it took 
a weaker sense and came to mean "disfranchisement". Aikheptolemos and 
Antiphon have been sentenced to death, confiscation of their property, demolition 
of their houses, and exclusion of their mortal remains from all land under 
Athenian control and they are to be ftxipoi themselves and their descendants both 
illegitimate and legitimate, and anyone who adopts any of their descendants will 
himself become frxipoi;. Harrison believed that dmjiia retained its sronger, 
archaic sense when combined with death, confiscation of property, and extension 
to the whole family.45So Rhodes argued that frnpoi; here is used in its stronger 
sense, meaning "outlawry", which, at least in early Athens, was applicable to a 
non-citizen, and concluded that Aikheptolemos and Antiphon were declared 
outlaws together with all their offspring, and, since this kind of &tijiicx could be 
imposed on aliens as well as Athenians, the fact that these illegitimate 
descendants of Aikheptolemos and Antiphon were subjected to this kind of 
dmpAcx, does not prove that they had citizenship before.
I find difficult to believe that ficnpo^ in this text means "outlawry" instead of 
"disfranchisement", but not impossible. But even if Rhodes is wrong at this point 
and &tijio£ in this text means what it normally meant in the fourth century, it is 
uncertain whether we can use this source as evidence that v60oi had citizenship, 
for the following reason: As Humphreys notes^, during the Peloponnesian
45 A  R. W. Harrison, The Law o f Athens, JL Procedure, (Oxford 1971) pp 169-76.
46 3. C. Humphreys, "The Nothoi of Kynosargca*, JUS, 94 (1974) 94=
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war it was not difficult to gain entry illicitly to demes and phratries, especially 
those based on villages evacuated for fear of Spartan invasions. In the later years 
of the war Perikles' law was disregarded or repealed. Antiphon and 
Arkheptolemos were sentenced in 411. The v60oi mentioned here were probably 
bom or came of age during the Peloponnesian war when the Athenians 
disregarded the regulations of citizenship imposed by Perikles in 451/0. So, 
although they were v66oi, they could have managed to gain citizenship under 
certain conditions which, however, were not the normal ones.
*  *  *
Isaios 3, 45.
In Isaios 3,45 the speaker says :
£7iei8f| 5£ iq) SsvoxXei iyfyixx 6 ~Ev5io<; xfiv 
6t8eX,qn5f]v oou, eTifcxpeiircK;, <& NixdSqjie, xfiv ex xffe 
eyyuT[xf|(; x<p ITbppqp YeyevT\p6vT|v exodpa<; 
exeivqp ouaav eYyuSoOax;
And MacDowell argues that the case of Phile in this speech proves that an 
illegitimate daughter of Athenian parents could be given in marriage to a citizen. 
But in the fourth century marriage or cohabitation of a citizen and a non-citizen as 
husband and wife was forbidden ([Dem.] 59.16 and 52). Therefore, MacDowell 
concludes, the daughter must have been a citizen.^?
Actually, in this case here, a double question arises: Is Phile both v60q and the 
wife of an Athenian citizen? And, does this fact establish that v60oi were citizens 
in Athens? Phile was really given in marriage by eyyuT] to Xenokles as the child
47 D. M. MacDowell, (1976) 90.
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of a hetaira (6<; el; Exocxpa*;)- sections 45, 48, 52, 55. However, her husband, 
Xenokles, had testified that Endios gave her as his yvqoiav 6c5eX(pfiv (section 
58) and Xenokles thought that she was legitimate: xe xai ei, ©<; qxxoxv
ouxox, fiYyufpcex aftxfiv xqi SevoxXei d)£ YVTl°*av &5eX<pfiv ouaav auxofc. 
(section 58). If Phile was v68ri, and if the laws recorded in [Dem.] 59.16, 52, 
prohibiting marriage between an &ox6< f^i and a §&vo£/t], were in force at the time 
of Phile's marriage, then it could be argued that v68ox were citizens, since the 
speaker never says that the marriage was illegal. But what was Phile's status? 
Rhodes has argued^ that Phile's status was ambiguous and not addressed by 
those laws. Although she was illegitimate (if she really was), as the child of both 
Athenians she would not have been £6vti in the ordinary meaning of the word. On 
the other hand, if the marriage was in fact illegall, namely the laws were in force 
and Phile was not an &oxfi, the speaker might not want to emphasize it, since his 
own brother had given Phile in marriage.49 Finally, Patterson concludes on this 
problem that this speech does not prove that v68ox were citizens for two reasons; 
first, because it is not clear that Phile really was v68t], and second, because, if 
she was v68t], it is not clear that her marriage to Xenokles was technically 
legal.50
However, from another point of view, I think that it could be argued that the 
marriage between Phile and Xenokles was perfectly legal, in spite of the fact that 
she was illegitimate daughter of Pyrrhos, without proving that v68ox in general 
had citizenship during the period when this speech was delivered.
48 P. J.Rhodes (1978)91
49 W. Wyse, The Speeces o f baeus, (Cambridge 1904), pp. 278-82.
50 C. B. Patterson, Those Athenian Bastards", ClAnL 9 (1990) 73.
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This speech was delivered approximately in the 380s51. In the prooimion of 
the speech we are told that Pyrrhos died more than twenty years before the date of 
the speech. In paragraph 31 we are also told that Phile at the time of the trial had 
been married for eight years. Thus, it indicates that her birth goes back at least 
twenty-two years form the date of the speech, if we assume that she was married 
in the age of fourteen. Therefore, if the date of the speech is correct, she must 
have been bom before 403/2.
But, during the period before 403/2 matters concerning citizenship were fluid, 
probably because of the war, and so we can assume that many sorts of person 
were accepted as citizens. The re-enactment of the Periklean law 403/2 strongly 
indicates that Athenians had left aside laws and mles ruling citizenship. 
Furthermore, this decree contained the proviso that no investigation was to be 
made about those who had been accepted as citizens of were bom before the 
archonship of Eukleides -
xoix; 5£ 7ip6 EincXeiSoo fcve^exdoxax; fctpetoQai (schol. Aesch. 1.39)52. 
Therefore, it is precarious reasoning to use instances of v60oi, accepted as 
citizens or bom before 403/2, as evidence for their status after that date. The re- 
enactment of Perikles' law as well as the law about v60oi were not made 
retroactive but they took effect from the year 403/2 forwards.
51 cf. R.F. Wevers Isaevs, Chronology, Prosopography and Social History (Mouton 1969) pp. 16, 
18, 25.
52 See also: Dem 43.51: vodcp Se v o d fl W  ctvaiayxioxaav |XT)d* iepaiv prid’ o o u d v  arc’
Efttfdfou ap%ovio£
Dem. 57.30: tou;xpavou; to iw v  ovwo (palveraiyeyovax; axrce, d  xxxi x a ta  
datep’ outio;  rjv, e ivai rcoXmjv rcpocnrpcav avtov: yeyove yap rcpo 
E\)xXa5cn).
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So, on this view, Phile's marriage could be regarded as not illegal.
j* * *
Demosthenes' speeches 39 and 40.
In Dem. 39, a certain Mantitheos, son of Mantias of Thoricus, brings suit 
against his halfbrother, Boeotos, to prevent him from calling himself Mantitheos. 
According to  the speaker, Mantias, an Athenian citizen, had legally married a 
daughter of Polyaratos and MantitheosMre legitimate son of him by the daughter 
of Polyaratos. Mantitheos was formally recognised by the father at the festival 
held on the tenth day after his birth; he was entered into the phratry and upon 
reaching the age of eighteen was inscribed by Mantias on the register of the deme 
under the name of Mantitheos (39.29).
However, Mantias had a connection with another woman of Athenian birth, 
named Plangon, whom, according to the speaker, Mantias kept as a mistress. Two 
sons were bom to her and she claimed that they were Mantias' sons. Mantias was 
unconvinced that Boeotos and Pamphilos were his sons, and refused to recognise 
them as such. But, when Boeotos came of age, he brought a suit against Mantias 
to compel him to recognize Boeotos as his legitimate son. For political reasons 
Mantias did not want the suit to come to trial, so he made a private arrangement 
with Plangon before the case came to arbitration. He gave her thirty minai and 
was to challenge her to declare under oath that he was the father of her sons. 
Plangon agreed that she would refuse the oath, but, when the case came before the 
arbitrator, she broke her promise and swore that Boeotos and Pamphilos were 
Mantias's sons, (39.2-4; 40.2, 9-11). So Mantias had no choice, he acknowledged 
the boys as his and introduced them to his phratry (39.4; 40.11). Mantias died 
before the sons of Plangon were entered on the register of the deme and Boeotos 
proceeded to enrol himself in the deme by the name Mantitheos, the name of the
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paternal grandfather, which had been borne by the speaker since birth with 
Mantias's full approval. So Mantias has brought a suit to compel Boeotos to 
resume his former name.
The first thing we have to indicate is that the union between Mantias and 
Plangon was not a concubinage but legal marriage by eyyuT]. In both speeches 
nothing is said about the marriage between Mantias and Plangon in a direct way 
(Mantitheos implies rather the opposite), but Mantias's reaction and attitude, as it 
seems through the speeches, implies that he was married to Plangon by eyyOr]. 
Mantitheos never explicitly denied that Plangon was married to Mantias. From or. 
40.10 it appears that Mantias's only reason for rejecting Boeotos was that he did 
not believe that Boeotos was his son, not that he had never been married to 
Plangon. Mantias's eventual acknowledgement of Boeotos's legitimacy is very 
important. It shows clearly that Mantias and Plangon were married by eyy6ti for 
the following reason: After the acknowlegment of the children's paternity, Mantias 
presented them to the phratry for admission, where he had to swear that the boys 
were his by a formally married wife of citizen birth (el; dcaitfe xai eyyuTyETfe). ^  
Mantias was not married to Plangon by eyyuTi and plangon was simply Mantias's 
mistress, then it would be very easy for him to refuse to take such an oath, which, 
in that case, would be a lie. The fact that he did enrol them into his phratry proves 
that the ground for such an enrolment existed - (i.e. ei; dcaif^ xai eyyoTyrfte). 
Furthermore, the fact that Mantias recognized not only Boeotos but also 
Pamphilos can stand as a proof that both children were bom before Mantias's 
divorce from Plangon. Otherwise, Mantias could agree to enroll Boeotos in his 
phratry by swearing the oath dcaitfe xcd £yyw]Tf[<;, but, if Pamphilos was bom 
after his divorce from Plangon, then it is difficult to accept that Mantias would 
take an oath which would be a lie, namely that Pamphilos was bom to him el; 
dcaifte xa i eyyoTyriji;.
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Sealey5 3 following another interpretation argues that Pamphilos was bom to 
Plangon and Mantias long after they had ceased to be united by eyyhii. It is true 
that the sworn testimony of Plangon asserted merely that Mantias was the father 
of Boeotos and Pamphilos and it did not say anything about the nature of the 
union in which each of the two children was conceived. But the sworn testimony 
of Plangon is one thing and the oath which the father (in this case, Mantias) had to 
swear at the procedure of admission of his son(s) in his phratry is another, and the 
oath was that the offspring was bom (Stairfe xcd eyyoqTfji;. So I cannot accept 
Sealeys conclusion that, when Pamphilos was introduced to the phratry, the 
phrateres had to be convinced of his actual parentage but not of the nature of the 
union obtaining between his parents when he was bom. Sealey goes further and 
uses the case of Pamphilos as evidence to argue that the child of citizen-parents 
enjoyed citizenship and anchisteia, even if the parents were not united in 
consequence of engyesis when the child was bom.
Let us now look at the case of Boeotos from another point of view; let us count 
as correct the view that Athenian parents only and not necessarily legal marriage 
between them is required by the law for their offspring to have citizenship. 
Mantias was an Athenian; Plangon also was an Athenian. Boeotos had to prove 
that Mantias was his father, but Mantias refused to recognize him as his son. If 
Boeotos had only to prove that his parents were Athenian citizens, and that was 
enough for him to enter the deme and gain citizenship, then he had the opportunity 
to follow another procedure: Ignoring Mantias completely, he could have 
appeared in the deme in order to claim his citizenship, proving that both his 
parents were Athenians. But how could he prove that Mantias was his father? He 
could do so by referring to the eyyOq which had occured between Mantias and
53 R. Sealey, "On Lawful Concubinage in Athens", CLAnt. 3 (1984) 124.
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Plangon. Mantias did never deny that Plangon was married to him. Mantias's only 
reason for rejecting Boeotos was that he did not believe that Boeotos was his son, 
not that he had never been married to Plangon. So Boeotos would prove his birth 
from citizen parents united by eyyuT], by proving the eyyuT] itself, although the 
eyybrj in the context of this hypothesis was not the requirement, but he would 
make use of it to prove that his mother (Athenian citizen) during the period of his 
birth had sexual intercourse only with her husband, Mantias (Athenian citizen), 
and not with anyone else. Mantias divorced Plangon on the pretence that Boeotos 
was not his son, but he never produced evidence for this. Therefore, the only 
possible thing to be believed by the demesmen was that Boeotos was Mantias's 
son, a son of an Athenian citizen. So, having proved that both his parents were 
Athenians, Boeotos would gain citizenship.
However, Boeotos neither followed this kind of procedure nor simply asked 
Mantias to admit paternity, but to acknowledge his legitimacy by enroling him in 
the phratry, for at this enrolment the father swore that the child was his by a 
formally married wife of citizen birth.
Finally, this hypothesis leads me to the question: Was the acknowledgement of 
a son's legitimacy eventually determinative of his right of citizenship? And if the 
answer is positive, then the eyyuT] was the base on which such a legitimacy was 
built.
* * *
Isaeos 12 , On Behalf ofEuphiletos.
The twelfth speech of Isaeos is a fragment quoted by Dionysius of 
Halicarnassus. In the archonship of Archias, 346/5 B.C., the Athenian assembly
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on the motion of Demophilos passed a decree ordering a general revision of the 
roll of citizens by means of a vote in each deme. Euphiletos, for whom this 
speech was composed, was a man whose name had been struck off the roll of the 
deme Erchia by a vote of the members met in assembly. He then appealed to the 
court and brought an action against the deme represented by the demarch. The 
defence of Euphiletos was committed to his half-brother on behalf of him. We do 
not know exactly the grounds on which the assembly of the deme had condemned 
him, but as we are told by this speech the charge against him was that he was not 
the son of Hegesippos and therefore he belonged to the deme illegally.
The case, as it is given by Isaeos, is not very clear and we do not have 
sufficient material to make any conjecture. The only certain thing is that 
Euphiletos was in danger of losing his citizenship, and his representative was at 
pains to prove that Euphiletos had all those qualifications which the law required 
for citizenship. So, let us see exactly what the speaker proves here. In the first 
section the speaker argues that Hegesippos had no motive in adopting Euphiletos, 
if Euphiletos was not his son, and uses arguments with which he attempts to 
establish the paternity of Hegisippos. In section 3 the speaker says that it has 
been testified that Euphiletos was brought up in the house of Hegesippos who 
also introduced him into his phratry. But the speaker does not stop here; he goes 
on saying that Hegesippos's wife is ready to swear that Euphiletos is her son by 
Hegesippos and later the speaker insists that Hegesippos also wanted and still 
wants to swear that Euphiletos is his son by a lawfully married wife of citizen 
birth, (section 9, el; &oxft<; xai yapeiTfc yuvaix6<;.).
Therefore, what is attempted to be proven here it is not only the paternity but 
also the legitimacy of Euphiletos.
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* * *
Demosthenes 57, Against Euboulides.
As it has been mentioned in the preceding chapter, in 346/5, on the proposal of 
Demophilos, the Athenians decreed that the members of every deme should 
review their register, deciding under oath whether each name was to be retained or 
excluded- An appeal to the court was possible by any man excluded in this 
review, and Demosthenes's speech 57, against Euboulides, was composed for 
delivery in court by a man appealing against his exclusion from the deme 
Halimous.
This speech has been often used as a piece of evidence in support of the view 
that bastards were not entitled to become citizens. The main argument is that 
Euxitheos tries not only to prove that his parents are citizens but also to establish 
his legitimacy.
I would agree with those who believe so. Indeed, Euxitheos's action can be 
divided into three parts: First, he argues and tries to prove that his father is a 
citizen (sections 18-30); second, that his mother is a citizen (sections 30-45); and 
the third part of his action is dedicated to himself (sections 46-56). However, in 
sections 40-43, Euxitheos is at pains to show that his parents were united in 
marriage by cyY^t], and this is one of the points which some scholars use as an 
evidence that legitimacy was a condition for citizenship.
Harrison, on the other hand, finds Euxitheos's action explicable on the 
assumption that all he had to prove was first that both his mother and his father 
were Athenian and second that he was indeed their s o n . ^ 4  But the charge against 
Euxitheos was not double; after all such a double charge cannot exist for the 
following reason: You cannot say that these two people are not Athenian citizens
54 AR.W. Harrison, The Law o f Athens, I: The Family and Property, (Oxford 1968) 64.
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and at the same time that a person is not their offspring and then conclude that 
this person is not an Athenian citizen. You have to choose; there are two 
alternatives: You can either say that these two people are not citizens and a 
person who is their offspring is not a citizen, or that these two people are both 
citizens but a person is not their offspring, therefore this person is not a citizen. 
So I do not think that Euxitheos's action is certainly explicable on this assumption 
of Harrison.
Nevertheless, even if we accept that the sections 40-43, where he speaks about 
the way in which his mother and his father were united, are not independent 
argumentation, but contributory evidence to confirm his mother's status, even then 
we cannot accept that the third part does the same. It is pretty clear that Euxitheos 
has left aside the discussion about his parents and speaks only for himself trying 
on the one hand to prove his legitimacy, as it is reflected in his entry to the 
phratry, on the other hand to establish his right to be a citizen. He says: obxofiv 
5ti x a i x& 7ip6<; piixp6<; eip &ox6<; xai id  np6<; naxp6<;f x& p£v &v &pxx 
pEpapxbpiyton. pepaQfpcaxe rc&vxet;, x6c 8’ 65v npbxepov tie pi xou 7iaxp6<;.
A.om6v 86 pm TtEpi epauxob itp6<; upft<; einEiv,. . .  (section 46).
And we could ask here: why does Euxitheos go further and deal with matters of 
legitimacy, if it was enough for him to prove his parents' status only? The 
accusation against him was merely that his parents were not citizens, hence he 
should not have citizenship. As far as we are informed through this speech the 
accusation does not seem to be that he was an illegitimate son. His rejection from 
the deme occurred on the basis that his parents were non-Athenians. So Euxitheos 
could have stopped his speech of defence when both his parents would have been 
proved citizens (i.e. section 46), if his intention had been only this and not also to 
prove himself the legitimate son of these two Athenian citizens. So it seems to me
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that Euxitheos's attempt in this direction is not just for contributory evidence only 
to his parents' status, but also to his citizenship.
Let us turn now to the sections 52-56; Euxitheos says: xai qxxaiv. . . xffiv 
papxbpcov evxoxx; dxpeXoop^voxx; pox papxopetv aoyyevext; etvax . . . e ^ v  
Sfpioo xobxou;, ex v68o<; f| £6vo<; fjv ey6, xXqpovdpox^ Etvax xfiov epfiiv 
rc&vxcov (section 52-53).
The accusers, according to Euxitheos, claim that some of the witnesses have 
been bribed by him to testify that they are ouyyevex^ to him, probably that 
Euxitheos belongs to their phratry. Euxitheos refutes this accusation by saying 
that 5£ 5fpiou xofcxox ,^ ex v68o<; fi £6vo£ fjv eydb, xXT|pov6pox<; etvax x(5v 
epcov ti&vxcdv, and therefore they would rather prefer to inherit the whole estate 
than to be bribed by him with less money. We should note here two points: First, 
that these alleged bribed witnesses come from his father's side, because if 
Euxitheos was v68o<; or £6vo<; they would have access to his father's property as 
his relatives. Second, for the same reason, it seems that in no way the paternity of 
Euxitheos is questionable. In other words, to be able to maintain this statement 
here, these witnesses must be relatives to Euxitheos's father and heirs of his 
property if his son (Euxitheos) is v68o<; or ££vo£. And I understand the meaning 
of v68o<; as the son of an Athenian mother out of wedlock and !;6vo<; as the son 
of an alien mother, and of course in this case out of wedlock.
The fact that Euxitheos discusses this case, even though it is only an alleged 
one, requires some consideration. Let us pretend that it really happened, that 
Euxitheos bribed some of the witnesses to testify that he was a member of their 
phratry. In which case would Euxitheos have turned to the subornation of 
witnesses? In the case that he was v68o<; or ^vo<;. It must be repeated that in 
none of these cases the paternity of Thoucritos is disputed. However, I can 
understand the case of 5&vo<;; then Euxitheos, being such a person, would have
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reasonably suborned witnesses, because he would not have had evidence enough 
to prove his mother's citizen status and perhaps he would have needed more and 
more evidence for this, even if he had to pay witnesses. But I cannot understand 
the case of v60o<;; even if he was the vo0oq son of Thoucritos (who was a citizen) 
and of an Athenian woman, would it be reasonable to act in this way? Would it be 
necessary to buy off some witnesses to testify that he was a member of their 
phratry, since claiming citizenship he could have only proved citizen parents? So I 
would expect Euxitheos to refute this accusation on the basis that he would have 
done so if he had been £6vo£, but I would not expect him to put v60o<; side by 
side with i;£vo<;. I would rather expect him either to ignore the case of v60o<; or 
just to say that even if he was v60o<; he would not have the need to ask them to 
give false testimony that he was a member of the phratry.
Having in mind that Euxitheos seeks to prove his father Athenian, and at the 
same time the use of his membership in the phratry by him as an argument which 
is, let us say, contributory to his attempt, and all of this with the hint that, if he 
was v60o<;, there would be the possibility to bribe the witnesses, let us make a 
general observation: a v60o<; son of an Athenian man and an Athenian woman 
being out of the phratry, it does not prove that his father is not an Athenian 
citizen. Thus, it seems unnecessary for a vo0o<; to suborn witnesses to testify that 
he is in the phratry in order to prove his father's status. And I stress the father's 
status, because he might do so for the purpose of the inheritance. But here 
Euxitheos has not gone to the law-court to claim inheritance, but his first goal is 
to prove his father's status, because this is what is in dispute.
So, in my opinion, the alleged case of the bribery of witnesses, in this context, 
mentioned by Euxitheos carries more weight than it seems to carry at first sight. I 
think that Euxitheos refers to his phratry membership because he wants to
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establish his own legitimacy. Now, if from his legitimacy the status of his father 
becomes clearer, this is another thing.
* * *
The grant of citizenship to the Plataians
It is known that any Athenian man of citizen status might be selected to hold 
some public office, either by lot or by election, and also that the nine arkhons 
were selected by lot among the Athenian citizens.
As we leam from Thucydides^ the city of Plataia made an alliance with 
Athens in 519 and before the year 429 the Plataians were declared citizens of 
Athens. After the destruction of Plataia, in 427, by Spartans and Thebans, the 
surviving Plataians took refuge in Athens and the Athenians granted citizenship to 
them by passing a decree which enabled them to be registered in demes. And, 
although Plataians were granted citizen rights, they could not themselves hold any 
of the archonships or priesthoods, as the Athenian citizens did. However, their 
sons could do so if they were bom by a formally married wife of citizen birth - 
xoiq 8’ etc xouxcdv, &v ffloxv doxfy; yovaiTC6<; X0£i Eyynrixf i^; tcocx& x6v 
vopov. ( [Dem.] 59.106). And this limitation of the rights of naturalized citizens 
is quoted earlier in the same speech as a general rule - (section 92).
So, it seems to me that this limitation was not without significance. The fact 
that the sons of the naturalized Athenians were to gain full citizen rights when, and 
only when, they were the legitimate offspring of citizen birth on both sides, leads 
me to the question: was this restriction - fcoxffc tcccI Eyynqxf]^ - a universal 
and necessary condition for citizenship?
55 Thuc. 3.55.3, 63.2,58.5.
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* * *
Phratry membership
It is generally accepted that bastards were not entitled to membership of a 
phratry and that before Cleisthenes's reforms a man had to belong to a phratry to 
be an Athenian citizen. It follows that before Cleisthenes's reforms bastards were 
not entitled to citizenship.
It has been argued that after Cleisthenes's reforms it was not necessary to 
belong to a phratry to be a citizen. The strongest argument, according to 
H a r r i s o n ^  is the failure of Ar. Ath Pol 42.1 to mention such a qualification for 
entry on the deme register: pex^xouoxv p£v xfr; 7ioX.xxexcx<; ol el; &p.(pox£pa)v 
yeyovdxei; ftaxcov, eyyp&(povxax 8s ex<; xoix; 5tip6xa<; 6xxcoxax5exa £xq 
yeyov6xe<;. 5xav 5* eyypdtqxovxax 5xa\jrq<px£ovxax . . . oi 8T|p6xax . . . ei 
eXef>0ep6i; eaxx xai y£yove xax& xoix; vdpoxx;.
It is true that Ar. Ath Pol 42.1 does not say directly anything for membership 
of a phratry as a qualification for entry on the deme register. However, if we 
accept that eXeoQepoi; here has the meaning of tioAAxtv;, namely a man bom from 
two Athenian parents, and if we accept that the phrase xcd y£yove xax& xoix; 
vdpoxx; may incorporate a requirement for legitimate birth (i.e. el; eyyoTycTv;)^, 
then the requirement of phratiy membership goes with it, because I do not see any 
reason for two Athenian parents lawfully married not to introduce their legally 
bom offspring into their phratry.
56 AR.W. Harrison, The Law o f Athens, I* The Family and Property, (Oxford 1968) 64 a  1.
57 See pp. 44 - 48 above.
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So I think that, although we do not have a direct mention of membership of a 
phratry, it could be implied by the wording of Ath. P o l. Of course the deme was 
the essential condition for citizenship after Cleisthenes, but I do not think that it 
replaced the phratry in the senge that the phratry ceased to b^still necessary 
condition.
Three points in support of this view:
1. According to Plutarch Per. 37.5, after the death of his legitimate sons 
Pericles was allowed to have his son by Aspasia enrolled in his phratry: . . . 
aov8xtf>pT]aav ArcoypAxpaaOax x6v vdOov^S ei^ xoix; <pp<5cxepa<;f Svopa 
0£p.evov x6 auxofc.
According to Suid. 5T|po7ioiT]xo<; [A 451] this v60o<; son of Pericles was made 
5Tipo7ioirixo£-i.e. a citizen: Suidas: 5T|po7coiT]xo£: 6 bad xoO Sfjjioo e io7ion]08i(; 
x a i  yeyovdx; tioAAxt]*;. nepxxXffc y&p 6 5 a v 0xji7iou . . . x6v v68ov ol TtatSa 
x6v ’AoTiaoxai; xf]<; MiXTjaxat; enoiqae 5t|potioit]xov. ATip.orcoiTixo<; ouv 6 
qxOaex £6vo<;f 0716 5k xou Sfipoo tioMxtiq yeyovdx;.
2.Claimants to citizenship, as it seems from the forensic speeches, are at pains 
to prove membership of a phratry. But H a r r i s o n ^  argued that these claimants use 
the phratry argument because by proving that they were phratry members it was 
the simplest way of proving that their parents were both Athenian. This 
explanation seems, in some way, to suit easily the case of Euxitheos (Dem. 57), 
but not the case of Boeotos (Dem. 39 and 40). In Dem. 39.2 we are told that : 
(Boxooxbi;) A.axd>v 5ikt]v x(p naxpi x<p eptp . ..  e5ix6£80’ ui6<; etvax (paaxcov ex 
xf]<; najup&ox) 0oyaxp6<; xai 5exv& rc&axexv xai xf[<; 7iaxpx8o<;
58 Pericles the younger, he was bom probably before 440 B.C. In 410 he was Helienotamias and in 4ue> 
strategos.
59 Harrison (1968) 65.
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6cnoax£p£xa0ax, and later (section 4) that: dx; 5e xo$x’ etioxtjoev, Exo&yExv ex<; 
xoix; cppdxepaq fjv &v<5cyxq xobxoxx;, xai X6yo<; oi>Szi<; xmzkzinzzo. So it is 
clear here that Boeotos had made a claim for citizenship (xcd xffe 7iaxpx5o  ^
6t7ioox£pexo8ax), won the case and the further step was his introduction to the 
phratry (Exo&yExv ex<; xoix; <pp<5cx£pa<;), and later to the deme. And so Mantitheos 
says later in the same speech: oox oboxa, naxfip y£yov£v, (section 34).
3. As all the preserved citizenship decrees show, the Athenians insisted on 
having naturalized citizens enrolled in the phratries.^These decrees, concerning 
grants of Athenian citizenship to foreigners, include instructions to the new 
citizens to seek enrolment into a deme, tribe and phratry. The enrolment clause 
has the general form ypdniraa0ax abxbv (or etvax ai>xq> yp&i|raa0ax) (pouffe xai 
5fyiou xai tppaxpxai; %  &v PobA.qxax. Naturalized citizens had a free choice of 
deme, tribe, and phratry.
Conclusion
A brief summary of this chapter's conclusions seems appropriate here.
I tend to believe that illegitimate birth was a bar to citizenship in Athens, in the 
period of the orators, for the following reasons:
1. The discussion of citizenship qualifications at Ath PoL 42.1 gives a hint of 
a legitimacy (xcd yfcyovE xax& xoix; vdpoxx;).
2. The decree quoted in [Plut.] Antiphon 834 a-b, imposing &xxpxa on the 
legitimate and illegitimate descendants of the convicted men, as well as the case 
of Phile (Isaios 3), who though a v60t] was given in marriage by eyybq to a
60 cf. M.J. Osborne, Naturalization in Athens: vols UI-IV, (Brussels 1983) p. 158.
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citizen, are precarious cases of v60oi (bom before 403/2 ) to be used as evidence 
for the status of v60oi after 403/2. The re-enactment of Pericles's law in 403/2 
indicates that matters concerning citizenship were fluid before 403/2.
3. Dem.39 shows that Boeotos's citizenship depended on the acknowledgement 
of his legitimacy.
4. In Isaios 12 and especially in Dem.57, the speaker's attempt to prove not 
only the status of his parents, but also to establish his legitimacy, indicates that 
"both Athenian parents" as a qualification for citizenship probably was not 
enough.
5. After Cleisthenes's reforms the deme was the essential condition for 
citizenship, but I think that the phratry did not cease to be a necessary condition, 
as it seems from the phratry argument used in forensic speeches by claimants to 
citizenship. Plut. Per. 37.5 and the preserved citizenship decrees which granted 
citizenship to foreigners confirm this conclusion.
* *
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PART III 
EITYH AS SURETY
ISAEOS V,
ON THE ESTATE OFDIKAEOGENES
Dikaeogenes n, the son of Menexenos I, of the deme K\)5a8f|voaov, was killed 
at Knidos in 412/11 B.C.61 He died childless and had no brothers left, but had 
four married sisters who would have inherited all his property, in accordance with 
the law of intestate succession.62 But after his death, Proxenos, the husband of his 
father's sister, produced a will under which his own son, Dikaeogenes in, was 
posthumously adopted as son of Dikaeogenes II and heir to one-third of his estate 
(xai erci xfp xpix<p pipex xoft xXfipou . . . md«; eyiyvexo noupri^* section 6). 
The will was not challenged and Dikaeogenes IH received the one-third of the 
estate, the other two- thirds being divided between the four sisters.
Twelve years later Dikaeogenes IH alleged that this first will was invalid and 
produced another will under which he was heir not to one-third only, but to the 
whole of the estate. A stand against this second will was made by Polyaratos, the 
husband of the eldest sister, in defence of his wife and her sisters. The court, 
however, decided in favour of Dikaeogenes IE, who gained possession of the
61 see, Wyse, Jsaeos 405.
62 [Dem] 43 Against Makartatos 51.
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whole estate, and Polyaratos, who intended to bring an action for false witness, 
died before he could carry out this threat (section 9).
For ten years Dikaeogenes III had the whole estate under his possession and no 
one so far attempted to dispute this second will. But one of the children of the 
sisters, Menexenos IE, the son of kephisophon, brought an action for perjury 
against one of the witnesses to the second will. This action was successful and 
the defendant was convicted of perjury for giving false evidence in support of the 
genuineness of this will. Menexenos was preparing to attack the other witnesses 
when Dikaeogenes IE stopped him by offering to restore to him his share of the 
estate, on the condition that he would not take any further action. Menexenos 
accepted this offer but Dikaeogenes HI eventually broke faith and failed to carry 
out this agreement. Menexenos then made common cause with the other 
claimants, the children of Dikaeogenes' 31 sisters (Kephisodotos, the son of 
Theopompos, and Menexenos IV, one of the sons of Polyaratos). Their plan this 
time was to claim from Dikaeogenes HI the whole estate on the ground of affinity. 
Their argumentation run as following:
"Two wills were produced under which Dikaeogenes m was adopted by 
Dikaeogenes II. Under the first will, Dikaeogenes IE was to be heir to one-third of 
Dikaeogenes' E estate; according to the will which Dikaeogenes IE himself 
produced, he was to be heir to the whole estate. Of these two wills, Dikaeogenes 
IE persuaded the judges that the first was not genuine; those on the other hand who 
bore witness that the second will was Dikaeogenes' E genuine will, were 
convicted of perjury. Therefore, both wills being invalidated, no one had any 
claim to the estate under testamentary disposition, but it could be claimed on 
grounds of affinity by the sisters of Dikaeogenes E." (sections 15-16).
So they claimed, as next-of-kin, the whole estate on the plea that Dikaeogenes 
E had died intestate. But this claim was met by Dikaeogenes IE by a protestation
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(5iajiapxopxcx); a friend of his, Leochares, testified that the estate was not 
adjudicable to the next-of-kin (p.f[ emSixov etvoci x6v xXfjpov, section 16), 
because Dikaeogenes in was the adopted son of Dikaeogenes II. The claimants 
prosecuted Leochares for bearing false witness (5ikt] x|f8X)5op.apxupx(Dv); and 
while the procedure of this suit was to be concluded and decision was to be taken 
by the judges, and although it was obvious, according to the speaker of this 
speech, that the defendant was found guilty by the court and a conviction was to 
be imposed on him, the two parties arrived at a compromise. Dikaeogenes IH was 
to keep his original one-third of the estate and to cede the two- thirds to the sisters 
of Dikaeogenes II. Leochares and Mnesiptolemos became his sureties for the 
performance of this engagement. But eventually, since Dikaeogenes III did not 
perform his agreement, the claimants sued Leochares as surety. The case came 
into court and the present speech was written by Isaeos for this trial, and was 
delivered by Menexenos IV, the son of Polyaratos. The suit was an action to 
compel Leochares to discharge his liability as surety.
The eyyuq took place in the court when Leochares was prosecuted for bearing 
false witness. Dikaeogenes IH promised to give back two-thirds of the estate to 
the three cousins, sons of the sisters of Dikaeogenes n, and Leochares with 
Mnesiptolemos undertook to stand sureties that Dikaeogenes IH would carry out 
his promise. But we are not told anything of the distribution of liability between 
the two guarantors. This suit was brought only against Leochares, one of the two 
guarantors, and there is not any hint in this speech that another action had been 
brought earlier against Mnesiptolemos, or at least that they intended to sue 
Mnesiptolemos later. Does this mean that Leochares was the main guarantor and 
Mnesiptolemos was a kind of co-guarantor with less obligation? But, if Leochares 
was sued and condemned in the whole amount, could he in any way compel
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Mnesiptolemos to bear his share in the loss? Unfortunately these questions remain 
unanswered since the evidence that we have is not enough for any conclusion.
The 5ixq must have taken place at least one year after the eyyuq,
since we leam from Dem.33 Against Apatourios 27 that 6 v6jio£ keXeoei x&£ 
syybai; etieteiodq eTvcci. What ■ ^ -  happened in the meantime must have 
been the following:
The cousins approached Dikaeogenes HI first and asked him to carry out his 
promise. He gave back some of the estate63, but they were not satisfied. They 
expected to recover the two-thirds of Dikaeogenes' II estate free of all claims and 
liabilities (dcvapqnopfixqTa). Dikaeogenes IH denied that he had given such a 
promise and they turned to Leochares, his surety. They approached Leochares, 
probably accompanied by witnesses, and made a demand of what he guaranteed 
according to them. Leochares refused to satisfy them and they brought the suit 
against him for the unfulfilled eyyuq.64
The problem lies on the interpretation of the compact. Let us suppose that there 
was not any compromise between Dikaeogenes HI and the cousins and the eyytiq 
did not take place. In this case Leochares would be convicted for bearing false 
witness and with his conviction the issue of the protestation would be over, which 
means that the cousins, as next-of-kin, would have taken back Dikaeogenes' II 
estate.
But which estate of Dikaeogenes II were they supposed to recover? They 
possibly knew very well that a significant part of his uncle's estate was mortgaged 
by Dikaeogenes IH. But, when they claimed the estate, they had in mind the estate
63 Section 22, JtXf|v yap Stxnv oiKi&oiv tei%ou<; xai ev ITe5up ^fpcovra rtXedpcov cni)5ev
KexofuajieSa, a X k 'd  napa totkov dejievoi xai jcpidjievoi.
64 For this kind of procedure see, Dem. 33. 25-26.
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which once Dikaeogenes E possessed,65 although in the twenty-two years passed 
since the death of the original owner a part of the estate had passed from one 
party to another and fair wear and tear should be expected. What the cousins 
wanted most, was in the first place to recover the estate and not for Dikaeogenes 
IE and Leochares to be convicted, since by their conviction the cousins would not 
succeed in their goal. Therefore, the only way out of the problem was the 
agreement with Dikaeogenes El. At least in this way they might have a hope that 
eventually they would take the property back. If the court, after the conviction of 
Leochares, had declared that the estate belonged to the cousins as next-of-kin, and 
since one part of the estate was mortgaged, I do not think that Dikaeogenes IE 
would repay to his creditors the loans he had taken on the security of some parts 
of the estate.
In my opinion, the agreement between Dikaeogenes IE and the cousins was 
imposed in a manner by the cousins themselves. Nobody had any other alternative 
at that certain time in the court. Otherwise, the cousins would lose a significant 
part of the estate and Dikaeogenes IE with Leochares would be convicted. By 
acting in this way (compromise - eyyuTi), the cousins intended to give more time 
to Dikaeogenes IE to return the estate and a last chance to Leochares to avoid 
conviction.
It seems from the context of this speech that Leochares did not become a surety 
for Dikaeogenes El willingly, because he himself wanted to or because 
Dikaeogenes IE asked him to stand as surety, but because the cousins forced it 
upon him. Leochares did not have any other choice. He had to choose between his
65 Section 3, avayvaxjerai yap \>p.Tv oca xateXuce Aixaioyevr>; o Meve^evov ev tco xXfjptp xai 
m  xpT||iata a  &Xa0e. < A n o r P A < D H  > .
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conviction or to become surety, and he chose the latter.66 However, it is strange 
that the same person who was the defendant in the §vkt|  ipeuSop.apTupxGov 
became the eyywytfK when the compromise was arranged. Now, as far as the 
content of the compromise is concerned I think that the provision of the agreement 
was that Dikaeogenes III would have to restore the two-thirds of the estate free 
from all claims and liabilities (&vapqnopfiTT]Toc), precisely as the speaker 
maintains here (sections, 1, 18, 20, 21), i.e. that he would have to recover and 
hand over everything that had been mortgaged. The reason why I tend to believe 
this, is because the cousins would have been able to recover exactly what they 
eventually managed to recover from Dikaeogenes IH without any agreement with 
him and without Leochares being a surety. The conviction of Leochares in the suit 
of false witness would be for the cousins the way to the estate possessed at that 
certain time by Dikaeogenes IH. If they were satisfied by taking back only what 
remained from the two-thirds of Dikaeogenes' II original estate, I do not think that 
they would need a particular compromise with Dikaeogenes HI. Therefore, they 
tried to recover two-thirds of the original estate of Dikaeogenes II, part of which 
was mortgaged by Dikaeogenes HI and therefore the only person entitled to repay 
his creditors in order to recover the mortgaged estate. Therefore the fact that there 
was a part of the estate which was mortgaged led the cousins to this compromise 
with Dikaeogenes ID.
However, there is a problem as far as the form of the agreement is concerned. 
There was definitely a written agreement where such a provision
66 se c t io n  2 0 , mltcn d  prj evavoov pev t<ov focaaaov, rcevtawoouov ovwov, evav-uov 5e xtov 
rcepiecmpcowDV nyyvato, crux oi5’ o , u  av ercotnoev. 
s e c t io n  22,5id xatka yap xai tow; eyywira*; jcap’ avrow &a|3opev, oi> jcioreuovrs; au r$  a  
(bpriXoyrjos icoujaeiv.
76
(&vap.<pia(5fiTr|Ta) did not exist, and this was the strongest argument of the other 
side (Dikaeogenes in and Leochares). But the speaker says that apart from the 
written agreement there was an oral agreement as well, and some of the provisions 
were written down and some others were not, but they obtained witnesses in 
support of them (section 25, xcov 6k p&pxopai; £7ioiqa(5cpe0a). Since it would be 
inexplicable if the cousins reached a compromise with Dikaeogenes UL into which 
the provision 6cvap.<piapf|XTixa was not incorporated, I think that such a provision 
existed in the oral agreement, although I am not able to explain why such an 
important term of the agreement did not take a written form.
»t* * *
In section 3 we read:
locot; 5£ ETi* e x e i v o v  i p e ^ e ' t a i  i6 v  X6yov, <b£ A ixaioy£ v t]< ; x z  
a  fyiiv dbpoMyqaEV S n av x a  TiETioirpcsv, x a i  aux6^ xrjv 
EyyuTjv 6xi &7i65a)X£v.
The phrase xai ai)x6<; xf|v Eyyoqv 5xi &7i65a)X£V does not have here the 
meaning that "Leochares discharged his duty as surety". After all the context does 
not allow here a meaning like this. The speaker says that Leochares might say that 
Dikaeogenes in has performed all that he agreed to do and he himself xf|v EyyoTyv 
6xi &7i65oox£v. If we take this phrase with the meaning that "he discharged his 
duty as surety", it does not make sense here. Leochares would have to do so, 
only in case that Dikaeogenes IH had failed to fulfil his promise. A guarantor was 
required to take action and carry out the promise given by the person whom he 
had guaranteed for, only when this person had failed to carry out his promise. 
But, just a sentence before, the speaker says that Leochares might allege that 
Dikaeogenes has kept his promise and done everything that he agreed to do.
Therefore, these two sentences (<b^  Aixaioy£vT|<; xz a  f]]iiv 6poA.6yrio£V 
ftrcavxa t i e k o I t t x e , and, xcd ahx6q xt^v  Eyyuqv 6xi A x ^ S o o x e v )  cannot stand
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side by side, if the phrase xijv kyyx>T[V 5xi AtieSgotcev is to take the meaning that 
" he has fulfilled his duties as surety". As the whole period stands here, with the 
two d)£ - clauses depending on the verbal phrase xp£iyexai ex exeivov x6v 
Xoyov and strongly connected with each other by the cumulative conjunctions xe .
. . xai, it cannot refer to the two different possibilities, namely that: either 
Dikaiogenes kept his promise or Leochares fulfilled his duties as surety. The 
syntactical structure of this period denotes that the sentence - xod aox6^ xijv 
EyybTiv 5xi 6c7i6Scdkev - comes as a result of the action of the subject of the verb 
of the previous sentence - dx; Aikoxoy6vt|<; . . .  tietioitjxe.
Therefore, the meaning of xod aux6<; xf^ v eyy^tiv Sxi ^tieScdxev, in this 
context, seems to be that "he gave up his liability as surety", in the sense that he 
was not bound any more by the kyyx>T\ previously undertaken by him. Thus the 
verb &7io5i5(D}ii connected with the noun £yybj\ as its object denotes release from 
the obligation which the subject of the verb (&7to5i5a)}ii) had undertaken by being 
the guarantor when the kyyx>T\ took place.
★ a*e *
In this case here we have an agreement between Dikaeogenes IH and the three 
cousins, the sons of Dikaeogenes' II sisters. Dikaeogenes El promised to give 
back to them the two-thirds of the estate free of all claims and liabilities and at 
that point he converted himself into a debtor. For this promise two persons 
undertook to play the role of sureties, Leochares and Mnesiptolemos. They 
guaranteed that Dikaeogenes HI would keep his promise. The promise of 
Dikaeogenes m and the agreement with the cousins formed new roles for the 
persons involved in this case. Through this procedure, Dikaeogenes IH became 
the debtor with Leochares as his guarantor and the cousins were the claimants. 
Without this guaranty the cousins would not have accepted Dikaeogenes' III
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promise, because they did not believe that he would carry out his promise. The 
gap between the promise and the real action was bridged by the guarantor.
But what was he supposjed to do as guarantor and what was his responsibility? 
If, after the eyytiq had taken place, Dikaeogenes HI fulfilled his promise, then 
Leochares would cease to have any responsibility. He would assume full 
responsibility for the fulfilment of the promise in case that Dikaeogenes in failed 
to do so. The obligation of the guarantor started when the debtor was unable to 
fulfil his obligations. If the debtor repaid what was due, the guarantor's role would 
be restricted to the initial proceedings for the contracting of the eyyhri; he was not 
required to proceed to any further action. But if the debtor failed to repay, then 
the guarantor took, in fact, the position of the debtor, and it was he who was 
required to undertake repayment of what was due. Eventually, in failure of the 
debtor to satisfy his creditor, a demand for the eyyuq was made to the guarantor. 
And if the guarantor refused to pay, then what followed was the 51k q eyyuq^, 
brought against him by the unsatisfied party.
However, the eyyuqifu; might take action even before he was required to do 
so. He might co-operate with the debtor for the return of what was due, or he 
could press the debtor to carry out his obligation. Since the eyyuqxq; had put 
himself under such an obligation by undertaking to guarantee that the debtor 
would actually do all that he agreed to do, he was the person who would really 
care more. So, the existence of the eyyuqxqc; operated as a kind of pressure upon 
the debtor to carry out his obligation. His quality as eyyuqxfis gave him the right 
to organise and plan the fulfilment of the obligation. In this example here 
Leochares, soon after his engagement as eyyoqxq;, took action towards the 
discharge of Dikaeogenes' IH duties. He suggested that Protarchides should hand 
over to him the building which he possessed in lieu of the dowry, on the ground 
that he was surety, and receive from Dikaeogenes III on his wife's behalf her share
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of the estate. This is an instance of co-operation between the debtor and the 
guarantor. The guarantor plays an active role from the very first moment of the 
eyybil and he acts in a way like a representative of the debtor.
However, there is something here that should attract our attention. The text, as 
it stands at this point (section 27) with pronouns instead of the names of the 
persons meant here, makes not very clear whether Leochares himself, who 
demanded the house from Protarchides, was to hand over to him his wife's share 
of the estate. The translator of the speech identifies Leochares as the person 
meant behind all these pronouns.67 Leochares demanded the return of the building 
which originally came from Dikaeogenes' II estate, before the estate was re­
divided. Up to that point his demand might be comprehensible to us.
But we did not expect to hear that Leochares, after taking the building back and 
after the re-dividing of the estate, was supposed to return to Protarchides the 
share of the estate which accrued to his wife, since Dikaeogenes IE was the 
person required to do so. So, in section 27 there might be a problem as far as the 
identity of the persons hidden behind the pronouns is concerned.
In the sentence "f^ioo 6 Aecox&pite x6v npcoxapxiSqv 7iapa5i56vai avr@ 
xfjv oovondav . . . , <b^  6vxi eyyvTixfi avrtp, x6 5£ jiepo^ U7t£p xtfe yovaiK6<; 
xofi xXfipon Tiap’ atfroi) Kopi^eaOcn.'', the pronoun a&x6<; is mentioned three 
times. The question that arises here is who is the person mentioned by each of 
these pronouns. In other words, is the first aoxtp identical with the second ocoxcp 
and the third nap’ anion? Or are different persons hidden behind these pronouns?
First of all we should notice that, apart from the nominative of anx6<;, the 
oblique cases of anxdi; are the ordinary personal pronouns of the third person,
67 E.S. Forster, baeus: with an English translation, (London) 1927, p. 179. See also, Wyse, baeus, 
p. 446.
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him, her, it, them. E.g. ZxpaxTflbv auxbv &7i£5eil;e, "he designated him as 
general".68
Now, the first auxcp is the indirect object of the infinitive 7iapa5i5ovai, which 
is the object of the verb f^xoo which has AeooxdpriS as the subject. The 
identification of auxcp with Aecox&pei is obvious, not because Aecox&prii; is the 
subject of the main verb (t\i;xoo), but because of the following participle - dx; 
6vxx eYYDTixfl.
The case of the participle (dative) indicates that it is connected with a previous 
dative in the sentence which must be the subject of the participle; this previous 
dative is the pronoun ocuxq). Therefore, aux<p is the subject of ovxx. From the 
predicative of the subject of the participle (eYY'U'nxfi) w© conclude that the subject 
of the participle is identical with Aecox&pex, since we know that Aeoox&prn; was 
the guarantor. Therefore, the first auxtp refers to Aear/dpex.
The second auxcp, in the phrase dx; Svxi eYY'UTVtfl otfcx$, seems at first sight to 
be the subject of the participle. But, if it is the subject of the participle, then the 
participle must be a "dative absolute participle", which does not exist in the 
Greek syntax, since this particular ocuxip, as a syntactical term, does not have any 
other function in the sentence. But, even though we take this aoxq) here as the 
subject of the participle, we have to explain why the participle is in the dative, 
which inevitably leads us to the first ocuxcp (the indirect object of 7iapa8i56vocx) 
and we have to confront the question why the speaker puts in his speech twice the 
subject of the participle. Does he do this because of emphasis, or because he 
feels that the audience needs this repetition of the participle's subject, since he 
has mentioned it so long before - actually ten words before? For those who will
68 W.W. Goodwin, A Greek Grammar, (London) 1894, pp 213-214.
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take this second auxcp as the subject of the participle, I cannot think any other 
explanation that they might give, apart from this of the repetition of the subject.
In my view, I would not find it unlikely that this auxq> might be connected with 
the phrase cbc, 6vxi eyyorixfl as a separate syntactical term which has nothing to 
do with the subject of the participle and denotes another person. According to this 
syntactical order, the first auxcb (the indirect object o f 7tapa5i56vai) is the 
subject of one, ovxi; Eyyorjxfl is the predicative of the subject, and aoxq) depends 
on d)Q 6v ti eyyuTytfl and indicates the person for whom the subject of the 
participle (Aecox&pEi) was a guarantor (eyynrixfl). Namely, according to this 
interpretation, auxtp refers to Ancaioy£vei, whose name has been mentioned 
some lines before, at the beginning of the same period where these sentences lie 
(eTiei 5’ ouv &7t£axTj AiKaioyevT]<;. . . ) .
The third pronoun ai)x6<; found in this sentence is in a prepositional form - 
7iap’ aoxofi, and connected with the infinitive xopi£ea8<xi. The subject of 
Kopi£ea0ai is IIpa)xapxi5qv who is "to receive what is due” nap’ afcxou. T6 
jiepoc; xo$ xlfjpoo is the object of xopx£ea8<n. IIpa)xapxx8Tv; would expect to 
receive his wife's share of the estate from Dikaeogenes IE himself, not from the 
guarantor (at least at the stage when this dealing between Leochares and 
Protarchides took place - i.e., before it was certain that Dikaiogenes III did not 
fulfil his promise). Dikaeogenes III was required and under the obligation to 
return the two-thirds of the estate. The guarantor was not required to pay 
anything, as long as the debtor had not broken faith and did not fail to carry out 
his obligation. Dikaeogenes IE himself gave up the two-thirds of the estate and 
promised to return it, while Leochares stood surety for him, that he would 
actually perform his promise (section 18). Therefore, the claimants o f the estate 
would expect to receive their share of it from Dikaeogenes EE and not from 
Leochares. Thus, nap’ auxou refers to Dikaeogenes IE, who took over the house,
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through Leochares, but did not pay over the share of the estate,(7iapaA,cxpd)v 8£ 
ifiv aovoxidav to pepoq ou rcapeSooxe.).
* * *
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Demosthenes xxxiii Against Apatourios
The Demosthenic speech 33 - Against Apatourios - is a speech delivered 
at a TKxpaypacpfj proceedings, napaypaipfi69 is a special plea in bar o f court 
action. It is a procedure that results from a formal objection by the defendant that 
his case cannot be brought to trial because the original prosecutor brought a 
prosecution in a way forbidden by law. napcxypatpfi means "prosecution in 
opposition". The procedure was a separate trial (see, Isocr.18.2; Harpocration: 
Siapapxopia, Siapapxopevv) in which the man who was the defendant in the 
original case was the prosecutor, and the original prosecutor was the defendant. 
Any 7iapaypa(pT| had to be grounded on some particular provision of a particular 
law and it was used to block prosecution in a number of cases in which the 
defendant claimed either that the case had already reached a judicially valid 
settlement (either by release and discharge - fttpecm; and b.notXkayf[ - or by 
arbitration, when the decision was accepted by both parties)70, or that a case 
could not be prosecuted because the plaintiff had chosen the wrong legal 
procedure.71
A1k « i  spTtopiKcti (maritime suits)
The nature of the maritime suits is offered by the speaker in Dem. 32.1:
69 Our sources for Jcapaypa<j>T| are: Dem. 32-38, which are called icapaypa<pucoi Xayoi; Isocr. 18 
(Pros Kallimachon) and Lysias 23 {Kata Pankleonos'). For a full study on this subject, see, KJ.Wolff, 
the amsche Paragraphe (l 966).
70 Dem 20 Lept. 147, 24 TLmokr. 54, 36 For Phorm. 25, 38 Nausim. 5.
71 Dem 32 - 5: in these cases the main plea is the alleged wrong use of the SCicp epicopucfj.
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oi v6pox xeXevoooxv, <5 ftvSpei; 5xxaoxax, x6c<^ 5xxa<; exvocx xoxq 
vaoxXfipoxi; x a i xox<; eji7i6pox<; xfiiv ’A8ijva£e x a i xa>v *A8ljvT]88v 
aupPoXaxoov, xax rcepi ©v &v ©ax auyypatpav72
Such suits are reserved to vauxXTpox (ship-owners) and ijircopox (merchants) 
and must deal with agreements concerning maritime trade to or from Athens.73 The 
plaintiff’s claim must be based on a contract which is in written form and maritime 
suits may take place only when a contract exists. Otherwise a claim that is not 
based on a written agreement between the litigants must follow another legal 
procedure. Maritime suits are brought before the QeopoQexax (Arist. Aik PoL 
59.5, Dem. 33.1). The speaker in Dem. 32.1 closes the paragraph by adding av 
5e xxq a a p a  xauxa Sxx&^Tjxax, pf| eiaaydoyxjiov etvax xt)v 5xxt|v, i.e., if neither 
o f the litigants in the case is an Ipaopoi; or a vauxXT]po^, or if there is not a 
written contract, or if the agreement does not concern maritime trade with Athens, 
then this legal action (the maritime suit) is not maintainable. Thus the defendant in 
a maritime suit has the right to present a napocypcccpTj if one or more of these 
conditions are not fulfilled - zo% 5£ aepi x&v pf| yavop^vcov aupPoXaicov exc; 
xpxaxv x a 8xaxap6vox<; ercx xi)v napaypaqjfiv xaxatpetyexv &5©xev 6 v6jio<; 
[Dem. 33.2].
Apatourios brought a maritime suit against the unnamed speaker of Dem. 33, 
alleging that he was surety for Parmenon. Apatourios had some dealings with 
Parmenon who was accused that he had caused damages to Apatourios. The 
matter was settled by arbitration and in Parmenon's absence judgement was given 
against him by default; the damages were assessed at twenty minai. Since 
Parmenon never came back to Athens, Apatourios sued against the speaker of
72 See also, Dem. 33.1, 34.42.
73 Maritime loans or contracts for renting cargo space on a ship.
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Dem. 33, alleging that he was surety for Parmenon. The speaker denied this 
accusation and used the process of 7iapaypacpf| to bar legal action against himself 
claiming that there did not exist between him and Apatourios any agreement 
(aop.p6X.onov), which was needed to form the basis of a 5vkt] ejiTtopiKq (section 
2 and 3). Therefore, according to the speaker, the maritime suit brought by 
Apatourios was not admissible (eioocY&YpmO- It becomes obvious from this 
speech that the case concerns arbitration agreements and the question of surety in 
these proceedings. However, it was brought as a 5ikti epnopncfi likely because it 
was originated from a commercial maritime loan. The backround of the case is as 
follows: Apatourios, a merchant and shipowner from Byzantium, had taken a 
maritime loan the repayment of which to his creditors was secured on his ship. 
We do not know details about the nature of this loan. He arrived in Athens owing 
forty minai on the security of his ship, but the period for which the loan had been 
made had expired and the creditors were pressing him to repay the money. They 
were ready to take over the ship (since it was security for the loan) and 
Apatourios avoided confiscation by raising a new loan. He first approached his 
compatriot Parmenon who promised him ten minai, three minai of which was paid 
down at the time. Then they both approached the speaker of this speech who 
although he had the good will to lend Apatourios the rest of the money, did not 
have ready money at the time. So the speaker introduced Apatourios to the 
banker Herakleides who lent Apatourios thirty minai. The speaker acted as 
guarantor for this loan. He had to guarantee that he would repay the loan if 
Apatourios failed to do so. This is the only known case of a bank loan with a 
third party acting as guarantor.74 Parmenon happened to fall out with Apatourios, 
but, since he had agreed to furnish him with ten minai and had already given him
74 See, Bogaert, Banques et banquiers dans les dtesgrecqties, Leiden (1968) p. 355.
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three of them, he was compelled to pay the remainder as well.75 However not 
wishing to make any agreement with Apatourios Parmenon paid the seven minai 
to the speaker who entered into a contract with Apatourios:
obvfiv Tioiofyiai iffc v£<b£ x a i xcov 7iai5cov, £©£ 6hio5oxt] x&£ xe 5£xa pvoh; 
a<;  5x’ epofi t&apev, x a i x&£ xpx&xovxa <&v xaxeoxTiaev ep£ eyyuTixfiv xq> 
xpocTie^ xxfl.
He bought Apatourios' ship with the crew (slaves), but Apatourios had the right 
to release this contract by repaying the loan. If the whole sum was repaid, 
Apatourios would take back control of the ship and the crew. This type of real 
security is called npaon; etix \bozi, a technical term that does not occur in the 
literary sources but it is known by the horoi, stones which were put on an 
immovable property to indicate that this property or some piece of it stood as 
security for a. loan transaction. In other words TipSoiQ erci M oex was given 
publicity by way of the horoi. Written contracts with more details about the date 
when repayment was due or the rate of interest (if there was any) existed, at least 
in most cases of this type of real security. Eight of the horoi (seven from Attica 
and one from Amorgos)76 include the phrase "according to the contract. . .", and in 
both the Pantainetos and Apatourios cases there were written agreements. The 
sources for this institution consist of more than one hundred horoi and a few law- 
court speeches of which Dem. 33 Against Apatourios and Dem. 37 Against 
Pantainetos seem to give more information for this institution.
75 Pringsheim, The Greek Law o f Sale, Weimar (1950) p. 5 8.
76 Horoi from Attica, no 11,13,17, 27, 32, 39, 65; horos from Amorgos, no 104. See Finley, Studies 
in Land and Credit in Ancient Athens, 500-200 B.C., (1985) Appendix I: The texts of the horoi, pp 118- 
176.
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The borrower "sells" a piece of an immovable property (land or house) or a 
movable (such as a ship, as in Dem. 3 3.8) to the lender for the sum of the loan. As 
the name of this institution indicates, the sale is carried out on condition that the 
seller may release the property from the buyer's claim on it by repaying the 
amount of the loan to the creditor (within a given period). Meanwhile, in most 
cases the borrower retains possession of the property, this is obvious from the 
case of Apatourios and Pantainetos and from the phraseology of the horoi.77
But let us turn now to the point where we started from. Apatourios required 
forty minai. For this amount of money two parties contributed: Parmenon who 
gave ten minai and Herakleides, the banker, who provided the rest. Interest is not 
mentioned, so we assume that there was not any and the loan might be classified 
among the "friendly loans".78 The speaker went surety for the loan made by the 
banker. It means that he undertook the responsibility to repay the money in case 
that Apatourios defaulted to do so. Probably there would be a written or verbal 
agreement before witnesses between the banker and the speaker as far as the 
eyyhq was concerned.
But the question which arises here is about the involvement of the speaker as 
eyyuriTfn;. Was not it enough for Apatourios to be introduced to the banker by 
the speaker? Why did the speaker undertake to stand surety for Apatourios? The 
banker could have followed the same procedure as the speaker did, i.e., to lend 
him the thirty minai and "to buy with the right of redemption” his ship. Instead of 
doing so, he acted through a guarantor, whose appearance might be essential. The 
guarantor made a purchase of the ship and the crew until the two sums are repaid;
77 However, there is a case in which the creditor-buyer seems to hold possession; Is. 6 On the Estate 
o f Philoktemon 33- 34. see, Finley, op. cit pp 36-37.
78 Millett, Lending and Borrowing in Ancient Athens, 1991.
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this is a rcpaaxq h i  Xx>ozx transaction in which two parties usually are involved: 
the borrower who becomes debtor and is the "seller” and the creditor who lends 
the money and is the "buyer”. In our case, however, the borrower-debtor is 
Apatourios, the creditor is Herakleides, but the "buyer" is the speaker. Thus this 
instance here does not match the pairs:
borrower - debtor = "seller" } of a property which 
lender - creditor = "buyer" } stands as security.
We rather have the pairs:
borrower - debtor = "seller" 
lender - creditor = nothing 
guarantor = "buyer".
It seems that in order to secure his position as guarantor the speaker entered 
into this contract (Tipaon; eni Xvozx) with Apatourios. So the ship and its crew 
stand as security not for the loans themselves directly but for the EyybTi itself. 
The concept here is that, if the debtor failes to repay the loans, then the £yyuT|xf|<; 
will make use of the property secured by him, since he will be responsible for 
repayment as guarantor. Herakleides seems not to be concerned about this 
complex situation, he is satisfied with the speaker as £yyx)T]xf|<; and that is why he 
lends Apatourios the money. It does not seem that he is an easy banker-lender 
since he had to be persuaded by the speaker to make this loan; the whole 
responsibility is taken by the guarantor himself, %p6 pevo<; 5e ‘HpccxXExSn xcp 
TpaTie^Lifl Itiexooc ai>x6v SavExaax x& xpTjpaxa kapdvxa eyyurixfiv.
We should try to understand the significance of the £yyi>T| in this context. 
Although it is hardly possible to determine the legal status of this transaction by 
only one instance of loan for which a third person acts as eyyxjTixfn;, we might, 
however, speculate about the role of the eyyuri applied in this context.
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The banker probably is a metic.79 the ayyuqxite is an Athenian citizen. As a 
metic, Herakleides could not own property in Athens or claim any right on it. If 
the property was immovable (land or building), then it would be comprehensible 
that, as a metic, Herakleides would need a third person, citizen, who would play 
the role o f the £yy\)TyiT|<;. The 8yyur[Tf|^ would take legal action against the 
debtor in the case that the latter would fail to repay the loan. The eyyuiytfn; 
would confiscate the property, he would sell it and he would give the money to 
the banker, because the banker, being a metic, cannot acquire the property. The 
contract o f the eyyuq would be released and the story would be over.
But here we deal with a ship as security. And, as we know, metics could own 
movable property. The question why Herakleides needed a guarantor in order to 
lend money to Apatourios seems rather difficult to answer. But a simple 
explanation and a way out of this difficulty may be the following: in section 6 we 
hear that Apatourios orixidjpavoi; xouq xPTloxa£ emQupoftvxa^ xf]<; ved)£ 
5iap£p^qK£vcci orbxbv ev x(p epuopia), ^va Kaxdcaxcocn xfiv va$v ei<; fcnopiav 
xaxaaxf|oavx£<; xou &7io5ouvai x& XP'^ IM-Cxxcx- The creditors had created a very 
negative impression of Apatourios in the trade market, so that it was extremely 
difficult for him to find the money needed for repayment of the original loan. So, 
Apatourios' bad reputation on the one hand and the type of the loan that he was 
asking on the other hand, they both imposed the necessity of a third person as 
£yyuqxf|<;. The responsibility and the risk undertaken by the guarantor was a 
great one, so that he secured his position as £yyuqxTi<; by Tipaoxg £iti X.uo£i of 
the ship and its crew.
79 We are not told anything about his political status, but we can assume that he is a metic and not an 
Athenian citizen, since he is a banker, a profession seldom practised by citizens, see p. 92 a  80.
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Apatourios by raising this loan satisfied his creditors and dissuaded them from 
confiscating his ship. But not long after these transactions, the bank of 
Herakleides failed and Herakleides went into hiding. Demand was expected to be 
made upon the speaker of this speech for the thirty minai, the liability for which 
he had assumed. At the same time Apatourios tried to remove the slaves and get 
his ship secretly out of the harbour. Parmenon who learnt this fact went to the 
harbour and prevented the sailing of the ship. The speaker informed of this affair 
by Parmenon set about considering how he might himself get free from his 
guaranty to the bank and how Parmenon might avoid the loss of the money he had 
lent Apatourios through the speaker:
eoKOTiouprjv 5e 5tud<; aox6<; x£ 6c7ioX.u8fiaop.ax iffe eyyuTi  ^
life 87ti xfiv xpccTis^av, xa i 6 !*£vo£ pfi 6c7ioX.ex a  5x epou 
xouxcp e 5 6 c v £ i g £ v .  (section 10).
He then posted men to guard the ship and approached the "sureties of the bank" 
- xox£ eyyuTixax^ ifjc, xpa7i££T|<;- to whom he told the whole story and turned the 
security over to them, telling them that Parmenon had a lien of ten minai on the 
ship:
xaxaoxfioac; 5& qn>X,axa<; xf)<; vecbq 5xrjyriaccpT]v zoic, 
£yy\)Tixax  ^ xffe xpaa&^ Ty; xfjv TipS x^v, xa i 7iap£5coxa xo 
£V£Xopov, £X7id>v auxou; 5xx 5£xa pvax evexqaav xq> !;6vcp 
£v xfl vrp. (section 10).
But he did not stop there; he attached the slaves in order that, if any shortage 
occurred, the deficiency might be made up by the proceeds of their sale :
xafixa 5£ 7ip6c^ a«; xaxTiyyuTiaa xoix; TiaxSa ,^ W zx xx<; 
SvSsicc yxyvoxxo, x6c £lX.£X7iovxa £X tgqv naxScov zXt\.
Eventually the ship was sold for forty minai, the precise amount o f the loan; 
thirty minai was paid back to the bank and ten minai to Parmenon, and in the
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presence of many witnesses the contracts, in accordance with which the money 
had been lent, were cancelled.
We do not know exactly what happened to Herakleides' bank when it failed. 
What we can assume is that there would be a demand for cash in order to 
overpass the crisis. The bank now would impose repayment of all the loans which 
had been made and Apatourios' loan was probably one of them in the list of the 
bank. Herakleides, the banker, had gone into hiding and other persons came to the 
fore - the eyyurixai xpa7i6£r|£.
But who were these eyyuTixod iffe xpaTUE^q  ^ and what were they supposed to 
do? Bankers in Athens were almost without exception metics, and often ex­
slaves.80 One of them was Herakleides. Among other services they offered, 
Athenian bankers lent money on security, but when the security was real property 
the situation would be rather complicated. Metics did not possess the right to own 
real property in Athens; not only they could not have farm land under their 
ownership but they could not even own the houses where they stayed. A metic 
banker, who would make a loan to a citizen on the security of a piece of real 
property, would not be able to claim this property if the debtor defaulted. Since 
the law did not recognize him any right of owning real property, he was blocked 
from the right to seize the security in satisfaction of his claim. Therefore it would 
be worthless for a metic banker to accept real property as security for a debt. As 
a result of this, Athenian citizens who required cash could not easily borrow from 
metic bankers.81 In order to surmount this obstacle, a metic banker could use a 
citizen as an agent or middleman. Therefore, these eyyurixcd xqc, xpaii6£r|9 might
80 see, Bogaert, op. cit 386-8; Whitehead, The Ideology o f the Athenian Metic, Cambridge 1977,
p.116.
81 see, Finley, op. cit 77-8; Millett, op. cit 224-229.
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be Athenian citizens who would be involved in loan transactions, loans made by 
the metic banker to Athenian citizens, secured on real property. These guarantors 
would take legal action against the debtor who defaulted on repayment of the 
loan. They would foreclose the security, probably would sell it and would return 
the amount of the loan to the metic banker. Apart from this, they might guarantee 
repayment of the bank's deposits,82 but it is difficult to determine how they could 
do so. At any rate, they seem to play the role o f representatives of the bank. 
Millett prefers to identify them with the sureties required of metics in public and 
private transactions.83
In the case that a metic lender (not banker) made a loan to an Athenian citizen 
on security of real property, again he would need a citizen(s) to rely on, so that, if 
the debtor did not repay the loan, they would act on his behalf confiscating the 
secured property. This seems to be the case to which a horos*4 refers:
6po£
K a i o iida< ;
7i£7ipap&v[a)] 
v ETli X u o[£ i]
'AYVo5f||i[a)] 
i  K a i  o u v e v
YDTyiaii;
XXX
The transaction here is Tipotcn  ^ ini M oei; the name of the borrower-debtor is 
not mentioned. The name of Hagnodemos has neither patronymic nor demotic and
82 Bogaert, op. cit 39s.
83 Millett, op. cit 228.
84 Finley, op. cit 125 (horos no. 18)
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we can assume that he might have been a metic. Hagnodemos lent the owner of 
the property the sum of three thousand drachmas. He accepted real property as 
security but only with the co-operation of some citizen-sureties (ouvevyurixai^- 
co-guarantors). Should the debtor default, these co-guarantors would foreclose the 
mortgaged property.
JM
Parmenon, who had prevented Apatourios from taking his ship out o f the 
harbour, sued Apatourios for damages for the blows which he received from him 
and because he had been prevented by him from making a voyage to Sicily. 
However, it was agreed that the matter should be settled by arbitration (section 
13-14)85 and the rules for the arbitration were written in a contract which 
disappeared later. This written contract arranged who was going to be the 
arbitrator(s), what the matter was, and who was surety for each party. But this 
written agreement had been lost and there was a dispute whether the reference 
was to a single arbitrator or to three arbitrators.
According to the speaker, they submitted the matter to one common arbitrator, 
Phocritos, and each party appointed one man to sit with Phocritos; Apatourios 
chose Aristocles and Parmenon chose the speaker. They agreed that, if these three 
arbitrators were of the same opinion, their decision should be binding on both 
parties, but, if not, then they should be bound to abide by what any two should 
determine. Having made this agreement they appointed sureties for one another to
85 For private arbitration generally, see; Harrison, The Law o f Athens, ii: Procedure, Oxford 1971, pp 
64-66; MacDowell, The Law in Classical Athens, 1978, pp 203-6; Isager and Hansen, Aspects o f 
Athenian Society in the Fourth Century B.C., 1975, pp 107-8; Todd, The Shape o f Athenian Law, 1993, 
pp 123-24.
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guarantee its fulfilment. Apatourios appointed Aristocles, and Parmenon 
Archippos. At the beginning they deposited their agreement with Phocritos, but 
later with Aristocles. So, according to the speaker the arbitrators were three, with 
full authority to decide, and if the attempt at negotiation fail, then the parties 
should have to accept the decision of the majority (i.e. the decision of the two 
arbitrators). However, according to Apatourios the matter was arranged in a 
different way. He claimed that Aristocles was the only arbitrator who had 
authority to decide on the matter, and that Phocritos and the speaker were 
empowered to do nothing else than seek to bring about a reconciliation.
There was also disagreement about the guarantor for Parmenon. According to 
the speaker guarantor for Parmenon was a certain Archippos, But Apatourios 
claimed that the speaker himself was the guarantor.
Eventually, Aristocles pronounced judgement by default against Parmenon, 
who was required to pay twenty minai. Parmenon was bound to abide by this 
decision, in accordance with the law which made an arbitrator's judgement binding 
gala) x& Kpi06vxa bnb xou Sxaixqxob xupxa. Dem. 21.94)86.If the losing 
party did not conform to the decision, he was liable to a SiKTj e!;obA,Ti£.87 
Parmenon, then, was compelled to pay the sum awarded against him but he had 
gone away from Athens. Apatourios, claiming that the speaker's name was 
entered in the articles of the arbitration agreement as security, brought suit against 
him, charging that he undertook to pay any sum that might be awarded against 
Parmenon, if Parmenon failed to do so. This is the suit against which the speaker 
of this speech (Dem. 33) brought the Tiapaypoccptj, claiming that there was no 
agreement between himself and Apatourios.
86 see also: And 1 On the Mysteries 87; Lysias Fr. \6  Against Arkhebiades\ IG ii2 179.8
87 see: Dem. 52 Against Kallippos 16.
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The speaker's strongest argument that he was not the guarantor for Parmenon is 
the time: 7tp©iov j±&v ouv x6v xpdvov epaoxcp fvyoupax p&pxupa etvax xo$ pi) 
x6 £yxA,qpa exvocx. (section 23).
The argument runs as follows (sections 23-27): The agreement of arbitration 
and the award of Aristokles took place two years ago. But Apatourios, although 
merchants could bring action every month fom Boedromion to Munichion (from 
September to April - winter period),88 did not bring any action; not only 
immediately after the arbitrator's decision, but not even after a year had passed. 
Therefore, the speaker concludes, if he had become a surety for Parmenon, 
Apatourios would not have waited until two years afterward to exact the sum 
guaranteed, but would have proceeded to do so at once. The speaker brings a 
deposition that Apatourios was in Athens during the period when 5vkocx 
epTiopxKax took place and that he never brought a suit against him, and closes this 
argument about the time by making use of a law concerning the Eyyoq itself.
So, in section 27 the speaker says:
Aap& 5f| pox xcd xov v6pov, o<; keA.£x>ex x&q £yy\>a<; 
etiexexoxx; etvax. xax owe xoxupx^opax xq) v6pq), dx; qx> 5ex 
ps 5xxqv Souvax ex fiyyuqodpqv, ctXXa papxupd pox (prjpx 
x6v vopov stvax xou pi) EyyuqoaoOax xod auxov xouxov- 
eSeSxkocoxo ydp &v pox xfr; Eyyuq^ ev xq> xpovcp X<P 
vopcp ysypappEva).
NO MOT.
At this point the law is read out in the court. Unfortunately we do not have this 
law. Certainly it is a law about £yyx>Ti, but we do not know whether what 
mentioned here is the paraphrase of the whole law or only a paraphrase of one
88 see: Cohen, Ancient Athenian Maritime Courts, 1973, pp 42-59.
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sentence (provision) o f a law concerning eyy'OT] generally. Whatever it might be, 
the only information we get for sure here is that 6 vopoq xeXeuei xdtq eyyua^ 
sticisiouc, etvax - "the law orders that the guaranties shall be for one year”.
This provision of the law may be interpreted as follows:
1. Guaranties are valid only for one year.
2. They become invalid, if not renewed at the end of a year. Probably it 
would depend on the willingness of a claimant.
3. The party who is to claim a guaranty should claim it within the time 
specified by the law - i.e. within one year. If one year passes after the 
appointment of the guarantor and no action has been taken against him 
so far, the eyyuT] becomes invalid, and no claim for it could be made 
after one year.
4. The guarantor is given a space of time (one year) within which he should 
fulfil the eyyuT], in the sense that he is not obliged to pay what is due 
immediately when his obligation as guarantor starts, but he can pay the 
eyyfjT] at any time within one year, up to the last day of this one year.
If we are to take as possible this last interpretation of the phrase lac, eyyua^ 
enexexouc; exvax, then we may say that this might be the very purpose of the law. 
The law seems to protect the guarantor. It gives him the space to act, to press the 
losing party of a case, for whom he has stood as surety, to fulfil the award. If he 
does not manage to do so, again the guarantor has the space to face the award 
himself. The law probably takes account of the fact that eiyy'DT] is such a risk and 
a guarantor may be involved in a very unpleasant situation without being himself 
the wrong-doer, and gives him this space of a year in order to fulfil the eyy-ftT].
The claimant, however, can demand the eyyuT] immediately after the award is 
given against his opponent. The procedure is the following:
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The claimant accompanied by witnesses approaches the guarantor and makes a 
demand of the amount guaranteed (eyyuTi). If the guarantor offers the Eyyuq to 
him, the matter is closed. But if the guarantor does not fulfil the eyyuTi and 
refuses either to pay or that he is the guarantor, then the claimant brings a suit
A
against him for the unfiilfied eyyuq and this is the suit called 5vkt] eyytiris.
xaxxox Tipoofjxev, ex 6 \ikv nappEvoov cbq&fpcei aux<p xfiv 5xxqv, 
ey© 51 eyyuTyEtfis qv, TipoosXGexv auxdv pox f-xovxa papxupaq x a i 
dtTiaixfjaai xf|v eyybqv, ex  pi) Tipam^pooxv, ev x $  e ^ e ^ G o v x x  
Evxauxcjr x a i ex  p£v auxcp &71e 5 x5 o o v , xopxaaaGax, ex  5£ pfj, 
Sxxa^saGax. x&v yap xoxobxcov EyxXqpaxcov npoxspov x&q 
dtnaxxfiasxi; Tioxofivxax &7iavxe<; f\ 5xx6c£ovxax.
(section 25-26)
In section 28, it is implied that a guarantor himself should take measures in 
order to avoid any unpleasant consequences, in case that the person for whom he 
has guaranteed fails to carry out a desicion given against him. So, the speaker 
says that, if he actually was the guarantor for Parmenon, he would not have 
allowed himself to be deserted in difficulties by Parmenon as his surety to 
Apatourios. We are not told what he would have done, but probably in first place 
he would have prevented him from going away before the arbitration procedure 
was over.
In section 29ff, he refers to the lack of any written agreements in accordance 
with which the arbitration took place and he had stood surety for Parmenon; and 
he concludes that, since Apatourios cannot prove that his name is written as 
surety in any agreement between him and Parmenon, Apatourios' claim is 
baseless and he has instituted a suit contrary to the law.
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In this speech we hear about two instances of eyybri in two different contexts. 
Firstly, a loan is to be made by a banker to a merchant in order to cover another 
previous loan. For this loan a third person stands surety for the borrower and 
future debtor to the banker-creditor. This third person assumes fiill responsibility 
for repayment of this loan in case that the debtor fails to do so. The obligations of 
the guarantor start when the debtor is unable to fulfil his obligations. If the debtor 
repays the loan, the guarantor's role will be restricted to the initial proceedings for 
the contracting of the loan; he is not required to proceed to any further action. But 
if  the debtor fails to repay, then the guarantor takes, in fact, the position of the 
debtor, and it is him who is required to undertake repayment of the loan.
The second instance of syyoq concerns arbitration proceedings. A private 
arbitration is to be set up; the disputants choose their arbitrator(s) and each party 
appoints a third person as surety to the other. Each guarantor undertakes the 
responsibility that the arbitrator's judgement will be binding for the person for 
whom he stands surety and, if this person is the losing party, that he will carry out 
the award; otherwise, each of them undertakes to pay any sum that may be 
awarded against the person for whom he is the guarantor. Again, in this instance 
of eyyuTj the obligations of the guarantor start when the losing party o f the case 
does not fulfil his obligations.
In both cases, in failure of the debtor to satisfy his opponent, a demand for the 
eyyuT] is made to the guarantor. And if the guarantor refuses to pay, then what 
follows is the 51xq eyy6q<;, brought against him by the unsatisfied party.
* * at*
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THE VERB ETTYQ AND THE NOUN ETTYH 
IN DEMOSTHENES XXXIII 
The verb eyyotib in the middle voice with the accusative of a person and the 
dative o f a person is used to denote that the subject of the verb stands security for 
the person in the accusative to the person in the dative. The syntax of the verb is 
as following:
iy jv3 fta i n vd  nvi = "I am guarantor for someone to someone else”, 
e.g. ei yap TiyyoTjadcpTiv eyd) xouxcp x6v nappevovxa (section 28). 
Sometimes the dative is missing and the form of the phrase may be:
iyyv&fiai rtva=  ”1 guarantee someone”, ”1 am guarantor for someone”, 
e.g. o u k  fjyyur|a6pT]v ey<b x6v nappevovxa (section 2 2 ) ,
dooxe ei rjv fiyyoripevo<; eyd) x6v nappe  vovxa (section 24).
A variation of this expression may be as follows: Instead of the verb eyyucopai 
sometimes we have the noun eyyoTp:f|<; with the verb eipi, plus genitive of a 
person. The noun eyyuT]xfi<; denotes the person who (of course he is identical 
with the subject of the verb eipi) guarantees, and the person in the genitive is the 
person for whom the eyyuT]xij<; gives the surety. The form is:
irrvqTffg eijj.1 n  vog= ”1 am guarantor for someone”, 
e.g. ei 5ti xcp &A.T|0eiqc eyyx)T]xf|(; t|v xou napp£vovxo<; (section 23).
The noun eyyDTixife is also used with the verb xa0iaxT|pi accompanied by an 
accusative of a person and a dative of a person. The subject of the verb 
Ka0ioxripi denotes the person who seeks the security, the accusative with the 
noun eyyvrixTi*; denote the guarantor and the person in the dative is the person to 
whom the surety is given. The form is
KaOioTiyii n va  iyyvijn jv  n w  = ,lI make somebody surety to
somebody else”,
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e.g. Kai x&g xpxaxovxa ©v KaxeoxTjoev k\ik &y'{x>t\tt\v xcp xpane^ixj]
(section 8),
eYYOTix&£ xooxmv 6&A.tiA.ox£ KaxeoxTioav, ox>xo<; p£v £K£xv<p x6v 
ApiaxoKX6a, 6 5e IIocpp6v©v xobxq) ’'Apxxnrcov Moppxvobaxov
(section 15).
The nonn EYY’^ ’n1^  is also used with the verb kapP&v© and an accusative of 
a person. The subject of the verb is the person who accepts a guarantor to 
himself, and the accusative denotes the guarantor. The form is:
Xcqip&vo) viva iyjvTjTjjv=  "I accept somebody as guarantor" 
e.g. grcexaa auxdv Savexcax xa xpijjiaxa Xapdvxa ep£ eYYvtixf|v
(section 7).
The noun kyyx>x\ in the genitive with the verb 6c7ioA,bopax is used to indicate 
discharge from the surety. The subject of the verb is the guarantor. The form is: 
(knoXvoficn vfjg iyyv-qg = "I get free from a guaranty" 
e.g. 80KO?xox)pT]v 5£ 6tx©<; ax>x6<; xe a7ioX.x)0ljaopax xfj<; eYY^S 
£7ix xfiv xpdTis^av (section 10),
Kax tjpftxa £x otix l* a v 6 v  pox £xti aoxcp &7ioXx)0f|vax xf\q eyY^n^ 
xf|^ rcpot; xijv xpdtTie^av (section 11).
The noun eyy^ ti is used in a variation of phrases in which it sep/es either as 
the subject or as the object o f a verb:
subject: xov vopov, 6<; K£^£i)£x x&£ £YY^ a<; £7i£X£xoxx; atvccx (section 27), 
no><i £vfjv... fj 5xaxxav Y£v6a0ax f\ eYY^ Tiv (section 30). 
object: 5tx©<; auxoi; x£ <x7ioA.o0ljaop.ax xfj<^  kyybrfe (section 10),
5xa xx.. .  o o k  . . .  £7ip&xx£XO xf|v £YY^tiv; (section 23),
&AA.’ £o0b<; x 6 x £  axaircpaxxev &v p£ xijv eYY'bTjv (section 24), etc. 
It is also found with a preposition infront of it to denote either the reason (dx; 
£Y<b Sxoc xijv £YY^“nv fitpdvxKOc x&<; ouvOfpcat;, section 37) or a situation (£V
101
Eyybfl KcxiaXeiTiojievov, section 28). Sometimes the noun eyyuT] in the genitive 
serves as a complementary element of a verb (sSeSixaaxo yap av poi i q ;  
eyyuTv;, section27; oo5’ cxv eyd) eyyuiv; brcdSixoi; rjv, section 29).
The noun eyyorj means "suretyship”, "guaranty". As it is used in this speech, 
the same noun, syyurj, seems to take two slightly different meanings of which the 
second depends on the first.
The first meaning is "suretyship”, restricted to "the act of suretyship”, i.e. 
someone's undertaking to stand surety with all the consequences it might have, hi 
this category we might classify the following phrases:
- eaxoTiotyiqv 5e Shod?; aox6<; xe ccTtoXuGfiaojiax iqg syyoTv; eni xfiv
xpdnE^av (section 10),
- ev eyyuq xaxaXeindpevov (section 28),
- Ticot; evqv . . .  f\ 5iaixav yev£a0ai f[ eyyuqv; (section 30),
- Tioki) y&p 6 A,6yo<; ?jv poi iaxvpdxepoi; 6poX.oyouvxx xf|v eyyuqv ETii xai;
aov0fixa<; i£vai (section 29),
- xi pooA.6jievo<; fipvoupqv &v xf|v eyyuqv; (section 29).
The second meaning which the noun eyyuq seems to take (in this speech) is 
"the sum guaranteed". The word is identical with an amount of money. Under this 
meaning we might classify the following phrases:
- Si& xi Tipcoxov p£v oox euObi; xffc yv6aetDi; yevop^vqi; ercpaxxExo xf^v
eyyuqv; (section 23),
- a X)C EuOix; x6xe Eiafcnpaxxev &v pe xt)v eyyutyv (section24),
- 7ipoa£X0£iv aux6v poi l^ovxa papxupac; xa i &naixf|oai xqv syyuqv
(section 25),
- x a i xt^ v eyyhqv atixov £iG7ip6ci;ai; xf|v 7ip6<; xqv xp&rce£av (section 28).
In sections 23, 24, 25, the eyyuq mentioned is identical with the amount of 
twenty minai and in section 28 it is identical with forty minai.
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However, sometimes it is hard to decide which meaning we should take as the 
primary, in some examples of the word eyy'DT], both meanings fit the context very 
well:
- xov v6pov, KsA.euex x&<; eyyx>a<; e t ie x e xoxx; exvax (section 25),
- eSeSxiccxaxo y&p &v pox xt|<; eyyx>T|<; e v  x<p xp6vq>. .  - (section 25),
- o\)8’ av  eyd) iffo eyyuTv; x)ti65xxoi; fjv (section 29),
- <b<; eyd) 5x& xtjv  eyyftTiv rupdcvtxa xa<£ aovOfjKoti; (section 3 7 ) .
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DEMOSTHENES 24. AGAINST TIMOCRATES
The public debtors were of different kinds, and a man might become debtor to 
the state in various ways. Public debtors might be classified as follows: (1) 
Lessees of public property and leasable revenues (oi xdc p ia66aqi<x 
pioGofyievoi); (2) Tax-farmers (oi cbvoupevoi x& t£Xt|); (3) Persons who had 
been sentenced to a public fine; (4) Persons who had borrowed property from the 
state which was due to be returned (Dem. 47 Euerg. 22); (5) Persons who were 
holding public property, although they ought have turned it in to the state.
In the first two cases (Lessees of public property and tax-farmers) we have a 
contract between an individual (or more than one) and the state. The individuals) 
contracted to make payments to the state at future dates which must have been 
clearly defined in the contract. For each case a fixed date would have been 
appointed and the lessees or tax-farmers were required to make payment to the 
state up to that date or at least on that date at the latest. Failing to do so, they 
became public debtors and liable to the consequences that a state debtor might 
have. When the lessees of public property and the tax-farmers made the 
agreement with the state, they were required to provide sureties (eyYuqxai). 
These ayyoTixort were men who promised to pay the sum due, in the event that the 
debt was not paid by the debtor himself.
The farmers of public property or duties became public debtors as soon as 
they exceeded the appointed term of payment. As public debtors they were 
subjected to ftxipia and they were regarded as disfranchised until they paid up. 
We learn from Andocides that in the last years of the Peloponnesian War
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defaulting contractors and other men in debt to the State became &Tijioi.89 The 
dcTipia was put into force immediately upon failure of payment at the appointed 
period. A state debtor (under a contract) was required to pay at the latest in the 
ninth prytany of the year, if he failed to pay, his debt was doubled and if it was 
due to the gods' treasury it was multiplied by ten90; and if the double amount was 
not immediately paid, his property was confiscated and sold to pay it. We also 
leam from Andocides that before 403 the boule had authority to imprison any tax- 
collector who defaulted on his payments to the state.91; this right of imprisoning 
the tax-collectors is also contained in the oath of the boule of five hundred ; in 
this way the possibility of their escape was prevented and they were deterred in 
advance for any irregularity in their payments. The sureties were also responsible 
for payment of the debt and they were subjected to the same penalties.
Let us turn now to the persons who had been sentenced to a public fine. 
If a man condemned to pay a fine to the state for some offence did not pay it, he 
was reckoned among the public debtors. In public suits any fine which was 
imposed went to the state.92 A prosecutor in a public suit who either dropped the 
prosecution or failed to secure one-fifth of the votes was fined 1000 drachmai and 
was ftxipot; until he had paid.93 According to the law in Demosthenes (Against 
Meidias, 47) if any person was condemned for and sentenced to pay a
money penalty, he should be imprisoned until he paid it: ’E&v xiq i>Ppt£n
89 And. 1 M /st. 73-74
90 And. 1 Myst. 73 ; Dem. 24 Ttmocr. 82, 59 Neair. 7
91 And 1 Myst. 92-93
92The only exception was that half of the fine in aphasis, and three-quarters of the amount confiscated 
in an apographe went to the successful prosecutor.
93And 1 Myst. 33,76; Dem 21 Meid. 47,103 ; 24 Ttmocr.l and others.
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xxva...Ypa<p6a0a> np6<; xoix; 0£apo06xa<; 6 Poi)X6pevo<; ’A0T|vaxa)v of<; 
I^ eoxxv... 6dv 56 dpyopxoo xxpT|0fl xffc fiPpeax;, 5s56a0a), 6dv £Xe60£pov 
bPpxafl, p.6xpx &v exxsxafl. In this case the fine was to be paid immediately after 
the sentence, otherwise the party so sentenced should be instantly imprisoned, hi 
Demosthenes 24 Against Timocrates 105, a law concerning theft, maltreatment of 
parents and desertion is quoted:
NOMOI KAKOZEQZ TONEQN, AXTPATEIAZ 
— *Edv 56 xx<; drcax0fl xc&v yov6a>v xaxtoaEax; EaXcoxcb^  f| 
doxpax£xa<; f\ Hpoeipqp v^ov atixqi x&v v6pa>v £lpyeo0ai, eiaiobv 6nox |if| 
Xpfl, Sqadvxaw adxdv oi IvSexoc xai exaaydvxcDV ei<; xfiv fjXxaxav, 
xaxqyopeixco 56 6 pouX6p£vo<; ot<; 6!;£oxxv. 6dv 5‘dX<$, xxjidxco fj f^xaia 6,xx 
XPfl xa0£xv afcxbv fj dnoxExoax. 6dv S’dpyopxoo xxpqOfl, 5£56a0oo x6ax; dv 
exxEiafl.
According to this law a person convicted and fined for one of these offences 
was inprisoned until he paid the fine.
Timocrates had proposed a law which provided that the offenders who had 
been prosecuted by an EiaayyeXxa, and condemned to pay a fine, should be 
imprisoned until such time as they paid: Txpoxpdxqs eTtiev 6tx6oox ’AOqvortcov 
xax’ sxaayyEXiav ex xffe PooXffe fj vuv exoxv ev x$  SEopcoxripxcp x6 Xoxndv 
xaxax£0<&ax, xai pf| 7iapa5o0fi fj xaxdyvcoaxs auxoov xov; 0£opo0£xax<; \>n6 
xofi ypappax6a)<; xofi xaxd npuxavsxav xaxd x6v EiaayyEXxxxdv vdpov, 
5e56x0ocx xofo; vopo06xax<; Exadysxv xoix; gvSsxa ex£ x6 5xxaoxf[pxov 
xpxdxov0’ fpepcov dtp’ ?j<; dv rcapaXdpcoaxv, 6dv j±f| xx 5r||ioaxQi xcoXbt], edv 
56 pfi, 6xav npc&xov oT6v x’ fj. xaxqyopexv 5’ ’A0qvax(Dv x6v PooXdpEvov ot<; 
e^eoxxv. edv 5’ dX$, xxpdxa) i\ fjXxaxa xspi aftxoft 6,xx dv Soxfl di;xo<; eTvox 
7ia0£tv f[ dxoxExoax. 6dv 5’ dpyupiou xxpq0fl, 5e56o0cd x6a>s dv Exxsxafl 6,xx 
dv adxofc xaxayva>a0fl. (Dem. 24, 63)
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In Ar. A ik Poi 63.3 there is the rule that a public debtor who sat as a juror, 
and was informed against by £v5eil;i^ and convicted and fined by a court, was 
imprisoned until he paid both the original debt and the fine.
Therefore, the persons who were convicted to pay a fine to the state became 
public debtors, if they did not pay the fine immediately after their sentence, hi the 
examples above, imprisonment was stipulated by the law. This kind of 
imprisonment was not part of the sentence itself, since the sentence was a money- 
penalty, but it was inposed as a means to exact payment of the money-penalty, 
when it was not paid by the condemned party immediately after the sentence.
We are to suppose that in cases in which the law did not prescribe 
imprisonment, it could be added by the increase of punishment (TipoatqiTipa) if 
the law permitted it. However, imprisonment did not always take place. In the 
passage from Andocides^ nothing is mentioned about it, whereas if 
imprisonment was a general rule it must have been mentioned.
Therefore, from the day that any person was sentenced to a fine which was not 
paid immediately, he became a public debtor. ’Axipia was the punishment 
immediately connected with the condition of a public debtor, while imprisonment 
was not always an immediate consequence of a public debt, except when the law 
expressly provided it. The debt was to be paid to the state by the ninth prytany 
and if it remained unpaid until that date, then a more severe penalty was imposed, 
the debt was doubled and the debtor's property was confiscated.
To sum up, we should try to define the main principles of the law concerning 
public debtors in the fourth century. They are divided in two main categories: (1) 
Those who became public debtors by undertaking to collect a tax or by other 
form of contract and failed to carry out their duties towards the state, and (2)
^Andl Myst.lZ-lA.
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those who became public debtors as a result of their conviction in a public suit. 
’Axxpxa was inposed on all public debtors; they were required to pay by the ninth 
prytany, otherwise the debt was doubled and in failure of its payment confiscation 
of the property was to follow. As far as the lessees and tax-farmers are 
concerned, they had to provide guarantors when the contract was made, persons 
who guaranteed the payment to the state. But in the case where a man became a 
state debtor on his conviction in a court he might be required to pay the "debt" 
(money-penalty) immediately after his conviction and if he failed to do so, then he 
was imprisoned until he paid it. Sometimes imprisonment was a stipulation of a 
certain law for a certain offence or in other cases imprisonment could be imposed 
by the jury as an additional penalty. Therefore there was this category of state 
debtor who suffered all the same consequences with the other state-debtors but in 
addition they had to suffer something more- imprisonment until the final payment 
of their money-penalty. And there is something more; a man who undertook, for 
instance, to collect a tax on behalf of the state, made a contract with the state, a 
date when the debt was to be due was fixed and he had time in advance to prepare 
the payment. But a man who was sentenced to pay a fine to the state and 
immediately was required to pay it, otheiwise he would be imprisoned, was in a 
more serious situation.
In 353 Timocrates introduced a law which was milder than the existing law 
governing state debts:
*£711 xf|<; II(xv5iovi8o<; apdbxqg, ScdSek&xti xffe 7ipoxctvei<x<;f TxpoKp6xt]<; 
etnev, xai xivi x6v 6<pexX.6vxa)V xq> STtyiooxcp npooxexxpqxax xotx& v6pov f\ 
Kax& T|rqcpiopa SeapoO f[ x6 X .o x t i6 v  7ipoaxxpq0f[, etvax a(>x$ f\ &M.q> (m&p 
c k c x v o x )  eyyuqxdn; xaxaaxfjaax xoO 6<pkfipaxo<;f ob^ &v 6 8fjpo<; 
Xexpoxovfiafl, pfiv exxExoexv xb fcpybpxov 6 ooq&Ev. xouc; 6k npo£Spou$ 
enxxexpoxoveiv ercdcvayxei;, dxav xx<; xaOxaxdtvctx PoM.Tytax. x$ 6k
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xaxaaxqaavxx xoi)£ EyyvTytdu;, e&v 6cnoSx8$ xfi n6Xz\ x6 dcpytipxov eqf $  
xaxfcaxqas xoi)£ Eyy\)Tyi;&<;, 6«p£xa0ax xofi S£ap.ou. s&v 8£ p.fi xaxaP<5tA.fl x6 
frpybpxov atixoi; f\ oi Eyyuqxai eirt xffc ev&xt^ npuxavExai;, x6v p lv  
E ^syyu r^vxa  8£86a0ax, xftv S£ Eyyuqxc&v Sqp.ooxav stvax xfiv obaxav. nepi 
S£ xffiv (bvo\)p6va>v x& x6A.t] x a i  xftv syyxjajpfcvcov xoti ExXeydvxcov, x a i  xffiv 
x& p.xo06ox)ia pia8oup6vcov x a i  £yyoa)pL&va>v, x&<; np&i;£x<; sTvai xfl h6A.ex 
x ax d  xob<; vdjioxx; xoix; xExpivoax;. e&v 8’ Eni xffc ev&xtv; f\ SexdcxTis 
Tipoxavexa^ Sq&fl, xo$ bax£pou Evxauxofc sn i xffe Evdcxqi; 7ipx)xav8xa<; 
exxxvexv. (Dem. 24 Ttmocr. 39-40)
Against this law a certain Diodoros brought a ypaqrii napav6p.Gov and, in the 
speech written for him by Demosthenes (Dem. 24 Timocr.), he claimed that 
Timocrates introduced that law because he wanted to save Androtion and his 
companion from the consequences of the embezzlement of which they were guilty 
at the time of their embassy to Mausolos of Caria. According to Diodoros (Dem. 
24 Ttmocr. 11-16), Androtion, Melanopos, and Glauketes were sent as 
ambassadors to Mausolos, prince of Caria. The occasion of the embassy, 
according to the scholiast, was to complain of the intrigues by which Mausolos 
was endeavouring, in the interest of the Pesian King, to overthrow the democratic 
governments in the islands of Chios, Cos and Rhodes. The ship on which they 
sailed was commanded by Archebios and Lysitheides. On their way they fell in 
with a merchant vessel from Naucratis in Egypt, and took it to Athens as a prize 
for adjudication. The Athenian authorities decided that this was a lawful seizure 
of enemy's property as Egypt was in revolt from Persia, with which Athens was at 
the time on friendly terms. The proceeds should have come into the treasury, but 
after considerable time no payment had been made. However, on the motion of 
the orator Aristophon, a commission of enquiry (^qxqxax) was appointed to 
receive information against all persons retaining public property. Before this body
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Euctemon and Diodoros laid information against the two trierarchs, who 
commanded the vessel conveying the ambassadors, and denounced them as not 
having accounted for prize-money the amount of nine and a half talents. When the 
matter came before the assembly, the three ambassadors admitted that they, and 
not the trierarchs, were in possession of the money, but Euctemon moved and 
carried a decree that the trierarchs should be responsible for recovering the 
money. So, as the trierarchs were legally responsible, it was decreed that payment 
should be exacted from them and that a SxaSxKOtaxa should decide the question of 
liability as between them and the ambassadors. Androtion and his friends brought 
a ypocqrii 7iapav6pcov against Euctemon, but failed to obtain a verdict and they 
had only the alternative of immediate payment or of being adjudged defaulters. 
Timocrates, the present defendant, interposed, according to Diodoros, on their 
behalf with this law against which the prosecution was directed.
Timocrates' law proposed that, if any one of the public debtors, by any law or 
decree, had been, or should be, condemned to imprisonment as an additional 
penalty, it should be lawful for himself or any one else on his behalf to give 
sureties for the debt. The sureties should be approved by vote of the Assembly 
and the debtor who has given sureties should be released from the penalty of 
imprisonment. The debt should be paid by the ninth prytany of the year, but if at 
that time neither the debtor nor his sureties had paid it, the debtor who gave 
sureties should be imprisoned and the property of the sureties should be 
confiscated. Timocrates excluded from this decree the following persons: tax- 
farmers, their sureties, and their collectors, the lessees of leasable revenues, and 
their sureties. For those the established laws were to be in force.
Thus this decree would not affect the state debtors who were in a contract with 
the state. But by iffiv 6epeiA.6vT©v icb 5ripooxcp in the first clause of this decree 
were meant the other kinds of public debtors, namely: (1) persons who had been
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sentenced to a public fine, and (2) persons who were still holding state property 
while it was due to be returned to the state.
We have seen that when a person was condemned by a jury to pay a fine for 
certain offences, it was stipulated in the law that he was to be held in prison until 
he paid it [v6jio<; bppeox;(Dem. 21,47), v6po<; Konabaeax; y° v - 6coxpcxxcioc<^  
(Dem. 24,103), and the law of Timocrates (Dem. 24,63)]. There were also other 
cases where a person might have been condemned to a fine and the jury might 
have inposed the additional penalty of imprisonment until the debt was paid, 
although imprisonment was not stipulated in the law for this particular offence of 
which the person was sentenced (apoaxtpTpa).
It seems that Timocrates' decree would apply to persons who became state 
debtors immediately on their conviction in a court. And we can easily understand 
the reason why he excluded from his decree all the contractual debtors. Because 
they had already what the other categories of debtors were gaining -i.e. payment 
by the ninth prytany of the year. This decree laid down the same consequences, at 
the same time (ninth prytany), for all public debtors. It provided for all the 
different kinds of public debtors a common starting point from where they became 
liable to the same legal treatment.
The first clause of his decree goes as follows: xai . . . etvai ai>x<$ &M.q> 
bn£p exsivou eyYunx&<; K axaaxfjaai.. .;  not only one person, but at least two 
or more should stand as guarantors. They would probably share exactly the same 
responsibilities and the obligation would be in solidum. In the event of the 
debtor's default, they would be all sued and condemned in the whole amount for 
which they guaranteed and they would bear their share in this amount. Not only 
the debtor himself was entitled to nominate sureties for his debt, but also any 
other person on his behalf could do the same. In this case the most probable is 
that the person who nominated sureties on behalf of the debtor would be one of
111
the eyyuTiTori. Most likely these eYYUTixoti would come from the very close 
social circle of the debtor (friends - Anliph. 5.47 f[ xoi£ qriXon; xo% ejioft; 
E^EYYufjaai) or even fr°m his own family (excluding probably those who 
belonged to the same oTko$).
These persons had to be approved as guarantors by vote of the Assembly. The 
law itself says nothing about the criteria under which the Assembly would (or 
would not) accept them to be guarantors. However a comment on this point made 
by the speaker lies in section 85: xi<; y&P nopiEixon tpoLvkoxx; 6tv0p6noo<;; 
ob<; dxav bpet<; &7ioxeipoxovfiaT|x’ &iiT]M,di!;£xai; pctoXoi &vQpmno\ (men of 
straw?) were not acceptable as guarantors. But how are we supposed to 
understand the meaning of (paOkoi ftvOpamoi? Are they men of bad nature or men 
of a low social class? Both meanings are well attested in our texts but I think that 
here this adjective refers rather to men of low social class - as it was defined by 
the lack of a considerable property. Since the £YY^nxo^ would be subjected to 
confiscation of their property if the debtor failed to pay the debt, therefore their 
property itself was a decisive point for their approval by the Assembly.
\it\v 8KXE1GEIV x6 fcpYbpiov: the eyy^H10^  would guarantee that the debtor 
would pay the amount in which he was indebted, but if he did not pay, then the 
guarantors themselves would be the persons from whom payment would be 
exacted. By providing sureties the debtor could remain free until the ninth 
prytany, if he had not paid by then he would be imprisoned and the property of the 
sureties would be confiscated.
I have mentioned above that persons who were condemned in a public suit to a 
money - penalty became state debtors and they might have been inprisoned until 
they paid the debt. In my view, by Timocrates' decree these money-penalties 
(debts) were affected; immediate payment was replaced by a contractual 
obligation to pay by the ninth prytany.
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Against this law a ypatpfi 7iapav6p.GOV was brought by Euctemon and 
Diodoros, and the trial came on about the beginning of 352. The heading xax& 
Tipoxpdxoug and the repeated demands for punishment show that the person of 
the defendant was attacked, and not merely his law, and therefore the time-limit 
of a year had not expired.95 Unfortunately we do not know what the result of the 
trial was. If Timocrates was found guilty, then his law would be annulled and he 
would be punished by a fine.
In section 144 the speaker (of Dem.24 Ttmocr.) says that Timocrates intends to 
cite a statute already existing as a precedent of his own proposal; this statute 
contains the following words:
oi>5£ SfiacD 'AGTjvoricov otiSfcva, &<; &v eyyuT|x6cq xpeti; 
xaGiaxfi x6 aux6 x&.o<; xeXoftvxa^, n k 1 \v  edcv xu; £7ii npoSoaxQC xffc 7i6>.£<D£ 
f[ cut xaxaA.ua£X xo$ 5f|pou auvicbv 6&<p, f[ x&.o<; 7ipx&p.£Vo<; f\ 
£yyuT]adp£VO(; £xA,6ya)v pfi xaxapd&fl.
In section 147 the speaker notices that: ai>x6 p&v xa0’ a\)i6 obx £oxi v6po£, 
x6 ox>5£ 5f|oco sA8i]voda)v oti56vaf £V 8£ x$ Spxcp x<p PouA.euxix$ y^ypaaxon.
After the appointment and Soxipaoxa of the bouleutai, the new members of 
the boule took an oath of loyalty to the state. According to Ar. A th Pol 22. ii 
the bouleutic oath was first sworn in 501/0. The boule was created primarily as a 
probouleutic council and until 462 its judicial power was limited. In 462 with the 
reforms of Ephialtes the Areopagus lost a significant part of its powers which 
were divided among the boule, ecclesia and Sixaoxfipia. The boule was given
95There was a time-limit for ypacpn icapavojjuov. If proceedings were not instituted within one year, 
the proposer of a new law could no longer be punished, but it was still possible for any person to proceed 
by ypacptj laxpavofjuov against his law. D. M. MacDowell, The Law Si Classical Athens, p .50.
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judicial powers and this transfer of judicial procedures may have involved an 
addition to the oath sworn by the bouleutai. Restrictive clauses were embodied in 
this oath and the clause that we have in Dem. 24 Ttmocr. is one of them. By the 
fourth century the boule was functioning as a law-court in a number of ways. One 
of its judicial functions was that it heard eiaayyeAAcxi.96
EtaayyeMa97 was one of the three procedures under which the boule and 
ekklesia might act in a judicial capacity; the other two were the ftnoxeipoxovia 
and rcpoPoXfi.98 EiaayyeMa was available against those guilty of acts threatening 
the stability of the state. There was a separate law, the v6po<; ciaayyeXxiKd^99 
that named the following grounds for impeachment (Hyper. 3 Euxen. 7-8,29):
(a). Attempt to overthrow the constitution (section 7ff.)
(b). Treason (section 8)
(c). Taking of bribes by an orator (sections 8, 29, 39)
wOn this subject see: M.H. Hansen Eisangelia (Odense 1975), Harrison The Law o f Athens vol. II 
50-59, Mac Dowell The law in Classical Athens 183-186, P.J. Rhodes The Athenian Boule (Oxford 
1972)162-171.
97The verb doayyeXXeiv means "report', "give information about' and in a technical sense indicates the 
initiating of a legal procedure called eLaayyeXia (impeachment).
"That the boule was the normal recipient of eioayyeXuxi, see Isoc. 15.314, ypacpcb; pev icpo$ tom;
(teajiodera^ daayyeXicu; 5 aq tfjv PouXrjv, icpoPoXa; 5’ ev St^ ko.
"According to Ar. Ath. Pol viii. 4, Solon enacted a law of elaor/yeAXa against men 
who attempted to overthrow the government: rout; eiti KaxaXuosi xou Sf|pou 
auviaxapfcvout; SKpivev (f| xov ApeoTiayiicov pouXf|), 2oX©vo<; Bevrot; vopov 
elaoryyeXiaq itepi oroxcSv. It is probably this law that starts the history of the vbpoc, 
eiaotYYeXitKoc;.
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(d). Making deceptive promises to the people - 6hi&tti 10O 5f|po\) (Dem. 49 
Timoth. 67).
Therefore this process (eioayyeXxa) was used for certain types of cases. But 
this does not exhaust the list of offences which might be dealt with by 
eioayyeXia. The law of impeachment found in Hypereides did not forbid that 
offences other than those mentioned in the law should be tried by eiaayyeAAa, 
but merely made certain that these specified offences should be so tried. And the 
fact that Hyperides complains about the degeneration of eioayyelia into a means 
of dealing with petty crimes (Hyp. 4 Eux. 1-3) suggests that there was no finite 
list of offences to which it could be applied. By the middle of the fourth century 
the process of eioayyelia was widely employed for the most trivial offences.
The procedure followed in eiaayyeAAa submitted to the boule could be 
summarised as follows: After an information concerning an offence to which 
eiaayyeXxa was applicable had been given before the boule against someone, the 
boule could either reject the information out of hand, or fix a day in the near 
future for a hearing before it. Hearing by the boule constituted a full trial and to 
make sure that the accused man would appear for trial the boule took strong 
measures; if the charge was one of treason or conspiracy to overthrow the 
democracy or charge against any tax-farmer or his surety or collector who was in 
default, then the accused man had to be held in custody until the day when the 
trial took place. But if the charge was something else apart from the three 
categories above, then the accused man could by providing sureties that he would 
appear for trial avoid the imprisonment. On the day fixed for the hearing the boule 
considered the charge and if it acquitted the trial was over. But if the boule 
convicted, it could itself impose a penalty of up to five hundred drachma! 
However if the offence was regarded very serious and a heavier penalty was 
thought appropriate, then the case had to go further. In this case a second hearing
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was required before the exxXqata or a Sixaoxqpiov. A decree (xaxdcyvcoai^) 
was passed referring the matter for trial to one of these two bodies. The 
8ea}io06xai were the eia&yooaa 6cpxfl when an eiaayyeXAa was referred to a 
Sixaoxqpiov.
Let us turn now to the clause itself found in Demosthenes 24,144. We know 
that this clause was a part of the bouleutic oath, but not one of the original 
bouleutic oath sworn in 501/0. The most probable is that it was embodied in the 
oath at some date after the reforms of Ephialtes in 462 B.C.100 The clause speaks 
about the right reserved by the boule to imprison and from the speaker's 
discussion on this point (sections 145-8) we leam that those who might be 
imprisoned by the boule were persons who had been accused of an offence and 
that this kind of imprisonment was not penal but precautionary.101 We also know 
that an accusation could be brought before the boule only by the procedure called, 
eioayye^ia.
Therefore this clause here, "of>S£ Sfioco ’AGqvalcov ooSfcva...." refers to the 
following case: when a person was accused of an offence by etoayyeMa before 
the boule he could by providing sureties that he would appear for trial avoid 
precautionary imprisonment imposed by the boule. But if he did not provide 
sureties, then imprisonment until trial seems to have been the rule. However 
persons accused of very serious offences (such as, treason, conspiracy against the 
democratic constitution, and misappropriation of public money) did not have the 
right to nominate sureties in order to avoid imprisonment but they had to be held 
in prison until their trial. According to the speaker this rule was intended for the
100 See: Rhodes, Boule pp. 194ff.
101 See : Bonner - Smith, The Administration ofJustice from Homer to Aristotle, Vol. H, p.275
116
protection of people who had not stood their trial (for those who were untried- 
dncpixoi) and its purpose was that they should not plead at a disadvantage, or 
even without any preparation at all, because they had been sent to prison (section 
145).
But why did this rule exclude certain persons from the right of nominating 
sureties? ... nA-fiv e&v xn; eni TipoSooigt iffe fj exi KaxaXboei xofi
Sfipoo aovnbv fj t£Xq<; npidtpevo^ fj eyyuTia&pevo*; fj ZKkkyaw pfi 
xaxaPdX]]. As Harrison points out102, the word 6&a> here does not have the 
meaning ''convicted”, since the speaker says in the next sentence that these men 
are still ftxpxxoi, but it means "against whom a prima facie case has been made 
out”. Therefore when there was a prima facie case the boule had the right to 
arrest and imprison the accused man until his trial (precautionary imprisonment), 
since the danger of his escape would be one of a high possibility. Again, as far as 
the tax-farmers, their sureties and the collectors are concerned, they had a definite 
date by which they had to make payment to the state. Their failure to satisfy the 
state was the prima facie evidence that they were guilty. In both cases the trial, 
which would follow after the £iaayyeA.ia to the boule and would probably take 
place in a Sixaaxfipiov or in the exx^r[oia, would not have to consider whether 
the accused man was guilty or innocent, but to impose a fine on him. Therefore 
persons accused of treason, attempt to overthrow the democracy, and 
malversation were not entitled to provide sureties but they were imprisoned by 
the boule until their trial.
However, except in the case of these certain specific offences which I have just 
mentioned above, a person accused by eioayyeXia could stay out of custody if 
he provided as sureties three persons of the s a m e  property c l a s s  a s  h i m s e l f :  o i) S £
102 AR.W. Harrison, The Law o f Athens, vol.H: Procedure, p. 56 a  2
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Sfiooo ’AQqvaitDV o()56va, 6<; &v eyyoqx&i; xpet<; Ka&iaxfi x6 ai>x6 x£Xo<; 
xeA.o$vxa<;. He had to provide three sureties, not just one, and the Scholiast took 
the passage to mean that the collective property of the three sureties was to be 
equal to that of the defendant: x&v xpr&v eyyuqx^v e%6vxa)v xf^ v foqv ofioiccv 
exeivqp $7i£p eyyoffivxai. But if that was the case, then just one person whose 
property was equal to the defendant's property could stand perfectly as 
eyyoTjXTjc;, and there would be no need for specification of the number three. And 
since these three eyyuqxai would be from the defendant's own property class 
their collective property would be larger than his.
Nevertheless, I cannot think of any other reason why this restriction (x6 ai>x6 
x£Xoi; xeX.o6vxai;) was put down in the oath, apart from the following: After an 
accusation against a person had been made, it was important for the boule to 
ensure that this person would appear for trial. It could either imprison him or 
accept sureties that he would appear for trial. In the first case, the defendant 
would surely appear for trial since he was imprisoned. He would be tried and if 
found guilty he would have to face the verdict. But if after providing sureties the 
accused man failed to appear for trial, then the sureties would suffer in his place 
the punishment due to him. And if the punishment was a financial penalty 
(financial penalties must in practice have been much the commonest) then the 
sureties would have to pay it. Therefore, the property of the eyyuqxai became a 
substitute for payment of the financial penalty imposed on the defendant103
The question, however, remains unanswered, i.e. why three guarantors but not 
one of the same property class were required? Since there is no evidence to 
support any certain answer to this question, we are bound to make an assumption. 
First of all, it would be much more difficult for an accused man to find and
103A n t  T etrlfr  1 2  : p ey d & a * ;v icep  noXkStv e y y ik x ^ a w m v o v r o .
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nominate three persons to be sureties for him than to nominate just one. But only 
accused men who provided three sureties (sYYuqx&q xpsii;) were not remanded in 
custody, any other person was imprisoned, and the result would be the restriction 
to a small number of cases in which eyyutyiccx were involved. Was that the 
boule's intention? Whatever the answer is, it seems that the boule by requiring not 
less than three sureties placed those who intended to provide sureties in an 
awkward position. Furthermore the requirement of EYYuqxoti ocut6 x£Xo<; 
xsXo'uvxet; refers to the property of the sureties and by this requirement the boule 
made a provision against an accused man who after providing sureties failed to 
appear for trial; in this case the sureties were responsible for the trial and the 
imposed punishment (money-penalty was the commonest), and it would be easier 
for the boule to exact payment from three persons than from one. Probably the 
three sureties distributed the liability between themselves and bore their share in 
the money- penalty.
Finally, we should notice that the <patiX,oi &v0pamox of the section 85 might be 
illuminated by the eyyutixoI aux6 x&.oq xeXoOvxei;, although both phrases 
are employed in two different contexts for two different cases of eyyvt1xo^ - The 
common basis, however, is the obligation of the eyyutixoci to pay themselves an 
amount of money (either a debt due to the state or a money-penalty), when the 
defendant for whom they had guaranteed failed to fulfil his obligation.
Evidently from some unknown date, but probably after the reforms of Ephialtes 
462/1 B.C., any person accused to the boule of an offence dealt with by the 
procedure of sioaYY^ta, had the right to provide sureties in order to avoid 
precautionary imprisonment until his trial. The sureties had to be three persons 
from his own property class who guaranteed that the accused man would appear 
for trial. The responsibility undertaken by the EYY^ nxc^ was on a large scale and
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consisted in that they suffered in the defendant's place the punishment due to him, 
if he failed to appear for trial.
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Lysias 13 Against Agoratos
After the victory of Lysander at Aegospotamoi (end of summer, 405 
BC.), his fleet was blockading the Peiraieus and the Peloponnesian armies under 
the Spartan kings, Agis and Pausanias, lay encamped outside the city (Xen. Hell 
2.1.30-32; 2.2.1-2,5-9; Plut. Ak.3T). During December supplies of food began to 
give out. The people asked for peace if they could retain their walls and become 
allies of Sparta, but the Ephors demanded the demolition of part of the Long 
>nfalls. Kleophon then carried a decree to put to death anyone who proposed the 
acceptance of such terms. The people next appointed Theramenes to negotiate 
with Lysander. He stayed away for three months, during which time many died of 
starvation and Kleophon was executed for desertion, the chaige being brought by 
members of an oligarchic club. When Theramenes returned, he and nine others 
were appointed with full powers to arrange the terms of surrender. They presented 
themselves before the Congress of the Spartan Alliance (XenJfe/I2.2.3-4;10-18). 
The envoys returned with terms which the Athenians accepted with relief : the 
IpngVfells and fortifications of Peiraieus were to be destroyed; the Athenians lost 
all their foreign possessions but remained independent, confined to Attica and 
Salamis ; their whole fleet, with the exception of 12 triremes, was forfeited ; all 
exiles were allowed to return ; Athens became the ally of Sparta, pledged to 
follow her leadership. When Theramenes brought back these terms, there was 
relief in Athens that an end to death and famine was in sight. However, the 
removal of Kleophon from the political scene had net still stifled resistance. Some 
military men, including former generals and taxiarchs, protested against the terms 
Theramenes accepted (Lysias 13.13,16: Xen. Hell. 2.2.22: &vt£17i6vtcdv
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tivgdv aoxcp). Among them was Dionysodoros, whose murder by the Thirty 
became the occasion of Lysias Against Agoraios (13).
We have mentioned in the previous section (page ....) that eioocyyeXla was 
one of the three procedures under which the Boule and the ekklesia might act in a 
judicial capacity. EioayyeXta was available against those guilty of acts 
threatening the stability of the state and in the vopo<; eloaYYS^ xiKo^  (Hypereides 3 
Euxen. 7-8, 29) the grounds for impeachment are named: attempt to overthrow the 
constitution (section 7ff.) and treason (section 8) were among them.
In Lysias 13. 19-22 we leam that at a secret meeting of the boule a certain 
Theocritos gave news of a conspiracy and informed the boule that there was a 
certain number of persons who were plotting to defeat the Peace with Sparta: 
£iaeX0ov 8& eIq iomiT|v xfjv pouXfjv ev oaioppfp:© Oeoicpixot; prjvuei oxt 
aoXXEyovxcxt xiveq EvavxixDoopevoi xotQ to ts Ka0ioxa|i£vou; upaypaoL Theocritos 
declined, however, to give their names but he said that there were others who 
would give the names, and revealed only the name of Agoratos. The fact that 
Theocritos laid his information before the boule at a secret meeting does not mean 
that he was a member of the boule. AJthough meetings of the boule were open to 
the public (Dem. 8 Chers. 4: 19 F.L 17), the boule was entitled, when it chose, 
to meet in secret, and there is a number of references to these secret meetings 
(G.E.M. de Ste Croix CQ2 13(1963)115 n.l). Non-members also could be given 
permission to address the boule, either at a public or at a secret meeting (see 
Rhodes Boule 40-2).
Theocritos' nickname son of ’EXatpdoxiKio^ (Deermark) indicates a 
foreign or servile or ffeedman origin. Therefore Theocritos was a slave or a 
ffeedman who was given permission to address the boule at a secret meeting in 
order to inform it about a conspiracy. And we know that in cases of zioayyzkia  
an information could be laid before the boule by any person, slave or free
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foreigner or citizen (Thuc. 6.27.2). Since Theocritos (the informer in this case) 
was a slave or a ffeedman, the prosecutor at the trial which would follow had to 
be someone other than the informer, and indeed the impeachment against Agoratos 
was brought by a commission of bouleutai who acted on behalf of the boule (see 
Hansen Eisangelia 32). Therefore the giving of information by Theocritos must be 
distinguished from the prosecution brought presumably by some members of the 
boule and then, in this case, eiaotYyetaa could mean the prosecution only.
Since an information of conspiracy was laid by Theocritos before the 
boule against Agoratos, two courses were then open to the boule: it could either 
reject the information out of hand or accept it. If the boule decided that there was 
a ground for this charge, the prytaneis fixed a day in the near future for a hearing 
of the case before the boule. In Agoratos' case the boule accepted the information 
given by Theocritos and it proceeded to the following action: It passed a decree 
which ordered the arrest of Agoratos, and some of its members went down to the 
Peiraeus to arrest him; they met him in the agora and tried to arrest him (section 
23).
The boule was able to imprison in certain circumstances: it could order 
the arrest of men whom it found guilty on an eiaayyetaa, whose case it intended 
to refer to a Sixocoxfipiov for a heavy penalty (Dem. 24 Tim.63); it could also 
arrest a person charged of treason or conspiracy against the demos or under the 
vbjioi xeXamxoi. That kind of imprisonment was a precautionary one, to ensure 
that a man discharged a debt or stood trial.
However, the obligation to accept guarantors in most cases instead of 
arresting a man until his trial was written into the bouleutic oath: Dem.24 
Tim 144: oi)S£ 5fioco ’AOtjvcxicdv ou56va, S<; 6cv eyyuTytdii; xpeti; xafhaxfl x6 
auxb x£Xo<; xeA.o$vxa<;, nXijv e&v xi£ eni 7ipo5oaigt xffc 7i6Xeco<; eni
123
KaxaX.bo8x xofi Styioo g u v icbv f[ x£Xo<; Jipx<5cp£vo<; f[ 8yyuTto&ji£vo<; f\
tK ktyoov jifi Kaxap<5&x|.
As Harrison*^ points out the word &A.<p here does not have the meaning 
"convicted", since the speaker says in the next sentence that these men are still 
ftxpxxox but it means "against whom a prima facie case has been made out". 
Therefore, when there was a prima facie case the boule had the right to arrest and 
imprison the accused man until his trial (precautionary imprisonment) since the 
danger of his escape would be one of a high possibility. But when there was not a 
prima facie case the boule might accept guarantors instead of arresting a man 
until his trial. Probably it was left to the boule to decide in any case for which it 
was responsible whether these precautions were necessary. This must have been 
the case of Agoratos.
Agoratos was accused of conspiracy by the procedure of eioayyeXia to 
the boule, and according to the bouleutic oath he should have been arrested by the 
bouleutai appointed for that purpose. But probably his case was not a prima fa d e  
one and subsequently the bouleutai had to accept the sureties in case that sureties 
were offered by Agoratos. And indeed when the bouleutai met Agoratos in the 
agora, in the Peiraeus, and tried to arrest him, Nxxxaq and others offered 
themselves as guarantors: xai n£pxxox6vx££ (ox aipe86vx£<; xcov pooXaoxcov) 
afixqi £v 6cyop$ a^xouv flcyeiv. 7iapay£v6p£vo<; 5£ Nxxxat; xai Nixopfcvtv; 
xcd &M.oi xxv££, ... &y£iv p&v x6v 'Aydpaxov oux £<paoav Jipofio£o0ai, 
&<pflpox)vxo xai fiyyu&vxo xai djpokdyoov 7iap6!;£xv £i<; xfiv poukfiv. 
(section 23).
The narrative of Lysias and the verbs used to refer to the actions which 
took place at that specific point of time indicate that the bouleutai were extremely
104AR.W. Harrison, The Law o f Athens, vol. TLProcedure, p.56 a2
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close to arresting Agoratos, otherwise the orator would have not used the verb 
&<pttpobvxo. The verb (xqxnpeioGai used with an accusative of a person (xxva) 
and the prepositional adjunct ei<; ekEoOepiav, i.e. &<paip£ia0ai xiva ei<; 
eXeuOepxav, has the meaning "to remove someone to freedom from slavery", and 
it refers to the case where a person was wrongly enslaved and got a friend 
formally to "remove him to freedom" (Lys.23. 9-12; Dem. 58.19, etc.). But 
Agoratos neither was a slave nor was going to be enslaved, simply he would be 
arrested until his trial because a charge of conspiracy was laid upon him. 
Therefore the verb &(paipexa8ocx here might have the meaning "to release him 
from arrest, asserting his right to be free". And his right to be free until his trial, 
after such an accusation against him, was prescribed in the bouleutic oath under 
the condition that he would provide three guarantors. Niki as and the others knew 
that, as the situation had been formed (eioayyeAAa to the boule against Agoratos 
and attempt to arrest him), Agoratos had only two alternatives: either he should be 
arrested by the bouleutai or he could remain out of prison only if he produced 
three guarantors according to the bouleutic oath. And since they did not want 
Agoratos to be imprisoned, they offered themselves as guarantors and eventually 
Agoratos evaded precautionary imprisonment until his trial.
They guaranteed that they would produce Agoratos (the accused man) 
before the boule to face the charge. According to the bouleutic oath three persons 
were required to stand as guarantors. We are not told by Lysias explicitly about 
the number of the guarantors in Agoratos' case. However three names are 
mentioned in the speech which must have been the names of the guarantors: 
Nudcfc; iccrt NixopfcvTv; and ’Apioxotpdcvrv; 6 XoM.fi5T]<;. That ’Apioxocpdvtiq 6 
XoM.fi5T|<; was one of the guarantors is made very clear by Lysias: 'Apioxocpdvei
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. . . iqi XoM,fi5n, S<; eyyoTixfn; x6xe xooxoo eyfcvexo (section 58) But as far as 
the other guarantors are concerned, namely Nikias and Nikomenes, they are not 
named as guarantors in the same way like Aristophanes, but they are the subjects 
of the verbs in section 23 owe iqxxoav (p£v) . . . &<pflpofcvxo 5£ xai fiyyuffivxo 
xod dbpoA.6yoov.. .  . However, the subjects of all these verbs seem at first sight 
to be not only Nixiat; xod Nixopfcvrn;, but also xod &Xko\ xxv&;. So, the verb 
fiyyo&vxo would have Nuriat; xod Nixop.£vT|£ xai &XX01 xiv£<; as its subjects 
and one would say that the eyyorixori would be more than four persons: Nixiat;, 
Nixopevq^, ’ApiaxocpdcvTv; and at least two other persons to justify the plural of 
xod &M,oi xivfc*;; even if we include ’Apiaxoqx5cvqv in the plural of xod &XXor 
xiv£^, still at least another person is required to make this plural valid. However, 
in my opinion, the eyyoqxod must have been three, i.e. Nixiccc;, Nixop6vr|<; and 
’ApiaxocpdvT^ ,and the phrase xod xiv£c, must refer to other people who
just happened to be present in the agora, in the Peiraeus, and they were of the 
same opinion with the guarantors (see section 24). In the speech they are 
distinguished from the eyyuqxod in the following ways: First, the emphasis which 
the participle napayevdjievoi; carries, at the beginning of the period, in the 
singular, with Nixia^, an individual, as its subject, and Nxxopivry; who comes 
next, all of it is in contrast with the plural xod &Xko\ xxv£<; where we have to 
understand the participle napaysvdpsvox, and intimates that Nixia^ and 
Nixop&VTi<; are going to play a more significant role than all the others. Second, in 
section 24 we hear that e56xex ofcv xoi£ ey yoTytaii; xod xofc; &XXoi<; Srnaaiv 
EXTioSajv noifjaaaQai x6v ’Aydpaxov dx; x&xiaxa, where the two categories of 
persons, eyyuqxod and "all the others”, are clearly distinct.
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These guarantors did not merely guarantee that Agoratos would appear 
before the boule to face the charge against him, but also that they themselves 
would produce him before the boule, xai Tiyyoffivxo. . . napfc^eiv gi^ xt)v 
pookfjv. Therefore the surety "produces" (7iap£xei) the bailee, (see also 
Lys.23.9: £yyuTia&p.evoi 7iap6!;eiv). According to Lysias (sections 23-24) 
Niki as, Nikomenes and Aristophanes offered themselves to stand as sureties, 
whereas Agoratos does not seem to have taken an active part in the whole 
proceeding. However in the bouleutic oath (oi>5& 8fiaco ’A0i]vaia)v o*&86va, 85 
&v EYYDTyt&t; xpsv; xa0iaxfl) the verb xa0iaxfj is in the active voice which 
indicates that the accused man nominated the sureties. Thus the fact that the 
bouleutai, in Agoratos' case, accepted the sureties proves that it was perfectly 
legal when other people took the initiative in proposing themselves to stand as 
sureties. Therefore, the phrase 5<; &v eyy\)T]x6t<; xpei£ xa0iaxfi might have the 
meaning that either the accused man himself nominated the sureties or he merely 
accepted the sureties when they were offered.
The EyyoT] took place in a public place (agora) where there were many 
people who could witness the incident. The bouleutai, however, took the 
guarantors' names first and then returned to Athens (ypa\|rt5cp£vox 5£ oi 
pooA,eoxort x& 6v6paxa xffiv syyucop^vcov xai xa)A,o6vxa>vl05, dcmovxEi; 
tpxovxo sii; &axu.) The bouleutai wrote down the names of the guarantors at the 
time when they undertook to stand sureties for Agoratos. If we try to explain it 
practically, we could probably say that a document was drawn up by the
105 The subject of the participle kcdXvov'WDV should be identified with xcov eyyuo)|H8v<ov, ue. 
Niidou;, NiKDpevry; and ApiortxpdvT)^
bouleutai which defined the terms of the eyyuTt and clearly stated the guarantors' 
names.
We do not know whether the time of the appearance of the accused man 
before the boule was accurately defined in the document or it was just left 
indefinite until the prytaneis fixed a day in the near future for a hearing before the 
boule. We know that, when a person was accused by eiaayyeXAa of an act 
threatening the stability of the state, his case was tried with the minimum of delay 
(Harpokr. s.v. eiaayyeA.icr i\ p£v y&p eni 5qpooior<; &5ncf|pa<n peyiaxoiq xai 
6tvaPo^ftv pf| e7n5exoji£voi<;). Therefore we might assume that Agoratos would 
appear before the boule in the very near future and in this case we can say that 
the law which ordered that the guaranties should be for one year is not applicable 
here. 10?
Finally, this document would be used as the main proof that certain 
persons named in it were Agoratos' guarantors, who would be prosecuted in case 
that Agoratos ran away and evaded trial; and their prosecution would be based 
mainly on this document in combination with other witnesses.
The guarantors would be responsible for the appearance of Agoratos 
before the boule. After the information about the alleged conspiracy had been laid 
before the boule by Theocritos and the name of Agoratos had been mentioned, the 
boule ordered the arrest of Agoratos in order to be questioned and to face trial, if 
he was found quilty. The hearing before the boule would take place in the near 
future but from the moment when the accusation was made until the hearing
106See also [Dem.] 33 Apatour.22, xai (pTjoiv eyypcKprjvai eu; tea; auvOrpcoa; epe eyyuTyniv.
107[Dem.] ibid. 27, xav vofiov, a;KeXeua too; eyywa;arexacn*; eivau
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before the boule the accused man had either to be imprisoned (precautionary 
imprisonment) or to produce three guarantors. The guarantors were in a way the 
substitute for imprisonment, whereas imprisonment and guarantors seem to be two 
different ways leading (theoretically) to the same end, i.e. hearing before the 
boule or trial. Agoratos would certainly appear before the boule if he was 
imprisoned, whereas he would possibly appear before the boule if he produced 
guarantors, unless he ran away. Therefore there was no possibility of avoiding the 
trial in the case that he was held in prison, but there was a possibility of evading 
trial in the case that he produced guarantors.
Let us try now to list all the possibilities of what could have happened after the 
eyyuT] took place. Three persons (Nikias, Nikomenes and Aristophanes) stood 
sureties for Agoratos that he would appear before the boule as a result of an 
accusation against him by the procedure of eioayyeXia to the boule:
1) The accused man appeared before the boule to face the charge. 
Probably he would be accompanied by the EYyuTytai since they had guaranteed 
that they would produce him before the boule (Tiyyucovxo nape^sxv ei$ tt)v 
PouA.fiv, 24). Their responsibility would finish at that point and they would be 
released from the eyytiTi, (fcnoXueoOcn xffc EyyOrv;, [Dem.] 33 Apatour. 10,11). 
If the accused man was found guilty and condemned, the guarantors would not 
have any further implication.
2) The accused man did not appear before the boule. In that case the 
eyyuT|xcxi would be bound to appear before the boule and to report that the 
person for whom they guaranteed escaped. The whole responsibility would lie 
upon them namely that they would be tried and suffer the penalty which would 
have been imposed on the accused man. So, the £yyw]xod, who in^first place
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became the substitute for the imprisonment of the accused man, now become the 
substitute for the accused man himself.
3) Neither the accused man nor his eyyoT|xori appeared before the 
boule. By doing so they would accept that the accused man was guilty and they 
would be all condemned by default.
In section 27 Lysias referring to the case that Agoratos would escape says 
that the guarantors ’A8T]vodoi fjoav d&axe ofnc e565iaav paacmaOflvailO^ 
which indicates that they would be interrogated by the boule, they would be tried 
and fined.
After the eyyfui took place and the guarantors' names were taken by the 
bouleutai, Agoratos and his guarantors took refuge by the altar at Mounychia. 
There they started thinking about what should be done. The guarantors suggested 
that Agoratos should quit Athens as soon as possible but Agoratos refused to 
escape. Of course this is a very peculiar case and we should not conclude from 
this that guarantors in general would support or even try to persuade the person 
for whom they guaranteed to escape and not to appear for trial. It would probably 
happen the other way round.
1 ^ However Lysias' argument here might be correct and possible but not definite. It is true that 
citizens were protected from torture by to  a d  LKajtavSplou yr)<f>iavux (And Myster, 43) but in the 
same speech of Andokides we hear that, section 43: *H pev dcayyfiAia avdp, <o av5pa^ toiavtT): 
dnoypd^ei 5e t a  td  ovopata td>v av5pa>v... dvaatd<; Se rietoavSpo; e<pn Xuav to  a d
Lttxpavfyiou ynpiona m i  dvapipd^av a d  tdv tpo%ov tow; aiooypa^evDCt^ orcax; ptj icpdtepcv 
vt** eotai icpiv icuOscrfkxi tow; av5pa<; amvtcu^ avacpayev t| pouXrj dx; eu Xeya. This passage 
points out that Skamandrios' decree could be repealed by the boule under special circumstances. 
Peisandros moved that the boule should repeal it and the boule was in favour of this proposal.
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While Agoratos and his guarantors were at Mounychia the boule enacted
another decree (sections 29, 30), presumably that Agoratos was to be arrested
and interrogated at once. With this new decree the arrest of Agoratos was
authorised, notwithstanding that eyYUTytoti had been found for him (section 24).
We saw at first that when oi aipe06vxe<; xcbv pookeoxffiv went dawn to the
Peiraieus to arrest Agoratos because an information of conspiracy was laid
against him, they accepted the sureties and did not arrest him. And although the
charge against him was conspiracy (probably, against the Demos - sections 21,
48) for which the boule did not accept sureties for the accused person, according
to the bouleutic oath, when there was a prima facie case, we concluded that
Agoratos' case must not have been, at least at the beginning, a prima facie one,
otherwise the boule would not have accepted the sureties. But now how can we
understand and explain the second decree in accordance with oi ex xfj<; pooA.fi<;
were authorised to arrest Agoratos although sureties had been nominated? This
decree obviously invalidated the eyyDT] and since, from the moment when the
decree was voted, the eyyuTyicri ceased to have any significance because of the
new facts Agoratos had to be arrested until his trial or to be arrested and appear
before the boule immediately. There was no ground left for avoiding the arrest by
producing three guarantors who would guarantee his appearance before the boule
in the near future. But what had changed? I think that the key to this question lies
on the nature of the information and charge against Agoratos. We are told by
Lysias (sections 25-28) that Agoratos' guarantors tried to persuade him to quit
Attica with them. This happened in a very public place, at the altar at Mounychia,
where many people were around and witnessed the fact, (eSdxei ouv xov;
eyyonxortc xcd xoic 5&A.oic cknacnv £kho5<J>v rcoifjaaaQm x6v *Ay6pccxov d)£
l - e a c \ r e d  vw’r t W
x&xraxa...) and I suppose that information about this fact
} the boule in Athens. The guarantors' attempt to persuade Agoratos to leave
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Athens and all the discussion about escaping was a proof in the hands of the 
boule that Agoratos "actually” was guilty and that his case was a prima facie 
case. But when there was a prima facie case, e&v xig kid rcpoSooiQC xffc 
exi xaxo&uoei xoft Sfipoo aovnbv 6&q>... (Dem. 24. Timokr. 144), the boule 
was bound to arrest the accused person and not to accept sureties. Only in this 
way, I think, we could explain the reason why although the boule at the beginning 
accepted the guarantors, after a while it invalidated the eyybq and arrested 
Agoratos. Certainly according to Lysias there was a plot between the leaders of 
the oligarchic party and Agoratos but still they wanted a reasonable and valid 
reason for the prompt arrest of Agoratos.
Under the boule's second decree which authorised the arrest of Agoratos, 
he and his guarantors were brought before the boule: xoftxo x6 yfiqnopoc
e\|rqqna0ri xai fj^0ov oi ex xffc PouA.^ Mouvixia^e. . . ei<; xfiv pouXflv 
exopio0T]aav.. .(sections 29,30). The plural verb exopia0T]aav ('Vere brought") 
probably refers to Agoratos and his guarantors. Agoratos' guarantors were brought 
before the boule with him not because they were merely his guarantors from the 
first moment when the boule tried to arrest him, but because they were the 
persons who, by guaranteeing him, had frustrated the first attempt to arrest him 
and, in addition, because they tried to persuade Agoratos to escape from Attica 
providing him with means to do so. When oi ex xffe PooA.f[<; went to Mounychia 
to arrest Agoratos under the second decree, Agoratos' guarantors had not been 
denounced yet. They were denounced by Agoratos himself later in the boule 
where they had been brought with him by the bouleutai. In the boule's eyes 
Agoratos' guarantors were supposed to make sure that he would appear before the 
boule in the near future, whenever the prytaneis fixed a date for the hearing before 
it. They had appointed themselves as guarantors and by doing so they had 
become the substitute for the precautionary imprisonment which the boule
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intended to impose upon Agoratos at the very beginning of the case. If the boule 
passed the decree for the immediate arrest of Agoratos simply because it found 
more strong evidence which made his case a prima facie one without his 
guarantors being involved in the whole affair, then this decree would merely 
repeal the syyuT], the guarantors would have nothing to do any more and Agoratos 
alone would be arrested. The guarantors would be arrested only in the case that 
Agoratos escaped while they had stayed back. Then, even if they were not 
involved in the charge made against Agoratos, they would be brought before the 
boule because they failed to fulfil their duty, i.e. to produce the accused man 
before this political body to face the charge himself. The guarantors would be 
then responsible for the charge against Agoratos and they would have to suffer 
any penalty imposed. But the boule probably thought that his guarantors had a 
part in the case because of their behaviour after they had stood as guarantors, and 
that is, probably, why they were brought before the boule with Agoratos.
The plural eKopio0T]aav may, however, also refer to the fact that, 
besides Agoratos, two other persons denounced by Theocritos were brought 
before the boule at the same time, as we learn from a later part of the speech 
(section 54), where the phrase is, \>n6 life PouA,fj<; p.8T£ix^ptp8T]oav.
When Agoratos was taken to the boule, he denounced there his guarantors 
and others; and he was produced before an assembly in the theatre at Mounychia, 
where he repeated his denunciations. This assembly voted that the accused men 
should be arrested and tried in a SiKaoxipiov. No chance was given to them to 
nominate sureties, probably on the pretext that there were strong evidence that 
they were guilty, exEtvoi aoM,ri(p06vT£<; e5e0T]aav (section 34).
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In my opinion, what we have here is an eiaayye^ia to the boule first and 
an EioayyeXAa to the assembly afterwards. Agoratos denounced certain persons 
to the boule and to the assembly and I think that he can technically be described 
as 6 zioctyykXKcov. That the procedure here is an eiaayyEXaa is proved by the 
word eiaayyeiX.ai (section 50) and by the fact that the trial was instituted by the 
boule and it was submitted to the court by a decree of the assembly. The verb 
eiaayy^Xexv is used in its peculiar meaning of impeachment by Lysias 13 
Agorot. 50, (see also, Lys.12 Eratosth 48). Hager thinks that because 
EiaayyeiX.cn is used here in a public document it must have its ordinary technical 
meaning in the language of the Attic courts*^. I cannot understand why Hansen 
believes that Agoratos cannot technically be described as 6 eioayy^X.a)v. 
Probably the problem lies on the fact that he takes Agoratos to be a metic. 
According to Hansen there are only two examples of an eiaayyeAAa to the 
assembly being opened in the boule, and he thinks that this is irregular and can be 
explained by extraordinary circumstances. Of these two examples one is the case 
of Agoratos, and Hansen explains the fact that the oligarchs in 404 opened their 
attack on the generals and trierarchs in the boule and not in the assembly because 
the attack was based on information supplied by the metic Agoratos whom they 
could not bring before the people without the permission of the boule * 1 * But 
Agoratos was not a metic, nor was he a slave or a ffeedman. He was an Athenian 
citizen, in the sense that he had gained the Athenian citizenship and was regarded
109For a partly opposite view see , M.HHansen, Eisaggelia, p. 86 a3 and 6.
noH. Hager "On the Eisangelia* Journal o f Philology 4 (1872) 81: see also P.J. Rhodes, Boule 165 n
1 5 .
1UM.H Hansen ibid. 26.
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by law and all the political bodies as an Athenian citizen, (see sections: 65, 70, 
73, 76, 91).
In sections 59-60 Lysias speaks about Aristophanes of Cholleis who was 
one of Agoratos' three guarantors. Lysias says that some persons in the assembly 
in the theatre at Mounychia wanted him to be put to the torture as one who was 
not of pure Athenian stock. He also says that the persons who then had control of 
affairs came to Aristophanes and appealed to him to save himself by a 
denunciation, and not to run the risk of the extreme penalty by standing his trial on 
the count of alien birth.
In the fourth century Athens there was a ypaqyq against an alien who 
passed himself off as a citizen (ypcx«p*n £evia<;). At any time a person alleged to 
be pretending that he was a citizen, by exercising any of the rights which only 
citizens possessed, could be prosecuted by YPa<P^ l £svia<; (for being an 
alien)! 12 Aristophanes of Cholleis was threatened that he would be prosecuted 
by a Ypatpfi ^eviac, probably because he was exercising some of the rights 
possessed by citizens only, whereas he was alleged to be a foreigner. Because of 
the context in which this threat was expressed and because of the fact that 
Aristophanes was one of Agoratos' guarantors, I think that one of the rights which 
he allegedly exercised without being entitled to it would be his undertaking to 
stand surety for Agoratos. They would prosecute Aristophanes by YPacP^ l ^evicts 
for being an alien who exercised rights possessed by citizens, and they would use 
the most recent example of a right exercised by him as if he was a citizen, i.e. to 
guarantee that a man accused by eiaaYY^ta to the boule would appear for trial. 
To stand as a surety in this context was restricted only to Athenian citizens:
112Isai. 3. 37: Dem. 24. 131, 39.18 etc.
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eYYUTytfo; xpeiq KaGioxft x6 abx6 xzXoq xeXofivxa^ (Dem. 24.144), where x6 
aux6 x£A.o<; xeXoftvxai; refers to the property classes defined by Solon.
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’'E v S e i^ iq
§v5ex!;t<; was naming an offender and his offence in writing to a magistrate. In 
most cases the appropriate magistrates were the Eleven, but in certain cases it 
was either the basileus or the thesmothetai.113 The procedure of Iv5eil;i<; could be 
employed against persons who although they had lost their civil rights (&xqioi) 
behaved as if they had full civil rights (enixipoi), and exiles who returned to 
Attica without reprieve. In practice £v5exl;x<; was applied to those who visited 
places from which they were banned or who exercised rights of which they had 
been deprived by fcxxjixa, and the most frequent case may have been that of the 
man who was technically 6<peiA.<ov i<p Sqpooicp.
~Ev5exl;x<; was slightly different from dTiaycDyq. The traditional view among 
scholars has been that Iv5exl;x<; and ^Tiayooyri were two different procedures. 
Lipsius thinks that the most important difference between the two procedures was 
that in dTtaycoyfi the accused was arrested by the accuser while in Iv5ex!;x<; he 
was seized by the magistrates empowered to do so.114 Lipsius was followed by 
Harrison and MacDowell who take £vSexl;x<; and dTiaycoyq to be two different 
procedures with the main difference that in (XTiaytDyfi the accuser himself arrested 
the accused and took him to the appropriate official, while in !v5£ti;t<; the accuser 
merely reported the offence to the official, and the official made the arrest.115
113At. j4th. Pol. 52.1, Dem. 24 Timokr. 22, And 1 2aysL 111.
114J. H. Lipsius, Das Attische Recht und Rechtsve rfah ren ( Leipzig 1915) pp. 319, 331.
115A R. W. Harrison, The Law o f Athens, vol. 2: Procedure ( Oxford 1971) pp. 222, 229. 
D. M. MacDowell, Athenian Homicide Law (Manchester 1963 ) p. 135.
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However, Hansen discussing the relationship between doiaycoyfi, £v5eii;x<; and 
etpfiyqan; concludes that they were not three different types of process but three 
variants of one and the same type of public action, "apagoge, in which the trial 
was preceded by the prosecutor arresting the supposed offender, ephegesis, in 
which the prosecutor denounced the supposed offender to the magistrates and 
entrusted the arrest to them; and endeixis in which the trial was preceded by a 
denunciation, and the prosecutor had to choose whether he wanted to arrest the 
suspect or not. If the prosecutor did decide to arrest him, an endeixis was 
followed by an apagoge.”116
Harrison in his chapter under the title dcnaywyii £v8ei%ig. iptjrrjaig writes: 
”The defendant was incarcerated unless he could furnish three sureties from his 
own census class”, and quotes two passages, Dem. 24 Timokr. 146 and 144.117 
MacDowell in his commentary on Andokides, On the Mysteries, writes that ” 
normally [my italics] a person accused by §v5ei!;i<; or dtTiaycoyfi was imprisoned 
until his trial" and refers to Dem. 24 Timokr.146 with the explanation "quoting 
from a law: x6v 5’ev5eix06vxa ft &7iax06vxa 5qodcvxoov oi IvSexa ev xq> 
£\&<p”. He goes further and adds, "But, except in the case of certain specific 
offences, he had to be released if he provided as sureties three persons of the 
same property-class as himself (Dem. 24.144, quoting what he calls a law, but 
what looks more like part of the oath o f the Eleven [my italics]: oo5£ Sqaoo 
’ABqvaioov ou56va, bg eyyoT]x6c£ xpexi; Ka0xaxfl x6 aux6 xeXo<; xeXouvxai;, 
n^fiv e<5cv xk; e n i 7ipo5oaxQt xffe ti6A.£<d<; f] eni xaxaXuaei xob 5fjpou aovnbv 
f[ x6Xo<; icpidcpevoi; f| eyyuqoctpsvoi; f| 8xA.eyoov pfi KaxaP<5&Ti)".118
116M. H. Hansen, Apagoge, Endeixis and Ephegesis against Kakourgoi, Atimoi and Pheugontes ( 
Odense Univ. Press 1976 ) p. 26.
117Harrison, ibid p.221.
118D.M. MacDowell, Andokides, On The Mysteries, (Oxford 1962) p.63.
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To sum up, these scholars think that in a case of §v5exi;x£ the accused man was 
usually given the choice of furnishing sureties (eyYuqxax) or suffering 
imprisonment until the case came into court. The two pieces of evidence on which 
they base this conclusion are: 1) Dem.24 Timokr. 146: oW  6ocov 2v5exi;xi; eoxxv 
f| dcTiayajyfi rcpoaeyfcypaTix’ &v ev zoic; v 6 j io x £  Mx6v 5’ ev5exx86vxa 
&7iax06vxa 5i]o<5tvxa)v oi £v5exa ev x$ from where they conclude that
the normal procedure in Iv5ex£x£ was imprisonment of the accused until his trial, 
and 2) Dem. 24 Timokr. 144: " ou5£ 5f[aco ’A O tjvocxcdv o656va, S<; av eyyuTixfo; 
xpexq xcrihaxfl x6 ax>x6 x£Xo<; xeA.ofivxa£. . .”, from where they conclude that 
the accused could avoid imprisonment if he provided three guarantors.
However, there is a number of objections to these conclusions as far as the 
method used for drawing them is concerned.
Even if we accept that in a case of §v5ex!;x<; the normal procedure was that the 
accused man was imprisoned until the day of his trial, quoting as evidence what 
Demosthenes quotes -”x6v 5’ ev5exx8£vxa f| &7iax86vxa Sqodvxcov oi £v5exa 
ev x<2> £6A.<p" (Dem. 24.146), I do not think that we can go further and claim that 
the accused man could avoid imprisonment by providing three guarantors, quoting 
as evidence what Demosthenes quotes -"oi>5£ 5qaa> ’AOqvaxcov ouSeva. . . jj.fi 
xaxap6A.n” (Dem. 24.144). Such a combination of these two pieces of evidence 
is not correct and itls wofcposiUt for the following reason: What Demosthenes 
refers to, in section 144 ("ox>5£ S^oco. . . jj.fi xaxaP&A,fl"), is a part of the 
bouleutic oath (section 147, Inexxa 5’, a> &v5pe<; Sxxaoxax, xouxo x6 ypriqijia 
a6x6 jl£ v  xa0’ abx6 o6x iaxx v 6 jl o <;, x6 "oi>5e Sfiaco ’AOqvctxcov o656va'\ ev 
5c xcp 6pxcp xcp pOuXcwiiK^ ycypciiixca)119, and applied to cases of exootyysXioE
119cf. MacDowell, And Afysf., p. 63: *Dem. 24. 144, quoting what he calls a law, but what looks more 
like part o f the oath o f the Eleven [my italics]1.
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brought to the boule (see pages 111-116, where I discuss the case of EioayYeXia 
to the boule and the obligation of the boule to accept sureties for an accused man 
instead of imprisoning him until his trial).
Therefore the conclusion that one accused by 2v5ei!;ic; or fitTtaycDyfi could 
provide sureties and avoid custody until his trial seems to be invalid if it is to be 
based on this piece of evidence found in Dem. 24.144.
Let us see now whether the normal procedure after an £vSei!;x<; (and not after 
an dxTiayooyfj) was actually always imprisonment of the accused until his trial or 
providing sureties instead. Most scholars base their conclusion on the evidence 
found in Dem, 24.146 ”x6v 8* ev8eix86vxa fl &7ia%06vxa Sqadcvxcov oi ivSeica 
sv x<p and they claim that normally a person accused by ivSex^u; was
inprisoned until his trial.
It is true that the above sentence as it stands here between quotation marks, 
translated word by word, and with the previous comment of Demosthenes that it 
was a part of a law, gives the impression that there was a law ordering that an 
accused by ^vSei^n; or ^Tiayooyfj had to be kept in custody until the day of his 
trial, and that it must have been the normal procedure. However we should be 
very cautious when we use this piece of evidence to prove that imprisonment as a 
rule was imposed on a person accused by iv8eii;x<; and that it was applied to all 
cases of IvSei^u;. Here our task is to look carefully into the context in which the 
phrase Mx6v 8’ ev8eix9£vxa &7iax86vxa Sqadvxcov oi £v8exa ev x<p is
said.
In 353 Timokrates introduced a law which proposed that, if anyone of the 
public debtors, by any law or decree, had been, or should be, condemned to 
imprisonment as an additional penalty, it should be lawful for himself cr anyone 
else on his behalf to give sureties for the debt, and the debtor who has given 
sureties should be released from the penalty of the imprisonment. Against this law
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a certain Diodoros brought a ypaqn) 7iapav6p.Gov and Dem. 24 Timokrates was 
the speech of the prosecutor in this case. Timokrates' proposal concerned cases 
of persons who had already been punished with a fine for an offence and 
imprisonment would be imposed as an additional penalty until they would pay 
that fine. However Timokrates claimed that in his proposal he followed an 
existing statute according to which certain persons had the right to nominate 
sureties in order to avoid imprisonment. The speaker's task, however, is to prove 
that Timokrates tries to confuse two different cases, i.e. imprisonment as a means 
of leading to a trial and imprisonment as a penalty imposed on a person who had 
already been tried and convicted.
In sections 144-148 the main issue is imprisonment which is divided by the 
speaker into two kinds: precautionary imprisonment and punitive imprisonment. 
The speaker says that Timokrates was prepared to cite a statute (actually a part 
of the bouleutic oath) which he would claim to have followed in his own proposal 
and he quotes it in section 144; in section 145 he tries to indicate to whom it 
really applied. According to the speaker what is written in the bouleutic oath was 
not intended for the protection of people who had stood their trial and argued their 
case, but for those who were still untried (ftxpixoi) and he accuses Timokrates 
that he is going to speak to the jurors of regulations made for untried culprits, as 
though they had been framed to include everybody (ouiool S£, & kni xoi^ 
fcxpiTon; xsixai, cb<; nepl fai&vxcov eipT}p6va np6<; bpfrc; A.6yeiv). And
in the following section he tries to prove that this part of the bouleutic oath does 
not affect the right of the judges to impose imprisonment as a penalty for an 
offence, and to make clear that it does not apply to everybody. He says:
obxe y&p &v, S &v5pe<; 5ixaaxort, xiu&v efcfiv buiv o /n  
7ia0eiv f[ &7iox£taai (ev y6cp xqi na0exv xod 6 5eap6<; &w ofrx 
&v ouv e^fjv Seapofi xijifjoai), ob0’ 6acov 2v5eil;i<; eaxiv
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fcTiayooYfi Tipooey^ypaTix 6tv ev xoi£ v6pox<; x6v 6’ ev8exx0£vxa 
f\  &nax86vxa S t j o & v x c d v  oi £ vSexa ev xq> £6A.(p, efaep p.fl e^rjv 
&M.oo<; f[ xoix; eni rcpoSooiQc xffe n6Xeax; f\ erci xaxo&ooei xofi 
5fyj.o\> aovtdvxai; f[ xoix; x& x£X,t] (bvoopfcvoxx; xai p.fi 
KaxaP<5cXA.ovxa£ Sfjoai. vfiv 6k xafi0’ op.iv xexpfipi’ ioxco 8xi 
i^eaxi 5f\oav 7iavxeXo&<; ydcp flSt] 6ncop’ &v fjv x& xipfjpaxa.
In the whole passage (sections 144-148) the distinction that is made is between 
precautionary imprisonment before trial - which according to the bouleutic oath it 
could be avoided under certain circumstances and if the accused provided three 
persons as guarantors - and punitive imprisonment after trial - which could either 
exist as a simple penalty or as an additional penalty in the case where a fine was 
imposed as the primary penalty and imprisonment was simply the means of 
pressing the convicted man to pay the fine and it would last as long as he did not 
pay it.
Following this aigumentation the speaker concludes that if what is written in 
the bouleutic oath was to apply to all cases of imprisonment, then the judgments 
(xipfjpaxa) - among which imprisonment was a possibility - would be invalid and 
inoperative.
In this context, in my opinion, the phrase - oW  5gcdv iv8eii;x<; eoxiv f[ 
dtnaycoyfi npoazykypanz av ev xox<; v6poi<; x6v 5’ ev8eix06vxa f[ 6cnax06vxa 
Stig&vxcov oi evSexa ev xco - might refer to punitive imprisonment which, 
if Timokrates' proposal became a statute, would automatically be inoperative, 
since a person who was condemned to a fine and was imprisoned until he paid it 
could avoid imprisonment by providing three sureties according to Timokrates' 
proposal. Furthermore another point which makes this interpretation stronger 
might be the following: Timokrates' proposal was attacked by Diodoros by a 
ypcHpfi 7tapav6p.GOv and his task was to prove that the new proposal was against
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(an) existing law(s). Timokrates' proposal concerned punitive imprisonment as an 
additional penalty, while there was already at least one law in which punitive 
imprisonment as an additional penalty was prescribed in it. Therefore Timokrates' 
proposal was against this law, and if it became a valid statute it would affect that 
certain law in making the penal sentences inposed according to it entirely 
inoperative.
Actually the speaker has quoted this law in section 105 :
NOMOI KAKQ2EQZ TONEQN, AXTPATEIAX 
Ti&v 56 xi£ faiaxOfl, xffiv yovfccov xaxftaeax; eaA.a)xd)<; 
&axpax£ia<; f\ 7ipo£ipTip6vov ai>x<p xcov vbpoov alpyaaOai, 
eiauhv Snox pfi xpfy SqadtvTCDV aoxov oi iv5exa x a i 
eiaaydvxajv ei^ xfiv f^iotiav, xaxTiyopeixa) 56 6 Pook6ji£vo<; 
ot<; 6i;eaxiv. £&v 5’ xip&xa) fi f|X.iaia 5,xi XP^ I rca0£tv 
aux6v f| &jtox£iaai. £&v 5’ dpyopioo xipqOfl, 5£56a8a) x6ax;
&V £K X £lO X l.
However, in this law both precautionary and punitive imprisonment are 
mentioned; the phrase Sqa&vxcov auxbv oi §v5exa xai eiaaydvxcov £i<; xfjv 
Tjfaaiav refers to precautionary imprisonment120, while the phrase e&v 5’ 
dpyopioo xxpT]0fl, 5e5ea8a) x£ox; &v axxaiofl refers to punitive imprisonment 
imposed as an additional penalty.
In my opinion, there is a connection between sections 102-103, 105 and 146- 
147, and I tend to believe that in section 146 the phrase "x6v 5’ ev5£ix06vxa f\ 
&7iax86vxa Sqodvxoov oi §v8£xa £v x<$ £6A.q>'' refers to punitive imprisonment 
and not to precautionary imprisonment, and therefore we cannot use this reference
120This law concerns dicaycoyrj and not evSa^u; (eav 6e tfc; ataxOfi).
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to argue that normally in £v5ei!;i£ and faiocycoyfi the accused man had to be kept 
in custody until his trial.
Let us look carefully at the above sections and notice some key words which 
probably will make it clear: section 102: (Timokrates' proposal) x&<; y&p 
brcapxonaai; ex xffiv vfiv xnpxcov v6pa>v xxpcDpxou; xaxo&tiex. The key word 
here is xxjioopxac;.
section 103: (1) &v xv; xA.07if\<; xod jj.f| xxpT\0fl 9av<5cxox), npooxxp&v 
aox<p 8eap6v, (2) x&v xx<; aXoxx; [xfj ]^ xax&aeax; xfov yov£oov exq xfjv 
ayop&v epP&M,pf 5e5£a9ax, (3) x&v &axpaxexa<; xx<; 6<pA.fl xod xi xSv auxcbv 
xox<; ercxxxpoxi; Tioxfl, xai xofixov 5e56a0ax, (4) Txpoxp&XTv; cxrcaox xouxok; 
&5exav Tioxex, xfi xaxaaxdtaex xc&v eyyuTjxc&v x6v 5eap6v 6«paxp<3&v.
The key words are: (1) 7ipoaxxp&v...5eoji6v
(2) ...5e56a0ax...
(3) ...8e56o0ai..
(4) ...x6v 8eap.6v...
(1) In this case it is clear that we have to do with imprisonment as an additional 
penalty.
(2) and (3) are not very straight forward cases in the sense that one could say 
that they refer to cases where the procedure of anaycoyfi was employed against 
the alleged offender and therefore 5e56a0ax refers to the arrest of the accused by 
the accuser. However, I think that both 5e56o0ocx here refer to punitive 
imprisonment imposed on the convicted person who had been tried and found 
guilty of an offence for which the procedure of dtnayooyq was employed; The 
whole section 103 comes immediately after the phrase x&£ y&p bnapxobooK; ex 
xcov vftv xupxeov v6jiav xxpcoplcx^  xaxc&fcei and the speaker explains which 
kind of penalty the proposal of Timokrates would invalidate and associates x&s 
ixpcopxai; with npoaxxp.&v...5eop.6v, ..5e86o0ax... 5e5eo0ax...x6v 8eap6v.
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Furthermore the two infinitives (section 103 5e5eo0ax) lead us directly to the 
last clause of the v6pox xaxdbaeax; yovecov, &axpaxexa£ in section 105 - e&v 5’ 
(xpyoploo xijiT]0flf 5e5ea0co x£ax; &v exxexafl (where 5e5£a0a) refers to punitive 
imprisonment) and not to the phrase Sqoocvxcov aux6v ol IvSexa xod 
eiaaydvxoov exc, xf[v fjAxaxav, because the two infinitives (5e5£a0ax) are cited 
under the "heading" x&£ xxpoopxaq.
Finally, in section 146 the key phrases are: xxp&v el;f|v bpxv 5,xx rcoc0exv 
f| dcrcoxexoax (ev y&p x<p naQeiv xax 6 5eaji6<; ivx), and, vfiv 5£ xa\>0’ bpxv 
xexpfipx* laxoo oxx Si^ eaxx 5f]oax- rcavxeXax; y&p ¥$t[ frxup’ &v fjv x& 
xxjiqpaxa, which make clear that the speaker, when he even mentioned 
imprisonment in the context of £v5ex£xc, and dnayooyfi, meant punitive and not 
precautionary imprisonment. His whole argument started in section 102 by saying 
that (Timokrates' proposal) x6c<; y&p imapxooGai; ex xa>v vfiv xx)px©v v6pcov 
xxpcopla^ xaxaXuex, and the speaker finishes it in section 147 by concluding that 
navxeXfo^ y&p fjSq flcxup’ &v fjv x& xxpf|paxa.
Therefore, I think that the phrase ”x6v 8’ ev5exx06vxa f| &7iax06vxa 
8qa<5cvxa>v ol £v5exa ev xq> l^ okcp" is more likely to refer to the case where an 
accused by the procedure of ivSex^x  ^ or faxayooyfj would be found guilty, fined 
and kept in prison until he paid the fine. Consequently, if this interpretation is 
correct, I do not think that we can use Dem. 24.146 as a piece of evidence to 
prove that normally a person accused by £v5exl;xc, was imprisoned until his trial.
Andokides' speech On the Mysteries is a speech delivered in a case falling 
under the procedure of IvSex^x  ^ and it is the speech for the defence. HEv5exl;x£ 
was a normal procedure for the prosecution of persons accused of exercising 
rights to which they were not entitled and of which they had been deprived by
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&xxpxa, (e.g. it was applied to those who visited places from which they were 
banned).
Kephisios prosecuted Andokides by an £v5sx!;xc;. The £v5ex£x£ was brought 
during the Eleusinian Mysteries in Boedromion 400/399 and it was laid with the 
basileus (section 111). Kephisios' main charge was that Andokides had infringed 
the decree of Isotimides by attending the Mysteries in 400 after committing 
impiety in 415; the decree of Isotimides had bidden all who were guilty of impiety 
and had admitted it to keep away from the temples and the Agora at Athens (And. 
1 M yst. 71: KTjqnaxo^ y&p ouxooi ev£5ex!;£ p£v ps xax& x6v v6pov x6v 
xsxpsvov, xi)v 8£ xaxTyyopxav xoxexxax xax& \|rii<pxopa 7ip6x£pov yEvdpsvov 5 
eTtiev ’IaoxxpxSTn;. . . 6 p£v y&p eTtiev ExpysaOax xgdv x£pa>v xoix; 
6ta£pf|aavxa<; xort 6pokoyfiaavxa<;. Kallias paid Kephisios one thousand 
drachmas to proceed against Andokides by IvSex^xi; on the charge of infringing 
the decree of Isotimides by attending the festival of the Eleusinian Mysteries. 
Practically, Kephisios pointed out to the basileus that Andokides was attending 
the festival; at the end of the festival the basileus reported this to the council, and 
the council referred the case to a law-court (section 111).
In the speech of his defence, Andokides says: xcd rcpc&xov p£v £v0upr|8f]vax 
6xx vfiv syd) fjxco ouSejix&i; pox dtv&yxTv; ofcaTv; rcapapExvax, obx’ £yyx)T]xcx<; 
xaxaaxfiaa<; oW  im6 ScapSv &vayxao0£x<;...
What Andokides says here implies that after the £v5ex!;x<; against him and 
during the period until his trial either he could have been kept in custody or he 
could have been at liberty by providing sureties (EyyuTyifo;). But Andokides was 
neither remanded in custody nor released on bail for the period between the 
indictment and the trial. However, on the one hand the fact that Andokides 
mentions here these two possibilities (remand in custody until trial or release on 
bail) indicates that this procedure was applied to persons who were prosecuted by
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iv5et!;ii;, on the other hand the fact that Andokides was free until his trial 
indicates that in a case of the accused man could be free until his trial
without providing sureties.
According to Hansen it is not very clear whether the accused had to be arrested 
and held in custody for the period preceding the trial. Of the five surviving 
speeches concerned with three (Dem. 25 Aristogeit. A, 26 Aristogeit.
B, 58 Theokr) were directed against men who had brought prosecutions in spite 
of being state debtors. The other two (Andok. 1 Myst., Lys. 6 Andok) deal with 
the case of Andokides.
There are two instances in which an §v5ei!;i£ led to the arrest of the accused: 
Dem.53 Nikostr. 14, Lys.6 Andok30\ these passages indicate that imprisonment 
before a court hearing was used in IvSei^k;. However, there are another three 
examples of IvSei^k; where the accused was at liberty for the period preceding 
the trial: Andok.lAfyjr.2, Dem.58Theokr., Dzm.25AristogeitA 49, Dein.2 
Aristogeit. 13; none of the speakers of the above speeches protest that the law has 
been broken by the accused being at liberty after the 2v5ex£ii;. And there is not 
any indication in the sources that the accused could avoid arrest only by finding 
bail.
Therefore, since we have examples of £v5ei i^<; where either the accused man 
was arrested, or he was at liberty until his trial, and since Andokides mentions the 
possibility of avoiding airest by providing sureties (Andok. 1 Myst. 2), we may 
conclude that when a person was prosecuted by IvSex^x  ^ and until the day of his 
trial arrived there were three possibilities:
(1). he could either be at liberty, or
(2). be kept in custody, or
(3). he could avoid arrest by providing sureties.
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However the criteria according to which each one of these three different 
procedures was chosen and employed to deal with cases of iv8£il;x<; are not 
known.
I think that Hansen121 is correct in concluding that in there was no
general statutory requirement of detention in custody or bail and his assumption 
may well be true, namely that either it was laid down by law that certain types of 
offence resulted in the arrest of the accused, whereas other offenders prosecuted 
by Iv8eil;ii; were allowed to be at liberty, or that there was a general provision 
that a prosecutor had the right - but not the duty - to arrest the denounced person.
If there was a law which required that in £v8ex£i£ the accused had to be kept in 
custody or alternatively he had to provide sureties until his trial, then it would be 
impossible to explain why Andokides was neither imprisoned nor required to 
provide sureties in accordance with that law. Andokides in the first sections of his 
speech says that he could have been arrested or at least he could have been asked 
to furnish sureties until his trial (section 2), and intimates that neither of these 
happened because the prosecutors wanted him to remain at liberty and hoped that 
he would flee to avoid trial (section 4)122. Andokides does not give a hint that the 
law was broken by his prosecutor. Therefore the case of Andokides indicates that 
in a case of £v8exl;xc; it depended on the prosecutor whether the accused would be 
at liberty, or arrested or he would avoid custody until his trial by nominating 
sureties.
Antiphon's speech On The Murder o f Herodes presents a case of ^vSei^u; and 
anayajyfi where bail was refused by the prosecutors. Antiphon 5 was written to 
be delivered by a Mytilenian (Euxitheos) who was charged with the murder of an
121M.H. Hansen, Apagoge p. 13.
122In that case Kallias would have achieved all he wanted, i.e. to claim and win the heiress, who was the 
real reason for the
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Athenian citizen, Herodes, on a journey from Mytilene to Ainos. In a considerable 
part of this speech (Ant. 5.8-19) Euxitheos deals with the argument that the 
accusers have employed the wrong legal procedure in prosecuting him. When he 
reached the Piraeus, after he had been summoned to appear before the court in 
Athens, he was denounced by Herodes' relatives and arrested. However, when he 
was summoned he expected the action brought against him to be a 5ikt] cpdvou 
and not an £ v5£i!;x£ and dnaycDyfi against him as a Kccxoflpyoi;. The procedure 
used in this case is §v5eii;i<; and dnaycDyfi KCCKOopyia<; which, according to the 
speaker, is not a correct procedure when the alleged offence is homicide.
I am not concerned here about the validity of the objection raised by the 
defendant to the action of his accusers in prosecuting him as a KOKofipyoc, before 
a Heliastic court, instead of as a (pov£0£ before the Areopagos. Macdowell 
seems to take the view that this procedure was not proper in a case of homicide 
(MacDowell, Homicide, 140). On the other hand, Hansen after discussing the 
examples of £v5eil;i<; and dnayooyfi xaxoupycov being employed against 
murderers concludes that "it is conceiveable that the Eleven at the end of the fifth 
century began to interpret v6po<; xffiv KctKoopycov as including homicides and that 
accordingly Aischines, in the middle of the fourth century, could include 
homicides without hesitation among the types of criminal who could be arrested 
by any citizen.", (M.H. Hansen, Apagoge, 107; Aischin.1,91).
Euxitheos in his speech for the defence protests against the procedure chosen 
by the prosecutors (Ant.5.9-10) and in section 17 says:
"Exx 5£ \l6X  £5£Gt]v, <S &v5p££, Tiapavopcbxaxa drcdvxcov &v0pd>7ia>v. 
£0&Xovxo<; ydp poo £yyoTix6c<; xp£i£ xaGiaxdvai xaxd x6v v6pov, abxax; 
ouxoi 5i£iipa!;avxo xofixo <box£ pf| £yy£v6a0ai poi 7ioif}aou. xa>v 5£ &X\oov 
^£voov 5axi£ 7id)7iox£ tj0£A,T]a£ Kocxaaxfjaai £yyoT|xd<;f o*65£iq rccbTiox* £860ti. 
xaixoi oi £7iip£X,T|xcd xa>v xaxoopyoov xq> aoiq) xpaivxai v6pcp xooxtp. obax£
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Kort ofixog xoxvbg xox<; &M.ox<; ti&oxv cbv spoi p6va> en^xiie pfi 6c7ioA.$aax 
xofi Seapoo. (Ant.5.17)
The procedure in this case is ivSex^xg Kosicoopyxai; employed against an 
alleged homicide (Euxitheos), (Section 9: Kaxoopyoi; evSeSexypevog <p6voo 
5xkt]v (peoyco), followed by an Anaycoyfi xaKoopyxag, (section 9: xaoxrjv xfjv 
dtTiayooynv, section 17:e5^8r|v); this fataycoyfi Koncoopyxag is based on the 
prosecutors' assumption that the accused man would run away before the trial if 
he remained at liberty, (section 13: Afcyexg 8£ dbg oi>K &v rcapfcpexva ei 
eXeXopTjv, d&X (pxbpTjv &v &nxdbv.). Probably if the accuser could show good 
reason for supposing that the accused would default if allowed his liberty, bail 
would be refused by the Eleven.
After the §v5ex!;xg the prosecutors proceeded to arrest the accused man 
(Anaycoyfi) who demanded to exercise his potential right of nominating sureties 
instead of being arrested, (e06Xovxog ydcp poo eyyoTjx&g xpexg xaOxoxdvax 
Kax& x6v v6pov). However, this right was not absolute but depended on the 
discretion of the prosecutors who eventually did not allow him to be at liberty by 
accepting bail for him from the moment o f the indictment until his trial, (obxcog 
ouxoi 5i87ip(5t^avxo obaxe xofixo pfi eyyevfcoOax pox Tioxflaax; the wording here 
implies that the authority to decide whether the accused should be imprisoned or 
not rested with the prosecutors).
Euxitheos protests against his arrest which, according to him, is illegal. When 
he says eOfcXovxog y&p poo eyyoT|x&g xpetg KOcOxaxdcvax xaxa x6v v6pov, it is 
not very clear which law (if any) he refers to. If in the v6pog xdbv KOKobpyajv 
there was a provision concerning bail, Euxitheos would have most probably 
referred to it. Probably the phrase xaxft x6v v6pov, as well as his statement that 
all the other aliens who demanded bail were unexeptionaly accepted to it, should
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be seen as a generalization made from the practice of bail which might have been 
attested in other cases of £v5si!;i£.
From Andokides' statement in his speech On The Mysteries (And. 1.2) and 
from Ant.5.17 we may conclude that a person arrested by £v5ei^ic, followed by 
ocTiaycoyfi had the right to be freed on bail only if the prosecutor accepted it; the 
prosecutor himself could choose whether he wanted to arrest the accused, or to let 
him be at liberty before the trial, or to let him be admitted to bail.
Therefore we may conclude that an accused person was sometimes arrested as 
a consequence of an 2v5eii;i<; and probably the authority to decide whether the 
accused should be imprisoned or not rested with the prosecutor. In an £v5eil;i£ 
the arrest until trial seems to have been optional and the accused, if arrested, 
could avoid imprisonment by providing sureties for himself.
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O a a i q
<£&Giq123 was a public legal action used particularly for some offences 
concerning trade. 4>&oi<; was also used to initiate an action by pointing out to the 
arkhon that an orphan's estate had not been leased, and an action of impiety where 
the basileus was the authority to whom this (p&oiq would be made; it was also 
available against mining offences. <£&oi<; was a form of denunciation which, as it 
has been argued by MacDowell, was aimed primarily at a piece of property and 
indirectly at the offender who committed an offence with this piece of property. It 
could be brought by anyone who wished to prosecute (6 Pot)A,6pevo<;) and the 
prosecutor in a cp^oiq, if he won the case, received half of the payment made by a 
convicted defendant - the fine or the value of confiscated property (Dem. 58.13).
Aristophanes mentions three cases of cpdoiq: in the Akhamians against 
the Megarian who tries to sell his daughters as pigs: 
xdc xoxptSia xotvov ey<b tpavS xa5i 
rcoA.6pia Kort ok
(Ar Akharn. 819-20) 
and against the Boeotian who has a variety of goods to sell: 
eycb ioivov 651
123<Xkxo*; is discussed by J. H. Lipsius, Das athscheRecht wid Rechtsverfahren ( Leipzig 1905-15 ) 
309-16 ; A R. W. Harrison. The Law o f Athens, vol. 2 (Oxford 1971) 218-21 ; R. G. Osborne , "Law in 
Action in Classical Athens", JH S105 :47-8. However the most complete account of <pdov; is given by D. 
M. MacDowell, * The Athenian Procedure of Phasis ", Symposion 1990 : Vortrdge zur griechischen und 
hellenistischen Rechtsgeschichte (Cologne, Weimar, and Vienna) , 187-98.
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qxxivco noAljna xaoxa... 
xcxi ok ye <pav<& 7ip6<; xoio5e.
(At. Akham. 911-14).
In these cases the offence is importing goods from an enemy state. The 
authority to whom these (pdoen; would be made is not specified here.
The third case of <p&cn<; mentioned by Aristophanes is in the Knights, 
where the Paphlagonian threatens to tpaiveiv the sausage-seiler to the prytaneis 
for goods on which a payment ought to have been made and the offence here 
seems to be similar to a failure to pay customs duty:
Kcri qxxvoo oe xoi£ Tipoxdcveoxv 
dtSexaxEuxoxx; xftv Geffiv le- 
p&Q i^ovxa xoiAAas.
(At. Knights 300-302)
Early in the fourth century a ship on which a man had lent money was 
denounced by <p&oi<; as belonging to a Delian: 6A.k65ci y<5cp, e<p’ f[ noXXh 
Xpf|p.ax’ fjv eyd) 5e8<DK6<;, itpT]v^  xk; <b^  ouoav 6cv5p6<; At^iou (Isokr. 17 
Trapez. 42); this case is discussed in details later.
Another case of qxkon; is also found in Isokrates' speech Against 
KaUimakhos but we should be cautious about using this passage as evidence of 
the correct legal procedure since the incident described here occurred in 403, 
during the regime of the Ten: Patrocles claimed that money in possession of 
Kallimachos belonged to the state; an argument developed, and when one of the 
Ten appeared Patrokles made a qxfcaic, to him; when this man brought the 
disputants before his colleagues they referred the case to the boule, which gave 
its verdict against Kallimachos. (Isokr. 18 KuUim. 5-6). The offence here seems 
to be similar to import of goods from an enemy state since the money earned by
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Kallimakhos, according to Patrokles, had been left behind by a man of the 
democratic party which was the enemy of the regime in Athens at this time.
The procedure of (pdaii; was also employed against the seller who did 
not accept silver coins, which were offered in payment for goods in the market, 
approved by the public tester (SoKipaoif^). The law of 375/4 about silver 
coinage stated that the goods offered for sale by a seller who refused to accept 
approved silver coins were "to be pointed out" to the officials in charge of the 
particular market, and not to the prytaneis (.Hesperia 43[1974] 158, lines 18-29).
Therefore offences concerning trade for which the tpdoi^ procedure 
could be used were the following:
- importing goods from an enemy state, which was 
forbidden in wartime (Ar. Akham. 819-20, 911-14 ),
-importing smuggled goods, without payment of 
customs duty (Ar. Akham. 517-22, 541-3: Knights 300-2),
-lending money for a ship which was not going to 
transport grain to Athens (Dem. 35.51),
- selling goods for which the seller refused to accept 
approved silver coins (the law of 375/4 about silver coinage).
In accordance with our evidence concerning <p6cn<; and as far as the 
authorities to whom <p&o£i<; would be made are concerned, MacDowell 
concludes that in the fifth century and early in the fourth (pdcan; cases were 
brought before the boule (Ar. Knights 300-2, Isokr. 17.42, 18.6 ), while later in 
the fourth century such cases were going to a variety of different magistrates, 
such as the supervisors of the market; minor cases were decided by them, while 
more serious ones were referred to a court.
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In the Trapezitikos of Isokrates we find a case of (pdon; which occurred 
in the 390s:
8A,x6c8a y&p, e<p 710Xkb. xpfjpax’ rjv eyco SeScoxdx;, Iqyqvfc xxq d><; 
ouoav 8cvSp6<; Ar^xou. fynpiaPTyrofivToq 5’ epoO xcd xa0eXx£iv &l;xoftvxo<; 
auxa) xfiv PouXf|v Sx£0eaav ol PooMpsvoi auxoqxxvxeiv okjxe x6 p£v iipajxov 
nap6t pxxpdv fjX,0ov &xpxxo<; 6nio0aveivf xe^soxffivxEi; 8’ £7xexo0t]occv 
EYYDTjx&i; nap* epo$ S6!;aG0ax. ( Isokr. Trapez. 42).
Someone pointed out (Iqyqvfc xi<;) that a merchant vessel which was in 
the Peiraeus belonged to a Delian man. The accusation in the first place seems to 
be that the ship belonged to the enemy and therefore it ought not to be there - 
Delos was under Spartan domination after 403 and at war with Athens at the time 
of the tp&ox£ which must be dated within the Korinthian war 395-386. The ship 
was denounced by <p<5cox<; as belonging to a Delian and presumably the Delian 
himself was denounced and he would be on trial. We are not told anything about 
the ship's owner, probably because the speaker finds it irrelevant to his case.
However the speaker of Isokr. 17, a man from Bosporos who was doing 
business in Athens, was involved in this case and he was accused before the 
boule of an offence which is not explicitly defined in this passage, but we learn 
that he had extended a maritime loan on the cargo of the merchant-man. What we 
have so far is the following: a maritime loan was contracted between the 
Bosporan and the ship's owner who was allegedly a Delian; probably the ship's 
owner had taken the money and he was preparing for the trade voyage; the ship 
was denounced by <p&ox<; on the pretext that it belonged to the enemy and the 
ship's owner would have to face trial initiated by the (p&cnc;. Nevertheless the 
Bosporan was brought before the boule where he was accused of an offence 
which must have had something to do with the <p&cm; of the ship. Eventually he 
was released on bail for the period preceding the trial.
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Here there is a problem in defining the accurate accusation against the 
Bosporan and the type of the legal procedure used by the accusers to bring him 
before the boule. Some scholars think that here we have two actions against the 
Bosporan, first a <p6cn<;, and second another action initiated after his protest, and 
that under this second action he was brought before the boule. Lipsius believes 
that the second action was an EioaYY&A.ia, while Hansen thinks that it was an 
SvSei^x^dncxY^Y^l124 The problem is caused by the fact that the Bosporan was 
brought before the boule where he was obliged to find sureties if he wanted to 
avoid arrest and custody. However a cpaoi^ could be brought before the boule 
(Ar. Knights 300) at least in the fifth and early in the fourth century. As far as the 
possibility of arrest and remand in custody until the trial is concerned the 
traditional view is that qrtxau; neither entailed arrest and custody nor 
defendant compelled to find sureties.125 But there is no evidence in support of 
these statements. When we look at the evidence concerning <p&ou; we realize that 
nothing is mentioned about arrest and custody of the accused. For the one of the 
two real cases of cp&oic; that are known, (Isokr. 18.6), we are not told anything 
about arrest and custody, but in the other real case of <pdon; (Isokr. 17.42-3) a 
person undoubtedly connected with the (pdcnt; of the ship produced sureties in 
order to avoid remand in custody until his trial. Now since there is not any other 
instance of (p&aui; where arrest and custody or the demand of sureties were 
attested, the scholars thought that this must not have been the practice in cases of 
(pccok; and they tried to find a way out of the problem by assuming that in this 
case (Isokr. 17.42-3) two actions against the Bosporan took place. Starting from 
the end, namely the appointment of sureties as a substitute for the accused man's
124Lipsius, idib. p.314 n.20; M.H.Hansen, Apagoge, p. 132
l25Hansen, ibid. p. 132; Harrison,ibicL p.220.
156
otherwise' the
remand in custody, they tried to find a type of process which entailed arrest and 
custody and consequently sureties, to match our case here and they conclude that 
the second type of the legal procedure used against the Bosporan must have been 
either EiGayyeMa or iv8ei!;i<; / faiayajyTi.
Hansen thinks that the Bosporan was prosecuted by an £v5eil;i<; or an 
fitTiaycoyfi to the boule as a result of his protest against the <p&ai£ of the ship, of 
the ship's owner and of himself. And if I have understood Hansen's argument 
properly, then it seems to me that the offence for which the Bosporan was 
denounced by I  v5ei£i<; or dt7iaycoyf| to the boule was that he protested at the 
(p&oii; of the ship (6cp<pioPrp;ofivTo<; 5’ epoft koci KaOfcXxeiv dc^iofivioq). But 
although I do not have any evidence to support my argument, I think that the 
reaction of the Bosporan is very comprehensible and it is something that we 
should expect from anyone who was accused of any offence, namely to protest 
against the accusation and to claim that he was innocent, without running the risk 
of a double prosecution.
Therefore I am not convinced by Hansen's arguments and I think that the 
procedure before the boule was the cp&oic; brought against the Bosporan. The 
accusation presumably was that he lent money for trade purposes to a shipowner 
who was from Delos, an enemy of Athens at that time.
We know that a law existed which authorized (pdoi^ for the offence of 
lending money for a ship which was not going to transport grain to Athens:
NOMQS
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’Apytipiov 5£ \if[ e^exvax exSoovax ’A0T]vaia)v 
xai xcbv pexoxxcov xcov ’AQfivqax pexoxxotivxcov 
[ii|58vi, \n\frk <Bv ooxox xopxox excrxv, exq vaftv f\xi£ 
&v p.f| jjlM.fi axxov ’A6ifva£8, xa i x&Ma x& 
yeYpajiji6va Ttepi exdaxoo a(>xa>v. e&v 8£ xx£ 8x5$ 
xap& xafixa, etvax xffv qxiaiv xod xi)v ficTioypaqrfjv 
xofi dpyvpiox) 7ip6<; xoix; 87np8XT|x6<;, xaQ&nep xf|^ 
vedx; xod xo$ aixoo elpTixax, xax& xafixdi. xod 5xxx| 
ai>x$ jifi laxtD xepi xofi 8tpyx)pxox), 8 &v 8x5$ 
&Moa6 Tiox f\ ’A8fivoc£e, jit|5^ dcpxfi sxaay^xco rcepl 
xotixox) JIT]5ejiia.
(Dem. 35 Lakrit.51)
Now, having in mind that <p&ax<; was also available against those who 
had commercial dealings with enemies of Athens (Ar. Akham. 819 ff. and 908 
fif), we may assume that there might have been a law, analogous with the law 
found in Dem. 35.51, which prohibited loans to merchants who were enemies of 
Athens and <p6oxQ would be the proper type of action against those who extended 
such loans to enemies. The accusation against the Bosporan might have been 
made in accordance with that law and the procedure of <p&ox<; would be employed 
as almost in all the cases concerning offences of having commercial dealings with 
enemies of Athens and of lending money for a ship which was not going to 
transfer grain to Athens. We know that the Bosporan's case was brought before 
the boule which handled many or all cases of (paax<; at that time (Ar. Knights 
300-302), and there the accused faced the possibility of arrest and custody until 
his trial, unless he furnished sureties who would guarentee his appearance in 
court.
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If my interpretation is correct, then we might conclude that in Isokr. 
17.42-3 we have a case of qx5coi<; before the boule which entailed the possibility 
of arrest and remand in custody of the accused until his trial or the requirement of 
furnishing sureties.
The Bosporan was released on bail until his trial. A trial was to follow 
where it would be decided whether the accused was guilty or not. If it was proved 
that the ship's owner was a Delian, then the Bosporan would be declared guilty 
and would be sentenced, (We do not know whether, apart from the money that he 
had given as a loan and which would be confiscated, he had to pay a fine in 
addition or to suffer another penalty). When he was brought before the boule the 
prosecutors proposed execution without trial ( outgo tt) v PouA.fjv 5x60eaav ol 
PouA.6p.8voi auxoqxxvxeiv, dfoaxs x6 p£v 7ipa>xov rcapfc pixpdv fjA.0ov &xpxxo<; 
&7io0aveiv). If we are to believe the speaker on this point, it seems that there was 
talk in the boule of putting the accused to death &xpixo<;.126 However the case 
was ultimately referred to a SixaaxTjpiov.
126If what is said here is not an exaggeration by the speaker, then this instance should re-open the 
vexed question of the punitive powers of the boule. This case might suggest that those powers were 
important where the defendants were non-citizens. There is the case of the assassination of the Athenian 
icpo^evo; in Iulis [ JGF iia 111 (Tod 142), dated in 364/3] where the boule condemnsV~*"to death (37-8 ), 
and we might conclude that if ,at this time, the boule might still in certain circumstances pass the death 
sentence on foreigners from allied cities, probably it could do the same in the case of metics in the same 
circumstances, i.e. in public actions with the public interest at stake, and as soon as aprima facie case had 
been established.
See also, Rhodes, Botde, pp. 179-207 for a full account of the punitive powers of the boule.
159
After the (p&cnc, was brought before the boule, as it seems from what is 
said here and what actually happened, two courses were open to it: it could either 
put the accused to death dxpixoq, without referring the case to a Sixaoxipiov, or 
refer the case to a 5xxaaxf|piov. If the boule chose the second alternative, then 
the accused had to be kept in custody until his trial, or he could avoid remand in 
custody by providing sureties (eyyoqxdq). Actually the Bosporan provided 
syyoTytat; and stayed out of custody, (xeXeoxfrvxet; 5’ eneiaGiiaav eyyoTycd  ^
nap’ epoo 56!;aa8ai). These eyyoTyiai guaranteed that the accused would appear 
for trial.
The number of the eyyoTjxai provided is not mentioned here explicitly, 
but we may infer that they must have been definitely more than one. The plural 
eyyoTyt&t; (xeXeoxc&vxet; eneia0T]aav eyyoTyt&i; nap* epoo S6i;aa0ai) indicates 
that the eyyurjxod were at least two; moreover we are told that two persons named 
in this passage stood as guarantors, ’Apx^oxpaxo^ (Ilaaicov 5’ ’Apx^axpaxov 
poi x6v 6cn6 xffe xpa7i££T|<; snxa xc&dvxcov eyyoiytfiv nap£axev) and naoicov 
(xaixoi ei pixpaiv dneaxepeixo xod pn5£v fiSei p’ ev0<5c5e xexxripfcvov, oox 
&v Sfpioo xoaohxcov xptip^oov eyyoT]xfi<; poo xax^axTj. tOJka 5r|A.ov dxi x&s 
p£v xpiaxoaia<; 5paxp&£ evexd&eaev spoi xa Pl £6pevo<;, xcov 5’ enxd 
xaXdvxajv eyyoTytfn; poi ey£veG* f]yoopevo<; niaxiv 2xeiv Ixavfiv x6 xpuaiov 
x6 nap aoxcp xeipevov) where the subject of the verbs in the phrases eyyoT|xfi<; 
poo xax£axr[ and eyyoiytlji; poi eyevexo is identical with 8yyoT]XTj<; and it is 
naoicov; since Ilaaicov is the subject of the verb in the sentence 5xi x&<; p£v 
xpiaxoaia<; Spaxp&S evex&Xeaev epoi xa Pl £6pevo<; (and actually in the 
sections 38-39 we are told that the Bosporan had admitted that he owed Pasion 
three hundred drachmas, although this debt was a fictitious one made up by them 
for another purpose) he is also the subject o f the verb in the phrase eyyoTyir^ poi 
eyfcvexo. Thus we have here:
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x&<; pfev xpictKOGia  ^ Spocxjiaq eveKti&eaev [Ilaaxoov] 
xoov 5’ enxdt xaX(5cvxa)v eyyDTixite pox ey^vsxo [IlaoxcDv] 
Therefore we may conclude that the eyyuTyiori in this case were at least 
two. However, Archestratos and Pasion are the only sureties mentioned by the 
Bosporan in this speech but not necessarily the only sureties put up by him when 
the eyyuT] actually took place. The plural of eyyur[the, in Isok. 17. 42 might 
include more than two persons.
I think that the accused was obliged to fmd more than one surety 
otherwise the boule would not release him. The requirement of more than one 
surety must have been a condition in cases of eyyuq of this type. If it was 
enough for the boule to accept just one person as surety, then either Pasion could 
have furnished Archestratos as the only surety for the Bosporan or he himself 
could have stood as the only surety for him. The fact that Pasion actually 
contacted and persuaded Archestratos to stand as surety for the Bosporan and 
then he himself went surety for him indicates that the number of the sureties (more 
than one) must have been important and decisive.
The Bosporan had his own circle of contacts to whom he could appeal 
for help and from whom the eyyuqxax would come. One of his father's guest- 
friends (£svo<;), Philip, was summoned and appeared but he refused to undertake 
the responsibility of standing surety for him, because he was scared of the danger. 
When the <p&ox<; against the Bosporan was brought before the boule and it 
decided eventually to refer the case to a Sixaaxfjpiov the accused man was either 
to be kept in custody until his trial or to provide sureties who would guarantee 
that he would actually appear before the court. Probably at this stage Philip was 
called by the accused to appear in the boule and to accept to be one of his 
sureties. Possibly although Philip knew the reason why he was called he appeared 
before the boule, which indicates that he had not decided yet whether he would
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stand surety or not. Since he knew that he was called in order to play the role of 
one of the eyyoTymi, if he did not want right from the beginning to undertake such 
a responsibility, he could have not appeared at all in the boule. But Philip 
appeared, heard the case, was informed of the prospective eyyuT] and then left 
without committing himself to such an act: xai $ft.ii(ico£ pev d)v poi ££vo<; 
7iaxpixo<;f xA.T]8£i<; xai brcaxobaa^, Seiaaq x6 p£ye8oi; xofi xivSbvoo fatnbv
$Xexo-
But how can Philip's behaviour be explained? Probably he refused to be 
one of the 8yyi)T]xod because of the amount of money (ercxdt x&Xavxa) for which 
he would become the Bosporan's surety (5eiaas; x6 p£ye8o<; xoft xiv5uvov). 
This amount of money was probably fixed by the boule when the accused man 
was given the chance to stay free until his trial only by providing persons who 
would become his sureties for this certain amount of money. The boule not only 
accepted to release the accused on bail but it itself determined the amount of 
money that would compose the bail. The Bosporan however managed to find 
other persons as his sureties. Archestratos and Pasion undertook to become his 
sureties for seven talents fApx^oxpaxov poi...£7ix& xak&vxcov eyyuTyifiv 
7iapea%8v - (Ilaatcov) xa>v 5’ ercxfc xaXdvxcov eyyurixfii; poi 8y£vexo]. 
Therefore the amount of seven talents, for which the Bosporan had to find at least 
two persons to become his sureties, was set by the boule.
The practical function of the seven talents must have been the following: 
The Bosporan who was accused by tpdou; to the boule for possibly extending a 
maritime loan to an enemy (the Delian ship-owner) was to face trial on a future 
day after the tp&ou; had been brought before the boule. In the meantime he was 
not remanded in custody because some persons (eyyunxori) guaranteed for seven 
talents that he would actually appear for trial. If the accused did not eventually 
appear for trial then the eyyuqxai would be responsible and they would have to
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pay the sum of seven talents. The failure of a party to appear for the trial was 
sufficient evidence for a verdict by default. In a public prosecution if the 
defendant fled the country his flight was regarded as a confession of guilt and he 
was forthwith condemned in absentia {see Lycourg. I. 117). The £yyur|Tal would 
pay the money for which they became the accused man's sureties not because he 
was proven guilty by his escape but because he failed to appear for the trial. In 
other words if the accused appeared for trial and was found guilty and 
condemned, I do not think that the eyyuT]xat would pay the money since the 
surety was for appearance in court and not for carrying out the court's award.
In our case here, the accusation against the Bosporan was probably that 
he contracted an illegal maritime loan. The amount of money lent by him to the 
ship's owner is not mentioned explicitly in this passage but the speaker says that it 
was a large sum of money (6A.K&5a y<5cp, s<p fj noXktit flv ey<b
5e5<DK6c;...). The legal procedure used against him was <p&at£ to the boule and the 
case was referred to a court. At least two men became his sureties for seven 
talents, an act which replaced his remand in custody. If the Bosporan appeared for 
trial and was found guilty then he would be condemned - the money for the loan 
would be confiscated and shared between the plaintiffs) and the state. If the 
Bosporan did not appear for trial but fled Athens then such an act would be 
regarded as a confession of his guilt and he would be condemned in absentia. But 
in this case what was going to be the sentence? In theory the money of the 
maritime loan should be confiscated but in practice the syy\)T|Tcxi would pay the 
money for which they became his sureties, i.e. in our case seven talents.
Is there any connection between the two amounts of money, i.e. the loan 
and the seven talents? I think that this is very likely since I cannot find what other 
criteria were used by the boule to fix the seven talents as the amount of money for 
which some persons would become the Bosporan's sureties. If this interpretation
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is correct, then the maritime loan made by the Bosporan would be seven talents, 
an amount of money which was very substantial- And although the maritime loans 
usually ranged from 1,000 to 4,500 drachmas, we actually have two references to 
maritime loans where the sums of money borrowed were several talents: a. the 
philosopher Zeno of Citium, according to Diogenes Laertius, had more than a 
thousand talents which he lent out in maritime loans (cpaax 5’ auiov \)7i£p 
x<5cA,avxa §xoVTa eiq, xt)v ’EM,&5a xai xafixa 8avex£eiv vauxix&i;,
Diog Laert. 7 Zeno 13). Probably this sum of money was made up of a plurality 
of loans, and b. we leam from Lysias that when Diodotos, who was a very rich 
man, died his estate was worth at least fifteen talents, of which seven talents and 
forty minas were lent out in maritime loans (vaxmxdi 5£ &7i65eil;£v 8x5eSop£va 
87ix& x&Xavxa xai xexxapdtxovxa pva<;..., Lys. 32 Diogeit. 6).
I now summarise my conclusions: I think that
_ The Bosporan was accused by the legal action of <paoi<; before the 
boule of extending an illegal maritime loan to a ship-owner (va‘6xXnP°£)-
For his appearance in court sureties were demanded to the sum 
related to the matter in dispute (illegal maritime loan).
_ He avoided remand in custody by providing sureties for the amount 
of seven talents which must have been the same sum of money with the maritime 
loan.
_ These persons guaranteed that the accused would appear before the 
court, otherwise they would be liable to pay the sum of seven talents.
If my whole intrerpretation of the case above is correct then we might 
also conclude that this case here is the only known to us example of a case of 
(pdou; where arrest and custody of the accused as well as release on bail was a 
possibility. Therefore this type of legal action (<p&ai<;) might have entailed arrest
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and custody or consequently release on bail (eyyuri) until trial, if not in all at 
least in some cases. Because of lack of evidence it is hard to determine the 
criteria used by either the boule or the other magistrates to whom <pdcn£ cases 
were brought to order arrest and custody [and in this case release on bail (syytiri) 
was an option] or to accept the case and just refer it to a court.
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Aikti acpaipeoecoq and eyyi)Ti before the polemarchos
&
Isocr. 17 Trapez. 14
There are five references to atpaipeox^ in the orators and a sixth in a 
fragment from a lost speech by Isaeos with the title eY7i£p ei<;
eXanGepxav fitcpaipEan;.
These are the following:
1. [Dem.] 59 Neaera 40 
[Dem.] 59 Neaera is a speech of accusation in a ypatpf] ^evxai; brought by 
Apollodoros and his brother-in-law Theomnestos against a woman, Neaera. The 
charge was that she, being herself an alien, was living as wife with Stephanos, 
who was an Athenian citizen. As Neaera's life is narrated in detail we leam that 
she had been a slave and a common prostitute and that before she went to live 
with Stephanos she had an eventful life. Among other things we hear that when 
she was a slave of Timanoridas and Eucrates in Corinth, she was offered her 
freedom by her two masters for the sum of twenty minae which she had to pay 
them. Neaera managed to collect some money from some men as a contribution 
towards the price of her freedom. This money was not enough and eventually a 
certain Athenian called Phrynion advanced the balance needed to make up the 
twenty minae, and he paid it to Eucrates and Timanoridas to secure her freedom. 
After paying down the money Phrynion went back to Athens taking Neaera with 
him. But after some time Neaera, not being happy with Phrynion, ran off to 
Megara where she remained for two years until Stephanos met her there and 
brought her back to Athens with him.
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When Phrynion learned that she was in Athens he reacted in the following
way:
71d 0 6 j i s v o <; 5e 6 ^puvicov eTnSTijiouaav ai)xf|v x a i 
ovaav  Tiapa xofixqp, 7iapakaP<bv veaviaxoix; pe0’ eauxofi 
x a i eX0(bv erci xfiv oixiav xofi Zxe<p6 vou fjyev atixfjv.
Aqmpoujievou 5£ xo$ Zxscpavou xax& x6v v6|iov ei<; 
eX.8D0epiav, xaxT|yy\>Tioev atixfiv np6<; xq> 7ioXepL&px<p.
To prove that what is said here is true the speaker brings as a witness to the 
facts the man who was polemarchos at the time:
MAPTYPIA
Aif|XTj£ Kexpi&ST]<; jiapxupei noXepapxofcvxo^ auxou 
xax8yy*oT]0flvax N£aipav xt\ v  vuvi & y <d v i £ o ]i £ v t | v  0x6 
Opuvioovtx; xofi ATipox&pooi; ASsA.tpou, x a i eyyi)Tix&£ 
yev£a0ai Neaipa<; Zxeqxxvov IEpoia5i]vf r ^ a u x 6xT|v 
Kr|(piai6a , ’Apiaxoxp&xriv <I>aXTip£a.
[Dem.] 59.40
Phrynion attempted to carry Neaera off from the house of Stephanos and 
take her with him, presumably on the pretext that she was a slave of his who had 
run away (fjyev auxfjv [ei<; SouXeiav] )127.
127The legal basis for Phrynion's attempt to arrest Neaera is not very clear. We know that Phrynion had 
paid a sum of money to Neaera's former masters for her emancipation and took her to Athens, but we do 
not know whether Phrynion had actually acted as her patron during her previous stay in Athens.
We also know that after some time with Phrynion Neaera ran away from him and went to Megara but 
she came back to Athens after two years with Stephanos as her patron (jcpoiortxtai I/t8<pavov tot/covi 
a tm k i section 37). If Phrynion was Neaera's patron during her previous stay in Athens, then the proper
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Stephanos, however, took her away from Phrynion declaring that she was a 
free woman and not a slave; he acted in accordance with the law (&q)axpoup.6vox) 
5£ ion Execpavou xaxdc x6v vopov exi; e^euOepxav).
What happened next is the following:
Aa^dvxtx; xoivnv auxa> xoO Opuvxcovoi; 5xxr|v, 6 xx auxou 
AcpexXexo Neaxpav xavx,nvi ex<; e^euOepiav, xod 5xx, & 
£5f|A,0£v nap’ anxon abxr], hneS^^axo, auvffyov
auxoix; oi enxxfiSexox x a i Ixexaav 8xaxxav 87ixxp6't|rax 
abxox<;.
[Dem] 59. 45
Phrynion brought a suit against Stephanos for taking Neaera from him and 
asserted her freedom. The charge was that Stephanos wrongfully made a stand for 
Neaera's liberty and it was originally laid with the Polemarchos, who would pass 
the case to the relevant court. Neaera was compelled to provide sureties to the 
Polemarchos that she would actually appear in court. The case however was 
submitted to arbitration and it was decided that Neaera was to be free
course for him would have been to bring a drcocroaokn) against her because she appeared with a new 
patron (Stephanos), and his action would have been based on the law forbidding a change of patron 
However Phrynion's action (his seizure of Neaera) indicates that he was probably claiming her as a 
runaway slave, although his actual intention may not have been to enslave her, but to keep her as his 
mistress agaia
Presumably he claimed that he paid money to Neaera's former masters for buying her to be his slave 
and not for her manumissioa See C. Carey Greek Orators: Apollodoros Against Neaira [Demosthenes] 
59, p. 107.
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(auveMovxet; 5’ oxixox ev xqi iepq>, . . .yvdopriv &7t£(pr|vavxo . . .xt)v p£v 
6cv0poo7iov eA,£D0£pav etvax xai aoxf|v auxTjt; xopxav, section 46), where the 
decision £Xea)06pav etvax xai ai>xfiv aoxfte xopxav is opposed to the other 
possible decision which could have been taken by the arbitrators, i.e. 5ox>>.t]v 
etvax xai Opovxoova auxfv; xtipxov, and indicates that Phrynion was claiming 
Neaera to be his own slave.
Therefore when a person was seized as a slave by someone who claimed 
that he was the owner of the alleged slave, a third person could oppose the 
seizure by declaring the liberty of the alleged slave. The alleged owner of the 
alleged slave could then bring an action against the third party who prevented the 
seizure. This action was called 5xxt\ 6c<paxp£aeax; or ei;axp£aecD<;; since 
Harpokration discusses the suit under e^axpeaeax; Sxxtj and refers to a lost 
speech by Isaeos (Taaxo<; sv xfi xm£p Eupa0oo<; ext; eXeuOepxav &(paxp6aex) it 
seems that there is no difference in meaning whether the term 5xxt] Atpaxpfcaeax; 
or Sxxtj e^axpfcaecot; is used128.
2. Aeschin. 1 Timarch. 62-63
I28Harp. s.v. e^aipeoeox; fiuai: orccne xu; 01701 nva ox; SouXov, em xa xu; avxov dx; eXevOepov 
e^aipoiTo, e£,T)v xd> avxirooicmpevcp xov avOpcbrccm dx; 8oi>Xoi> XaTxavsiv s^aipeoeox; Siktjv x$ 
ei; xfjv eXeudepiav avxov e^aipoupeva): IaaTa; ev xfj vjcep Evpadcnx; ei; eXeudepiav acpaipeaei.
S ts  S’ aSxx&^axo, S&Xriv ox6\|raa0£ ji£y<5cA.Tjv ^(bjirjv 
HYTjatf^pox)- &v0pamov ofc8£v ochxbv Ti8xxrpc6xa, x6 
£vavxxov ti8iktip.6vov, ouS£ Tipoafpcovxa auxqi, ctXkb 
8t]}i6oiov oxx£xt|v xffc 7i6A.£ax;, fjyEV £X£ Sou^Exav 
(p&axcov aauxo’O £tvax. £V Tiavxi S£ xa x o fi Yevfyievo<; 6 
ITxxx6tfiocxo<  ^ 7ipoo7ii7ix£i &v8pi x a i  p.&X.a xpTjaxfp. laxx  xx<; 
r^auxcov XoXapyeix;* ouxo<; ai>x6v &<paxp£xxax £X£ 
£^£D0£pxav. x6 S£ ji£x& xoOxo Sxxftv Xf^axt; £7ioxriaavxo.
Hegesandros attempted to enslave to himself Pittalacos, who was a public 
slave, alleging that he was his owner. But Glaucon took Pittalacos away into 
liberty129 and law-suits were begun next (Sxkti 6c<paxp6o£<D£). It is very clear in 
this passage that Hegesandros claimed that Pitallacos was a slave of his (fiyev £xi; 
8ouA,£xav (p&axcov aauxoo etvax).
3. [Dem.] 58 Theokr. 19:
xfcxapxo£ xoxvuv v6po<; eaxxv ... xa0’ 8v 
6(p£x^£x nevxaxooxai; Spaxp&S Q£oxpxvn<; 
ouxoox, oux £xx£X£xx6xo<; afcxft xo$ naxpoi;
npoaaiq&£v &<p£X6p.£vo<; xfjv 
KTypxaoSdbpoi) 0£p<5t7iaxvav £x<; £^£X)0£pxav...
Presumably in this instance the father of Theocrines maintained that the 
maid-servant of Cephisodoros was a free woman. Cephisodoros then brought a
l29Public slaves were privileged and their legal status was close to that of the metics (see Harrison 
Law 1 177). Thus, when Glaucon rescued Pittalacos and secured his freedom, we should understand the 
freedom of a state-slave in place of the slavery that Hegesandros had attempted to impose on him.
5vkti 6c<paip6aea)<; against him and the case went to the court where Cephisodoros 
claimed ownership over the maid-servant and eventually won the case. The father 
of Theocrines had evidently not been able to make good his claim that the servant 
in question was a free woman, and had been ordered to pay damages to his 
adversary and a like sum as a fine to the state (upoo&q&ev)130.
4. Lysias 23 Pankleon 9-11
In this speech the speaker (plaintiff) tries to prove that Pankleon was not a 
Plataean, and therefore could not claim the rights of an Athenian citizen. He tells 
how he made inquiries among the Plataean community in Athens who denied 
knowledge of him and that the only information he could get concerning Pankleon 
was from one man, who said that a slave of this name, who seemed to be like the 
defendant, had run away from him. Some days later the accuser saw Pancleon 
being arrested as the slave of Nikomedes: ‘Hpipocis xoivov pexfit xabxa ob 
7ioM,ort£ baxepov i8<bv 6ty6pevov xooxovi nayxX^cova bn6 NixopfiSooi;, 6  ^
epapxbpqoev abxob 5eoh6xti<; etvoci, section 9. Nikomedes asserted that he 
was Pankleon's owner and arrested him. However some of Pankleon’s associates 
said that he had a brother who would vindicate him as a freeman: e?n6v xiveq 
xgdv xobxcp Tiapdvxcov 6xi abxcp &8eX<p6<; Ss e^aipfjooxxo abx6v ei<; 
eXeoOepiav, section 9.
But Pankleon was unable to find anyone, even a relative, who would assert, 
in proper legal form, his allegedly free status and, according to the plaintiff, the 
sole issue concerning the defendant's status is the identity of his owner, since a 
woman asserted her ownership of Pankleon and prevented Nikomedes from taking
130Dem 58. 21: to v  te vofiov, oq iceXeuei to tjpwrj to w  x ifiT jp a u x ; cxpeft&v drmooup, oq av 
5o$n fiucauoq dq ttjv eXeu&epiav acpg&eodoa
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possession of him, yuvfi 5& tpftoKooaa abxlte a(>x6v eTvocx Sofiko v, 
dcptpiaPTyiofiaa x$ NixopfiSei, koA ofiic §qn] k6caeiv afixbv ftyexv, section 10.
Pankleon was not vindicated as a freeman by legal process but he resisted 
forcibly when he was hauled into slavery by Nikomedes, although Nikomedes 
and the woman, who also claimed that Pankleon was her slave, were both willing 
to let him go if somebody should either vindicate him as a freeman or arrest him 
on the claim of owning him as a slave: ei<; xofixo 5£ Pkxi6xt|xo(; fjkQov o\ xe 
7iap6vxe<; xofixqp koA afix6<; ouxo<;T woxe e06kovxo<; p£v xofi NucopfjSoo^ 
£0ekofioTi<; 5£ xffe yovanc6<; &qn£vai, e% xk; f[ ei<; ekEoOepiav xofixov 
<6tqxxipoixo> f[ &yoi (pdcncoov eaoxofi Sofikov ctvai, xofixcov ofiSev 
Tioifioavxe^ SccpEkdpevoi $xovxo, section 11.
Presumably, if Pankleon could find someone who would assert his free 
status, then Nikomedes would probably bring a Siktj ftqxnp&oeax; against the 
adsertor, and in this suit he would claim that Pankleon was his slave, (cf. x>n6 
NncopfiSoos, S<; epapxbpTioev afixofi 5eaa6xT]^ etvai, section 9; yovf| 5£ 
<p6aKooaa afixffc afixbv etvai Sofikov, section 10; tX xi<; ... f\ Ayoi cp6axcov 
eaoxofi Sofikov Etvai, section 11, where it is clear that the person who &yoi ei^ 
Sooksiav claimed that the alleged slave was his own slave).
5. Isocr. 12 Panathenaikos 97
koA TiapaTiXfjmov enoiriaav xofi; nap& p£v xcov &kka>v 
xofis oixfcxai; zx<; EkeoOspiav ftcpaipoop&voK;, atpiox 5’ 
afixofi; Sookefieiv 6cvayx&£ouaiv.
Here we have a reference to 6ccpcdpeai  ^ in general as a practice in Athenian 
law; the parties involved are as follows:
a. xox<; eit; eXeoQepiav &<paipoop£voi<;: people who asserted the freedom 
of wrongfully enslaved persons.
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b. ioi)Q oix^xa^: slaves or according to the adsertor, wrongfully enslaved 
persons.
c. 7iap& loov fyXkazv: alleged owners of the alleged slaves.
In a potential 51kt] &<paip6aecoc, brought by the persons of category c against 
the persons of category a, the latter would claim that the persons of category b 
being wrongfully enslaved should be free, while the former would assert their 
right of ownership over the alleged slaves. We should notice here that the persons 
who would bring a Sikt] ftqxxip&oecDi; were identical with the alleged owners of 
the slaves.
6. Isaeus Fr. 16 (Thalheim) Eumathes
*'EpX.a\|f6 pe 58v6k^t]^ &<peA.6pevo£ Etyi&Qnv ei<; 
eA.eo0epiav, ftyovio^ epofl ei£ 5oo^£iav xax& x6 ep6v 
Jlfepo?.
This is probably an extract from the speech of the plaintiff in the 5ikt] 
6upaip6aeax; brought against Xenocles. Eumathes was seized as a slave by 
the speaker of this lost speech by Isaeos (bn£p Etyi&0ou<; ei<; eXsuQepxav 
&(paipeai£, see Harp. s.v. 8i;aip6aea)<; 51kt|) claiming to be the owner, but 
Xenocles opposed the seizure and "took him away to freedom” 
(&<peX6pevo£ Etyi<x0Tiv ei<; eXeuOepiav). The party claiming ownership 
brought an action (51kt| &<ponp£aea)£) against Xenocles who prevented 
seizure.
Therefore, to sum up, when a person was wrongly seized as a slave by 
someone claiming to be the owner, he might be hauled into freedom (&qxxipeio0ai 
or s!;aipeia0ai eii; 8A.eu0epiav) by a third party who claimed that the enslaved 
person was a free man/woman. But if the alleged owner denied the validity of that
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"removal to freedom" and still claimed to own the person in question as a slave 
he could bring a 5ixq e^aip&oeax^-dcqxxip&oeax; against the adsertor who 
prevented seizure, for having wrongfully asserted the alleged slave's liberty. The 
charge was originally laid with the Polemarchos before whom the alleged slave 
had to provide sureties to guarantee his/her appearance for the trial. The case was 
passed by the Polemarchos to the relevant court where it was decided whether the 
alleged slave was really the slave of the man who claimed him. If the action (8ixq 
ftcpaip&oeax;) was successful the defendant had to hand over the slave or the 
slave's value in money and to pay a fine to the state equal to the value of the 
slave ([Dem.]58.19, 21)131.
We have discussed the six references to &<paip£oi<; in the orators (including 
Isocr. Panaih. 97 which is not a reference to an actual case of fttpaipeox^ but a 
general statement about this procedure) and we have seen that four of them 
([Dem.] 59 Neaera 40, 45; Aischin. 1 Timarch. 62-63; [Dem] 58 Theokr. 19; Is. 
Fr. 16 (Thalheim) Eumathes) refer to actual cases of &<poripeoi<; where the 
alleged owner of the alleged slave brought a 5ixq &<paip£aea><; before the 
Polemarchos against the person who asserted the liberty of the alleged slave. We 
know that the polemarchos supervised cases involving metics (Ar. Ath Pol 58. 
2-3), and his involvement in cases of 5ixr| &<pocip&o&<D<; is due to the fact that the 
alleged slave was usually claiming the status of a ffeedman or ffeedwoman, and 
consequently metic status.
When the case was brought before the polemarchos, the alleged slave was 
usually compelled by the plaintiff to produce sureties who would guarantee that 
the slave in question would appear for trial. In our evidence of the 5ikt]
l3iSee Harrison Law 1 178-9,221; MacDowell Law 80.
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fctpaipfcaecDs there is clear reference to such persons (EYYuqxax) in [Dem.] 59 
Neaera 40 and Lysias 23 Pankleon 12.
In Pankleon's case, however, a 5xkt| 6c<paip6aeoo<; was not brought since an 
fcqxxipecm; ei<; eXenOepxav never took place, and this is used by the speaker of 
Lysias 23 as an evidence that Pankleon knew that he had a very weak case and 
therefore by his own actions acknowledged his unfree status: ex> exScbi; eauidv 
6vxa SouXov ISexoev eYYi>Tyt&<; xaxaaxfiaa<; Tiepl xoft o 6paxo<; 
6cya)vioao0ax, section 12. This implies that if Pankleon had been removed to 
freedom by a relative or a friend of his, then his alleged owner would have 
brought a 5xxq 6cqxxxp^ aeoo^  and he would have demanded sureties. The fact that 
the speaker here mentions the possibility of sureties in the hypothetical context of 
the procedure Aqxripeox  ^ exq eXevGepxav, with the possible consequence of a 
Sxxq &<ponp&oea)£, indicates that furnishing sureties was the normal consequence 
after a 5ixq dupaxp&OEox;.
Actually the only preserved real case which is certainly a 5xxq ftqxxxp&oeax; 
([Dem.] 59 Neoera 40, 45) points to the same conclusion, dcqxxxpoopfcvox) 5£ xofc 
Exe<p&vox) xax& x6v v6pov eig £Xex)0epxav, xaxitYY^Tloev np6<; xfp
TioXe^ idpxcp, section 40. Stephanos asserted Neaera's freedom, Phrynion brought 
a 5ixq &<paxp£a£(D<; against him (section 45) and demanded sureties.
But who was the defendant in a 5ixq &(paxp6oeooc; and who furnished the 
sureties before the polemarchos? [Dem.] 59.45 (Aax6vxo<; xoxvov ai>x$ xo$ 
OpuvxoovoQ 5xxqv, 6xx aoxofi 6«pexA.exo Neaipav xax)xqvi ex<; e>,EX)0epxav, "so 
then Phrynion brought a suit against him (Stephanos) for asserting the freedom of 
this woman Neaera") suggests that the real defendant in a 5ixq 6ctpaxp£aea)£ was 
the adsertor: The main issue in the case was the status of the alleged slave; if the 
slave in question was proved actually-uLe a slave and belonged to the
plaintiff of the Sxxq 6c<paxp6oeoo<;> then the adsertor would be guilty of a wrong in
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taking him/her into freedom, and liable to a fine as the lost party of the suit 
([Dem.] 58 Theokr. 21 keXeuei x6 fjpiao xofi xipf|paxo£ 6<pett.eiv x$ Sijpoaicp 
S<; &v 865n P l^ Sixaico^ ei<; xfjv eXEo0epiav 6«peX6a 0ou).
Therefore, since the alleged slave's status inevitably was in question in a 
5ikt] ftqxxxp&aeax;, I think that we should understand in this context the language 
of Lys. 23 Pankleon 12 (eu ei8<b<; eouxbv 5vxa 5ouX.ov ISexaev eyYnqx&t; 
xaxaaxfiaat; nepi xo$ a 6paxo<; 6tYCOviaao0ai)132 and we should not take the 
phrase nepl xoft o6paxo^ 6cYooviaao0ai as an indication of the alleged slave's 
role as the defendant in a Sixq fapaipfcaeco^.
As far as the second question is concerned (who furnished the sureties?), 
both cases ([Dem.] 59.40 and Lys. 23.12) suggest that the alleged slave did so. 
The verb xccxeyyu&v means "to compel to give security" and Phrynion 
xaxqYY^Tl°ev a^xfjv (Nfcaipav) np6  ^ x$ 7ioXspdpx<p- "he compelled her to 
give security before the polemarchos". The phrase xa0iox6vai eyyutix&q means 
"to appoint sureties" and Pankleon SSeiaev EYYUTyt&t; xaxaaxfjaa^- "he was 
afraid to appoint sureties".
The plural eyyut]x&£ in Lys. 23.12, although it does not specify the exact 
number, indicates that more than one persons were required to stand as 
guarantors. In [Dem.] 59.40 the deposition of the polemarchos before whom the 
sureties were furnished is given, where the names of the guarantors are stated. 
The guarantors were three, they were Athenian citizens and members of 
propertied families.133 One of them was Stephanos himself, the man who 
* removed Neaera to freedom " and who was now facing a Stxq 6c<pocip£aea)£ 
brought against him by Phrynion, the man who alleged that he was Neaira's owner.
132cf. Harrison Law 1 179.
133See J.K. Davies, Athenian Propertied Families, 600-300B.C. ( Oxford 1971) 60,89.
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We may then conclude that the normal practice in cases of Sxxq &<paip£aeax; 
must have been that the slave in question was required to furnish as sureties three 
Athenian citizens and that there was nothing wrong if one of the sureties was the 
adsertor himself. Stephanos's example suggests that an adsertor by his act was 
not disqualified to play the role of one of the sureties.
These three Athenian citizens would guarantee before the polemarchos 
Qience the deposition of the polemarchos himself, [Dem.] 59.40) that the alleged 
slave would actually appear for trial. Presumably, if the alleged slave could not 
furnish the sureties required by the plaintiff (the alleged owner of the slave ), he / 
she would be kept in custody, either by his / her alleged master or by the Eleven 
after an order of the polemarchos, until a decision about the status of the alleged 
slave was taken, either by a trial or by arbitration proceedings, (cf. Isocr. 17 
Trapez. 12 eftxfc pe np6<; x6v rcoA.6papxovf aixo&v, xod oi> npbxepov
6t(pfjxev, §a>£ afcxqi xax^axqa* xaX.6tvxa)V eyYuqx&s).
Let us consider now what might have happened, first in the case that the 
alleged slave appeared in court, and second in the case that he / she did not turn 
up for trial.
* If the alleged slave appeared for trial, he / she could either be proved a 
free person, and in that case the alleged owner would lose his case and the 
alleged slave would go free, or he / she could be proved a slave of the plaintiff, 
and in that case, since the action of the Sixq ftqxxip&oeax; was successful, the 
defendant had not only to hand over the slave, but also to pay a fine to the state 
equal to the value of the slave (see [Dem.] 58.19, 21).
* If the alleged slave did not appear for trial and ran away, then what 
would probably happen is the following : His / her escape would be taken as a 
proof that he/she was actually a slave of the plaintiff, and the defendant who had 
previously taken him/her into freedom would be guilty. In this case the slave
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himself was probably replaced by the slave's value in money which the defendant 
had to pay to the slave's owner, he would still have to pay an equal amount as a 
fine to the state.
But what would be the responsibility of the guarantors? They guaranteed 
that the slave would appear for trial, but eventually the slave did not. It was they 
who prevented the slave's arrest until the trial, otherwise his/her owner would 
have taken him/her into custody which earned more guarantee that he /she would 
certainly appear for trial. Here we should bear in mind that it appears to have 
been perfectly legal for the adsertor to be one of the guarantors (there was no 
objection against Stephanos by Phrynichos or by the polemarchos, [Dem.] 59.40), 
and probably this was the most common practice in cases of 5xkt[ dupaip&aaoD^ , 
since the person who asserted the freedom of an alleged slave would certainly be 
willing to stand as surety for him/her if he was allowed to do so. In the case where 
the slave did not furnish sureties and was kept in custody until the trial, if the 
defendant was convicted, he would have to pay a fine to the state. The slave was 
there and would go with his/her master. But if, in the case where the slave 
furnished sureties and being free until trial had ample opportunity to run away, 
he/she actually did so, then the convicted defendant would have to pay twice an 
amount of money equal to the slave's value, first to the slave's owner who had 
lost a piece of property and second to the state as the law ordered. The slave was 
replaced by his /her value in money.
The same person had undertaken two different roles, one of the adsertor and 
another of the guarantor, and he was required to pay accordingly a sum of money 
to the state, as adsertor, and another to the owner of the slave, as guarantor 
(supposing the slave had ran away). Probably to secure his position the owner of 
the slave demanded three guarantors who would cope more easily with the second 
payment (to the owner) than only one person would do, and especially when this
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person was the adsertor who had also to pay another amount of money (to the 
state). Therefore, I think that the responsibility of the guarantors would be 
restricted only to the second payment, i.e. the payment made to the owner of the 
slave as a compensation for a lost piece of his property.
* * *
An incident described in Isokr. Trapez.14 has been taken by some scholars 
as a reference to the procedure of dcqxripeau; ei<; eleuGepiav with the ensuing 
5xkt] &qxxip£o8ax;.134 Before we consider this case, it would be appropriate to 
mention briefly the facts which led to this incident. A Bosporan man who had 
moved to Athens opened an account in Pasion's bank, and when he prepared to go 
back to Bosporos and asked Pasion to return him his money, Pasion at first 
claimed that he had not the means of refunding it just then, but when the Bosporan 
sent his friends Philomelos and Menexenos to inquire the matter, Pasion 
repudiated the debt altogether. The Bosporan then decided to take legal 
proceedings against Pasion. The only person who had knowledge of their financial 
transactions, according to the Bosporan, was Kittos, a slave of Pasion. Believing 
that this slave could furnish the clearest proof of his claim the Bosporan went to 
Pasion and demanded that Kittos should be given to torture. Kittos however had 
disappeared; according to the Bosporan, Pasion hid him, while Pasion accused the 
Bosporan and Menexenos that they had taken Kittos away after having deceived 
him when he was in the bank and took six talents from him. However, after some 
time Kittos was found in Athens by Menexenos who then arrested him and
134 Harrison Law 1,221, MacDowell Law, 80 a  149.
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demanded that he should be given by Pasion to torture in order to give testimony 
about the Bosporan's deposit and the charge brought by his master:
Mev6!;evo9 5’ efcpiaxei i 6v rcaxS’ ev0&5e, Kcrt 
87uXap6pevo<; ffeiox> ai>i6v P<xaavi£eo0ax xod nepl xf|q 
napaKaxaOfpcTv; xai Tiepi cbv 00x09 flU&S fixidcaaxo. 
Ilaaicov 8’ . . .  dupnpexx’ aox6v 69 eXsMepov 5vxa . . .  
KaxeYYo(&vxa9 y&p Meve^voo np69 x6v nokipapxov x6v 
TiaiSa, Ilaaicov aox6v enxdc xo&dcvxcov SxTiyyofiaaxo.
Isocr. 17 Trapez. 13-14
It is true that the language of this passage suggests that here we have the 
procedure of &<paipecn9 819 eA.8X)0epiav followed by a 5xktj &qxxip&oea)9. 
However, there is a problem which dissuades me from accepting this passage as 
reference to &<paxpeax9 819 eleuGepiav.
Menexenos seized Kittos and demanded that he should give testimony under 
torture; he took as granted that Kittos was Pasion's slave and challenged his 
master to submit him to torture in order to give testimony about the deposit and 
the charge brought against Menexenos by Kittos's master. His action is described 
as: 87ixA,ap6p.8V09 (x6v naxSa) f£ioo ai>x6v paaavx^eaQax. The arrest of Kittos 
was not an attempt of enslavement by Menexenos in the sense that he claimed the 
slave as his own. Menexenos arrested Kittos because of the circumstances: 
previously, Menexenos and the Bosporan had been charged by Pasion that they 
hid kidnapped Kittos. That is why Menexenos, when he met Kittos in Athens, 
arrested and led him before Pasion who was then challenged to submit the slave 
to torture. Pasion's reaction is described as: fttptipeix’ aux6v 69 eX,ex>08pov Svxa. 
He released Kittos on the ground that he was not a slave but a freeman, and thus
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he could not be tortured. Finally a legal action was taken by Menexenos before 
the polemarchos.
Let us suppose that this action was the 51kt| &qxxip&G8CD<; against Pasion 
who "removed Kittos to freedom" brought by Menexenos who denied the validity 
of that removal and insisted that Kittos was a slave.
We have seen that in cases of 6cqxxipe<n<; eiq eXeoGepiav there were the 
following parties:
1. The alleged slave. — (in our case, Kittos),
2. the person who arrested the alleged slave and claimed that he was the 
owner. — (in our case, Menexenos ?),
3. the person who reacted to this action and removed the enslaved person to 
freedom. — (in our case, Pasion).
And the next step was made by the man who arrested the alleged slave. He 
could bring a 5ikt] &<paip6oeax; against the man who removed the enslaved 
person to freedom. This suit would decide whether the enslaved person was 
wrongfully removed to freedom and consequently rightly enslaved. The 
wrongfully enslaved person had to prove his/her non-slave status. The plaintiff 
had to prove that the alleged slave was actually a slave and that he was his/her 
owner, while the defendant would claim that the alleged slave was a free 
man/woman.
But in the alleged 5xkt] fopaipfcoeax; brought by Menexenos against Pasion, 
the plaintiff would argue that Kittos was a slave and not a free man as the 
defendant claimed, and when the question "who owns Kittos?" would arise, 
Menexenos would reply that Pasion owned him. But Pasion himself was the man 
who "removed Kittos to freedom”. In other words Menexenos would claim that 
Kittos was Pasion's slave, while at the same time Pasion claimed that Kittos was 
a freeman. But what was the issue of this suit? If the alleged master of an alleged
181
slave declared that he was a freeman, how could another person prove that this 
man was not free but a slave of the man who declared that the alleged slave was a 
freeman?
The question in this suit would be whether Kittos was Pasion's slave or a 
freeman. Menexenos would maintain the former, while Pasion the latter.
Paradoxically the person who enslaved the alleged slave (Menexenos) would 
claim that he (Kittos) was a slave of the person who removed him to freedom 
(Pasion).
I conclude that Isocr.17 Trapez. 14 is not a reference to a 5ixq ftqxxip&oeax;, 
and therefore the demand of sureties by Menexenos should not be seen in this 
context.
I suggest that Menexenos brought probably a 5iktj p^dcpry; against Kittos 
whose status had changed from a former slave of Pasion to a freeman after 
Pasion's declaration that Kittos was not his slave but a freeman.
Consequently this 81xq pxdpqq was brought before the polemarchos who 
was dealing with cases concerning metics (an emancipated slave held metic 
status). The purpose of this 5ixq pk&pry; was to compel Kittos to give testimony 
about the Bosporan's deposit in Pasion's bank and the charge brought by Pasion 
against the Bosporan and Menexenos. We are told that Kittos was the only person 
who knew about Pasion's transactions with the Bosporan and therefore the person 
who could give such a testimony (Isocr. 17.11). Menexenos taking Kittos to be 
Pasion's slave and seeking for his testimony, arrested him and challenged his 
master to submit him to torture, (a slave's testimony would be accepted in court 
only if it was given under torture). When Pasion denied that Kittos was a slave 
and therefore he could not be tortured, Menexenos acted in a different way:
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presumably he called Kittos to give evidence as a free man135 but he refused to do 
so, and then Menexenos brought a 5 x k tj P A .& P ti<; against him.
The 5 x kt]  p x d t p i ] ^  (a private action for damages) is one of the most 
frequently attested kinds of case in Athenian law, because the concept of PA.dpq 
was very broad covering any action which caused someone to lose property, and 
particularly money.
When an important witness was unwilling to give evidence or, although he 
promised to do so, failed to attend at the required hearing, it appears that there 
were three ways in which a litigant could bring pressure to bear on the unwilling 
witness:
2. Sixq IxTiopapxupxou
3 .  5 x k t |  p k d c p q g
Dem. 49 Timoth. 18-20 is the only evidence for the 5xkt] PA,&Pt|<; in this 
connection; vovi x$ ’Avxupdvex etkqxa PA.&pTi<; xStav 5ixT]vf 6xx pox odx’ 
epocpxfcpTjaev out’ e^copdaaxo Kocxfc t6v vdpov. When Apollodoros brought an 
action for debt against Timotheos, he needed Antiphanes's testimony since he was 
present when the money was lent. Antiphanes, however, failed to testify, with the 
result that Apollodoros lost the case before the arbitrator. Apollodoros then 
brought a Sixq pX.dPq  ^ against Antiphanes because it was Antiphanes who had 
caused him to lose the money.
135cf. Dem 49 T im o th . 55: ripojiTtv atrcov rcpd; Suxvrnrji ex eu SoGXa; eit| o Aioxpwov, xax 
awdv ev 5eppaa tdv eXeyxov 6i66vau aitoKpivapevou 5e |icx awrov d a  eXe\>08pcx; 
ex*n, try; pcv eJ^amjceax; eneoxov, paprupuxv 5’ awov rji^ouv ejipaXsaOai tcn> Aio%puovo£ ax; 
eXeudepou dvuo<^
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Furthermore, Plato Laws 937 a (6 5’ ei<; papxopiav xA.q0eii;, pfi &7iavxa>v 
5& x$ xaXeaapfcvtp, xflg p^dprn; uti65iko<; ioxco xax& v6pov) may be based 
on an Athenian law.136
In our case, Pasion brought a charge against Menexenos and the Bosporan 
that they deceived Kittos and received six talents from him, (section 12). Kittos 
whose deposition would be vital was unwilling to give testimony about the matter. 
Kittos's testimony was also important for the deposit which the Bosporan had in 
Pasion's bank. Therefore, Kittos's failure to testify could result in their 
conviction, which meant that Menexenos would be liable for the six talents and 
that the Bosporan, who would lose his deposit, would also be liable for the six 
talents137.
In section 15 we are told that after Menexenos's action (probably 51xr] 
PX&Ptv;) Pasion changed his attitude and appeared willing to surrender Kittos 
(according to the Bosporan) for torture. They chose Paoavioxd^ (according to 
the Bosporan "torturers" while according to Pasion "questioners") and when the 
Bosporan demanded that they should torture Kittos, Pasion made a stand against 
torture and asserted that they had not been chosen as torturers but as interrogators 
(X6y<p 7iuv0dveo0oti rcapa xo$ 7ia i86<;, section 15; X6yq> p&v exfcXeoae 
paaavi£eiv ipycp 5’ oi>x dta, section 17).
This change of Pasion's attitude may be due to the fact that Menexenos put 
pressure on Kittos and consequently on Pasion by bringing the 5ixq pA.dpi] .^
136See Harrion LawJL 139-143.
I37cf. Isocr. 17. 21 Mevef^ voq 6 opyi^ieva; vrcep tt*; aiitcu; xdiceTvov ITaoicov fraaoaijo, 
Xaxcbv 8uctjv e^nra tov Kfcoov, a^uov xf)v avrrjv nacuovi yeufopevcp yiyvecrfku £nniav rjarcep 
av avta; exvyxavev, ei u  tovwdv e<paweto laxtjoa^
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However I have to admit that my suggestion above is based more on pure 
assumption than evidence and it was made because of my refusal to accept, for 
reasons mentioned above, that the action brought by Menexenos before the 
polemarchos was a 51kti &<paip6aeoo<; against Pasion.
Pasion guaranteed that Kittos would appear for trial and gave security for 
him in the sum of seven talents. If we take the case here to be a 5ikt] 
dcqxxipfcaeax; then the seven talents would be the alleged slave's value in money. 
Presumably this amount would be fixed by the alleged owner of the alleged slave 
and it would be paid over to him by the adsertor if the alleged slave failed to 
appear for trial.
If the case here was a kind of private suit (probably 5xkt] by which
the plaintiff aimed to compel an unwilling witness to give evidence about another 
case in which he was involved either as a plaintiff or defendant, then presumably 
the seven talents would be an amount equal to the amount of the matter in 
dispute.
Here the charge was that Menexenos and the Bosporan had wrongfully 
extracted money from Pasion's bank through Kittos. The amount of this money 
was six talents. Kittos's testimony was vital. He was also called to give testimony 
about the Bosporan's deposit in Pasion's bank. We do not know exacdy how much 
money the Bosporan had put in Pasion's bank, but we might infer from section 44 
that it was at least seven talents. The consequences of Kittos’s failure to give 
testimony, either under torture as if he was a slave or under normal circumstances 
as a witness, would be that Menexenos with the Bosporan would probably be 
convicted for the sum of six talents and that moreover the Bosporan would lose 
his deposit.
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Menexenos, who after Pasion's declaration that Kittos was a freeman could 
not extract Kittos's testimony under torture, did not have another alternative than 
to call upon him to give testimony as a witness, hi Kittos's refusal Menexenos 
probably brought the SIkt] pXdcp-q^  against him on the ground that he would suffer 
a material loss (six talents, if he was convicted) as a result of Kittos's inaction as 
a desirable witness. Was this SIxt] PX&Pt]<; directed against Kittos because he 
was not giving testimony about both issues, the deposit and the sue talents, or 
because he refused to testify only about the sue talents for which Menexenos was 
charged?
When Menexenos arrested Kittos, he demanded that he should give evidence 
under torture for both, the deposit and the six talents (section 13). However, after 
a short time he appears to have dissociated himself from the Bosporan who was 
trying to reach an agreement with Pasion (section 21).
Whatever the case was, the amount of money for which Pasion stood surety 
for Kittos (seven talents) corresponds neither to the deposit nor to the six talents, 
and I have here to admit ignorance in the question ''why did Pasion guarantee 
Kittos for seven talents and not for six or for at least thirteen talents?”. The only 
certain thing is that if Kittos did not appear for trial, then Pasion would be liable 
for the payment of the seven talents.
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Isocr. 17 Trapez. 12
Pasion the banker, accusing Sopaeos's son, who was a metic, and 
Menexenos, who was an Athenian citizen, that they deceived Kittos, one of 
Pasion's slaves employed in his bank, and extracted six talents from him, brought 
a legal action against them. In section 12 of Isocr. Trapez. some details are given 
about the initiation of the action brought against Sopaeos's son.138
Pasion arrested the defendant and took him by force before the polemarchos, 
while in cases where the defendant was an Athenian citizen the prosecutor in a 
5ixri or YpcHpfi (apart from dtxaYooyfi, £v8ei£i£, eiaaYYe^ia and etpfiYTjan;) had 
to summon him to appear before the relevant magistrate on a stated day 
(7ip6oxXricn<; or icA^cnt;).139
The involvement of the polemarchos is due to the fact that Sopaeos's son 
was probably a metic. He has paid eiatpopd (section 41), and thus, presumably, 
paxoiiaov also. It appears that the polemarchos handled all lawsuits in which 
metics and privileged foreigners were involved (except on homicide charges) in 
the fifth century, whereas in the fourth he handled the private suits only while the 
public suits were handled by the same magistrates as would handle them if both 
parties were citizens.140 The rule appears to have been that a private case in which 
a metic or a privileged foreigner was either plaintiff or defendant was handled by 
the polemarchos; Lys. Pankleon is a reply to a defendant's claim that he should be
138However we may infer from section 21 that a separate legal action was brought against Menexenos 
before the appropriate magistrate.
139 See Harrison Law I I85 f , MacDowell Law 238.
140 See MacDowell Law 221-24
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treated not as a metic but as a citizen and so ought not to be indicted before the 
polemarchos.141
Before the polemarchos Pasion demanded sureties (eyyoT]xod) from 
Sopaeos's son. These eYYuqTori would guarantee the defendant's appearance in 
court. The language of Isocr. 17.12 (eft.x£ pe np6<; x6v noXfcpapxov, eyyuTixdti; 
aiioov, xod oft Tipftxepov fttpffcev, lax; aftx$ xaxfcaxTia £1; xo&titvxoov 
EYYwyc&q.) suggests, first, that since the case was submitted to the polemarchos 
the appointment of the sureties by the defendant was not a natural consequence, 
but it depended on the plaintiff to demand them, and, second, that since the 
plaintiff had demanded sureties, if the defendant failed to produce such sureties, 
he was imprisoned until the trial. The demand of sureties in these cases might be 
due to the fact that, unlike an Athenian citizen, a metic or an alien could more 
easily escape from Athens and avoid trial.
The plural eYYUT]x6c<; suggests that the sureties were more than one persons, 
probably three (cf. [Dem.] 59.40 ). They guaranteed Sopaeos's son for six talents; 
six talents was the amount of money that they had allegedly extracted from 
Pasion's bank. Therefore they undertook to stand sureties for an amount of money 
related to the value of the matter in dispute. If the defendant failed to appear for 
trial, then the sureties would be liable to pay the sum for which they guaranteed.
To sum up, in private cases where the defendant was a metic or a privileged 
alien the prosecutor could take him by force before the polemarchos and could 
then demand sureties for his appearance in court up to a sum related to the matter 
in dispute, otherwise the defendant was imprisoned until trial.
141 See also 20 I 2 153, A r i s t a .  Pol. 58.2-3.
188
’Eyyvijrai in connection with the public 
debtors
In [Dem.] 53 Nikostr. 26-27 we hear about a case of eyybq which took place 
in the court. Before we consider in details the nature and the circumstances under 
which the eyyori took place, it would be appropriate to give a brief account of the 
events which led to this point.
[Dem.] 53 was delivered in support of a lawsuit arising out of an 
information (&7ioypa<pf|) laid against a certain Arethousios for refusing to pay 
a fine of one talent which had been imposed upon him by the jury before whom 
Apollodoros had secured his conviction for bearing false testimony. A certain 
Nikostratos made common cause with the opponents of Apollodoros, who was 
engaged at the time in a variety of lawsuits. Nikostratos induced a third party 
(one Lykidas) to bring against Apollodoros a suit demanding that certain articles, 
probably documents, should be produced in court (51kti eig ejiqxxvc&v 
xaxdaxaaiv, section 14). Arethousios, a brother of Nikostratos, was among 
those who were entered as witnesses to the delivery of the summons requiring 
Apollodoros to produce the documents. Apollodoros claimed that the summons 
was never served and therefore he did not appear in court where judgement went 
against him by default. Subsequently, Apollodoros prosecuted Arethousios for 
fraudulent deposition to a citation (nfeuSoxXqxeia^ ypacpfj), and when the case 
was brought before the jury Apollodoros obtained a verdict against Arethousios, 
and a fine of one talent, for the payment of which his brothers guaranteed and 
became jointly responsible. Arethousios, who after this fine became a public 
debtor, failed to pay off the debt to the state and Apollodoros took the legal steps 
required for the confiscation of his property, hi the written charge submitted by
189
Apollodoros, which probably consisted of a list (&noypa<pf|) of the land, houses 
or other property which he proposed should be confiscated, two slaves were 
staled to be the property of Arethousios and therefore liable to confiscation. 
However Nikostratos, a brother of Arethousios, put in a claim to the slaves, and 
in this speech ( [Dem.] 53) Apollodoros has to show that the claim is false and 
the slaves are really the property of Arethousios.
In [Dem.] 53 there are two references to the \irei)5oKA.Tyceiai; ypacpfi brought 
by Apollodoros against Arethousios. Sections 17-18 and 26 -27 are a very brief 
account of the result of this suit concentrating on the way in which the penalty 
was fixed. Arethousios was convicted, and when it came to fixing the penalty the 
jurors had to choose between the sentence of death proposed by the plaintiff and a 
fine of one talent proposed by the defendant. Eventually Arethousios was 
condemned to the fine of one talent and it was at this point that the eyytiT] took 
place: ooxox y&p, 6xe oi SvkocgtgcI epo6X.ovxo Gavdxou xipf]aai xq>
’ApeGooaxqp, eSfcovxo xffiv 5ncaaxa)v XPTUA^ T(DV xipf|acxi xcd epoO 
aoyxajpflaai, xcd d)poX.6yt]oav atixol aovexxeiaeiv. xoaotixoo 5f| 5£ovaiv 
exxivexv kccO* & fiyyufioavxo,. . .  ( section 26-27 ).
Evidently they guaranteed that Arethousios would pay the fine and also agreed 
that they themselves would contribute to the payment. Therefore we could name 
this kind of eyytiri here as " eyyOq for the payment of a fine due to the public 
chest
The eyyuT] must have taken place either simultaneously or immediately after 
the fixing of the fine. It might have been either a requirement of the plaintiff or 
even of the jurors, or it might have been offered by the defendant himself.
However, it does not seem that it replaced imprisonment of the convicted 
defendant until the payment of his fine. We know the case where a law for a 
certain offence stipulated that if the penalty was a fine the defendant had either to
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pay it immediately or to be kept in custody until he paid it. There was not 
mention of guarantors in order to avoid the imprisonment, ( Dem. 24 Timokr. 105, 
Aisch. 1 Timarch. 16). We also know cases where a fine was imposed but there 
was not any requirement of either imprisonment until payment or guarantors 
instead of it, ( e.g. [Dem.] 59 Neair. 7-8). And if the law of Timokrates (Dem. 24 
Timokr. 39-40) was ever enforced, we can guess that there might have been some 
cases where a defendant, who was condemned to a fine payable to the state and 
the additional penalty (TipooTipqjia) of imprisonment was imposed upon him until 
the payment of the fine, had the opportunity to avoid imprisonment by appointing 
three guarantors who would guarantee the payment of the fine within a limited 
period of time, the ninth prytany of the year in which the crime was committed.
Therefore we might classify the public cases (ypaqxxi) where the penalty was a 
fine as it follows:
# Certain laws stipulated that the fine had to be paid immediately, otherwise 
the defendant had to be imprisoned until payment, (Aisch. 1 Timarch.16).
# The fine had to be paid immediately, otherwise the defendant had to be 
imprisoned until payment unless he nominated three guarantors who would 
guarantee the payment of the fine at a future date (by the ninth prytany at the 
latest), ( Dem. 24 Timokr. 39-40).
# Although the fine had to be paid immediately, neither imprisonment was 
imposed nor guarantors were required. The convicted defendant became a public 
debtor liable to the same penalties like the other public debtors, if he did not pay 
it by the ninth prytany, ( see [Dem.] 59 Neair.7-8 ).
We do not know the law for \|fe\)5oxX,riT£ia, and therefore we are not in a 
position to say whether the law stipulated imprisonment until the payment of the 
fine, if the penalty imposed was a fine; however this seems to be very unlikely 
since then Arethousios would have not been allowed to nominate sureties for the
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payment of the fine. Nor we are in a safe position to say that in this particular 
case the additional penalty of imprisonment was imposed until the payment of the 
fine and the only way of avoiding that imprisonment was for the defendant to 
nominate sureties, because we would rather expect a hint about imprisonment to 
be made at the point where Apollodoros tells us about the eyyuTi. Therefore, 
since the eyybri here, as it seems, did not replace imprisonment of the convicted 
defendant until the payment of his fine, and since the penalty of a fine itself did 
not necessarily require persons who would guarantee its payment by the 
convicted party, then we have to ask, what purpose did the eyybq serve here 
(Pern.] 53, 27)?
Before we try to answer this question, I think that it is helpful to see how the 
decision concerning the penalty for Arethousios was reached by the jurors and 
even more helpful to put in a successive order, as far as it is possible, all the 
points mentioned in sectionsl7-18 and 26-27 which refer to the fixing of the 
penalty and the resulting eyybq.
The suit (ypaqrfi iifeuSoKXTyielai;) was an &yd>v tijit|t6£ which means that the 
law had not fixed in advance the amount or nature of the penalty or damages; 
since judgement had gone against the defendant, the next step for the jurors was to 
fix the noivfj, damages or penalty. Each litigant proposed a penalty, in our case 
the death penalty was proposed by the successful prosecutor (Apollodoros), 
while the fine of one talent was proposed by the unsuccessful defendant 
(Arethousios). The jurors had to opt for one or the other. The successive order of 
what actually happened in the court after Arethousios's conviction and before the 
fixing of the penalty seems, according to sections 17-18 and 26-27, to be as 
follows:
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1. The jurors wished at the beginning to impose the sentence of death 
upon Arethousios, PooA.op£va>v xcov 5ixaaxa>v Gavdxou xipfjacci aftxq> (section 
18), oi Sixaaxcd epoi&ovxo Qavdtxoo xipf[aai x$ ’ApeGouaitp (section 26).
2. Arethousios's supporters begged the jurors to chose the fine and 
begged Apollodoros to give his assent to this. They also agreed to be jointly 
responsible for the payment, e86ovxo xfiv Sixaoxffiv xpimtarov xipf[aoci xod 
epob auyxcopflaai, xod (bpoMyqaav auxoi aovexxeiaexv, (section 26).
3. Finally Apollodoros conceded to the defendant the lowering of the 
penalty and asked the jurors not to impose the death sentence upon Arethousios; 
he agreed to the fine of a talent, eSefiQqv eycb xftv Sixaoxrov pTjS&v 5i epo$ 
xoioftxov Tipc^cn, 6&A.& ouve%d)pT]aa Saowiep auxoi exipcovxo, xcxX6tvxou, 
(section 18).
Therefore Apollodoros's narrative of the events which took place during the 
ypatpfi i|feu5oxA.T|xeia^ might take the following order: ouxoi y&p, 8xe oi 
Sixocoxod epobXovxo Gav&xoo xxpi\aai xcp ’ApeGooaiq), e86ovxo xcov 
5ixocaxc&v xpityi&TCDv xipflaai xod epofi ouyxcopTjooti, xod (bpoMynaav aoxoi
aovexxeiaeiv, (section 26). xod ................eSefiQTjv ey<b xfiv SixaoxSv pi]5£v
5i* epoo xoiofcxov np6c£oci, (xXktt aovExdoprjoa Saooiiep ocuxoi ETipSvxo, 
xocX&vxoo (section 18).
The fact that the supporters of Arethousios agreed to be jointly responsible for 
the payment of the fine should be seen as a part of the eyybT], and the Eyybii as a 
whole should be seen as the crucial factor which eventually made Apollodoros, 
who had originally proposed the death penalty, to agree with the defendant to 
reduce it to one talent. However, a reason why he took back his initial proposition 
is given by him in section 18 (6&X* iva eydb nocoiavot; &v xod xocxa \jrq(piapa 
7ioAdxTi£ pTi5£va ’AQrivodoov &7iexxov<b(; si^v.) which, in my opinion, does not 
sound very convincing because when he made his proposition he was also xocxft
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i|rq<piapa hoXixth; and he could have not proposed the death penalty at all. But 
even if we accept that Apollodoros initially proposed the death penalty under an 
emotional charge and then when the jurors were going to impose it upon 
Arethousios he felt embarrassed that he, a naturalised Athenian citizen, would 
cause the death of a native Athenian citizen, it is not enough to explain 
Apollodoros's departure from his initial proposition, unless the eyytiq had not 
taken place. It seems that right up to the moment when the vote was about to be 
taken negotiations between the plaintiff and the defendant were taking place about 
the nature of the penalty. The eyytiq appears to be a condition put by the plaintiff 
in order to accept the fine as the penalty proposed by the defendant.
The verb 6poX6yT|oav might shed some light on the question whether the 
eyybq was the plaintiffs requirement or not. 'Ojiokoyeiv combined with a future 
infinitive takes the meaning ”to agree to do something”. Sometimes the dative of a 
person (xivi) is used to indicate the person with whom the subject of the verb 
6poXoyerv agrees. But even when there is not such a dative, the verb 6poX.oyetv 
+ a future infinitive still has the meaning ”to agree (with someone) to do 
something", e.g. xod x6v siTieiv 5xi eni 5ei7ivov ei<; ’Ay&8a)vo<;, X0&; y&p 
ai>x6v Sifcqroyov xoi£ 87nvurioi<;, tpoPqOeiq xdv o%X.ov 6poA.6yqoa 5’ ei<; 
xfyi£pov napeoeaOai. (Plato, Symp.llAA). Socrates, who evaded Agathon and 
his celebrations yesterday because he feared the crowd, agreed to be present at 
Agathon's dinner the day after. This implies an invitation to dinner made to 
Socrates by Agathon. Consequently Agathon was the person with whom Socrates 
agreed to go to his dinner, although his name in the dative is not put into the 
sentence, but it can be easily understood from the context.
In our case here ([Dem.] 53,28 xcd dbpoXdyqoav afixoi auvexxsiaeiv), 
Arethousios's brothers, and possibly Lykidas, are the subjects of <bpoX6yiiaav 
who agreed with Apollodoros that they would be jointly responsible for the
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payment if the penalty was going to be a fine. However we do not have here the 
dative of Apollodoros's name which would indicate clearly the person with whom 
they agreed, but it is understood from the context. MTo agree with a person" 
presupposes that this person at first has either made a statement or a proposal or a 
request or even has put a condition before any agreement is reached. When the 
brothers of Arethousios asked Apollodoros to change his proposal regarding the 
penalty and to give his assent to a fine in money, Apollodoros probably put the 
condition that he would accept to change his initial proposal of the death penalty 
to a fine in money, if they guaranteed the payment of the fine and also became 
jointly responsible for this payment; when they agreed to this condition, 
Apollodoros took back his initial proposal and proposed a fine in money.
The actual eyytiq must have taken place after this agreement had been reached 
and after the fine had been imposed upon Arethousios. Unfortunately we are told 
nothing else about the eyyuq itself apart from the purpose that it served, i.e. 
personal surety for the payment of the fine inposed upon the convicted defendant 
in a public suit (ypatpfi yeuSoKXTyEeiai;). The eyybq took place in a public 
place, in the court after Arethousios's conviction and therefore many people 
witnessed the act. However we cannot tell whether the witnesses called at the end 
of section 18 were persons who had been especially appointed as witnesses to the 
eyyuq or they simply happened to be in the court at the time when the eyyuq took 
place and when the need arose they were called by Apollodoros to testify to it.
Certain persons were nominated by Arethousios or they offered themselves to 
stand as his guarantors. They must have been at least two (possibly three)- 
fjyyofiGavxo, but we are not told anything about their exact number, neither we 
are told their names, since the orator refers to them as ouxoi: (ooxoi) xoaobxoo 
5fi 5£ooaiv exxiveiv koc8’ & qyyof|aavxo, d)axe xod xffiv tyiexfcpoov
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fyNpiaPrytofiai (section 27). Our task then is to attempt to identify the persons 
who are hidden behind the pronoun ouxoi.
The subject of the verb Tiyyofjoavxo (section 27) must be the same as the 
subject of the verb djupioprixoficn which refers to the participle &pqnaPTjxo$vxE<; 
xffiv tyiExfcpajv (section 26). The pronoun ouxoi at the beginning of the second 
period of section 26 refers to the same persons as the subject of the participle 
tyiqnapTytofcvxEi; and the verbs fiyyufjaavxo and dtpqnap^xoboi (section 27). 
This second part of section 26 refers to sections 17 and 18 where the subjects of 
the verb Exijifiovxo must be Arethousios, Nikostratos, and even possibly Lykidas. 
It appears that the same persons, apart, of course, from Arethousios, are identical 
with the pronoun auxoi, (xod dbjioA.6yTjaav auxoi auvexxeioeiv, section 26). 
Consequently Nikostratos is one of the subjects of the verb fiyyuqaavxo, and 
perhaps Lykidas might be another one. Furthermore, the pronoun xotixcov in the 
clause d>ox£ xcd ei xotixcov fjv x& dvSpdnoScc, TipoaffKEV aux& Sqpdcna etvai, 
which comes as the result of the previous sentence ( k c c i x o i  ol ye v6jioi 
ksX.E'Oouoi xf|v oiwjiav Etvai Sqpoaiav, 8  ^ EyyuT|G&ji£v6<; xi x6v xffc 
nokzwc, jj.fi 6ctioSi8<$ xfjv eyyuqv) refers to the guarantors. Nikostratos is 
definitely one of them since we know that he had put a claim on the slaves 
included in the list (&7ioypa(pf|).142 However Apollodoros goes further and uses 
the plural xouxcov instead of xotixou which would clearly refer to Nikostratos 
Tftho, as it appears, was the only 6pqnoPnx6 v of the slaves. But who else could 
(et least in this hypothesis made by Apollodoros) be included in this plural 
xobxoov which refers to the Eyyoryrai? After the &7ioypatpf| had been brought by
lJ2aee titie: IIpo; Nixocrrpatov rcepi dvoparcc&ov drcoypacw; Apeflawun); section 1: rcev© 
T)|npval<DV a^ux avSpaitoSa, ax; a w n ; o dpcpiaj^rj^ov Tsnpnixxi av ro  . . . ; section 4: 
Nxoarpa'ta; yap cnkooi....
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Apollodoros, the possession of the slaves was at issue. According to Apollodoros 
they belonged to Arethousios, but Nikostratos had actually put a claim on them. 
The possession of the slaves under these new circumstances (&7ioypa<pf|) would 
depend on the result of the action brought by a person (or more than one) who had 
put a claim on them (6 fyKpiaPTycaW). In this context we should understand what 
Apollodoros says, i.e. tboxe iced ei xobxcov fjv x& 6cv5p6no5a . . ., section 27; 
this possessive genitive here (xobxoov) does not indicate joint ownership over the 
slaves, but it rather takes the meaning that "either one or another from them all 
owned the slaves", and most importantly it is identical with the persons who might 
put a claim on these slaves (oi fynpiaPTixoftvxec;). And although Nikostratos was 
the only one who claimed that the slaves belonged to him, Apollodoros uses the 
plural xobxoov and concludes that even if the slaves belonged to them they should 
be confiscated because they would be property of the guarantors. Therefore 
xobxcov refers definitely to the guarantors, but at the same time it refers to the 
persons who might put a claim on the slaves. Nikostratos is one of them, and I 
think that Deinon is the other one. In my view, the genitive xobxoov is identical 
with xffiv &5eX<po)v; section 28 holds the answer to this. We are told in section 28 
that before Arethousios became a debtor to the state he was admitted to be the 
richest of the brothers, but now he pretends to be a poor man, and his mother lays 
claim to one part of his property, and his brothers to another (xai xfiv p£v f] 
jif|XT|p fyupiaPnxei, xc5v 5& oi 6c5eA.(poi.). Therefore the guarantors seem to be 
the following: Nikostratos, Deinon, and possibly Lykidas, who was involved in 
the suit brought against Apollodoros (Sxktiv epcpavcov Kotx&axaoiv, section 
14). When Apollodoros prosecuted Arethousios for false citation and he won a 
conviction, it is very likely that Lykidas was one of those who proposed a fine 
(SoouTiep auio i exipawxo, xaX&vxou, section 18) instead of the death penalty 
proposed by Apollodoros, and he might have been one of the guarantors who
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promised that Arethousios would pay the fine and they themselves would 
contribute to the payment.
To sum up, although we are not explicitly told the names of the guarantors, we 
can identify with certainty one of those, i.e. Nikostratos; moreover, it is very 
likely that Deinon was another one and probably Lykidas. Nikostratos and Deinon 
were the brothers of Arethousios, which shows first that it was perfectly legal for 
Arethousios to nominate his brothers as his guarantors, and second that the close 
relatives of a defendant were on the top of the list of persons whom he would call 
on to be his sureties, if need arose.
We have noticed above that the eyyf)T] here seems to be the plaintiffs 
requirement in order to take back his initial proposal concerning the penalty which 
the jurors would inpose upon Arethousios. Although it was an eyy^T] to secure 
payment of the fine which Arethousios incurred, it operated as the decisive factor 
whether the penalty was going to be the death penalty or a fine in money. Two 
stages of the eyy^t] should be discerned here: one was the negotiation of the 
prospective eyY^q with the influence that it had on the plaintiff in changing his 
initial penalty proposal, and the other was the actual eyY^ti which took place and 
became lawfully valid from the moment when the jurors imposed the fine upon the 
defendant. Therefore we might classify the successive stages of the procedure 
which led to the iyyi>T\ as it follows:
1. The defendant's proposal for the penalty of a fine.
2. The plaintiffs condition of the eyY1^ .
3. The first stage of the kyyi>i\ — an "informal" eYY^ Tl-
4. The plaintiffs acceptance of the fine.
5. The imposition of the fine upon Arethousios.
6. The actual eYY^ T].
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After Arethousios's condemnation to the fine of one talent in the ypacpfi 
\|T8‘o5oxA,T]xeia(; brought by Apollodoros, three persons guaranteed that 
Arethousios would pay the fine and they agreed that they would be jointly 
responsible for the payment. From the moment when Arethousios was condemned 
to the fine he became a public debtor ( the fine was payable to the public chest 
since he was convicted in a public case), and he had to pay it by the ninth prytany 
of the year.143 If he did not pay it by that date then the debt was doubled and his 
property was liable to confiscation by the procedure known as dcrcoypoupfi. This 
was the normal procedure applied to all public debtors. However, the possible 
existence of guarantors in cases concerning a public debt on the one hand and the 
available procedure of &7ioypaq>f| against the public debtors on the other hand 
creates some problems as far as the way of extracting the sum of money required 
for the debt and the responsibility of the guarantors are concerned. The case of 
Arethousios ([Dem.] 53, 26-27) gives rise to an examination of all the possible 
cases where there was a state debtor with (or without) guarantors, and the result 
was the &7ioypaq)fi of his property:
1. If a state debtor had property the value of which was sufficient for the debt, 
and he did not have any guarantors, then the &7ioypoupf| was brought against his 
property which was confiscated, sold by auction and with the amount which it 
raised the debt was paid off.
2. If a state debtor had property the value of which was sufficient for the debt, 
and at the same time had nominated some persons as his guarantors, then the
143 This seems to be the date for payment in most cases ( Andok. 1 Myst. 73, [Dem.] 59 Neair. 8). In 
some other cases however the law stipulated that payment should be made on an earlier date ( Aisch 1 
Timarch. 16).
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faioypatpfi probably was brought against his property (as in the case 1), but there 
is a problem here concerning the function and the responsibilities of the eyyoTyiai.
3. In the case where a state debtor neither had any property nor had he any 
guarantors, an dc7ioypa<pfi would be impossible; the debt was left unpaid 
indefinitely and he remained a state debtor.
4. If a state debtor had too little property to be worth confiscating, or he did 
not have any property at all, but he had nominated some persons as his 
guarantors, then the &7ioypacpf| would be brought against the guarantors' property.
5. If a state debtor's property was not too little, but at the same time its value 
was not sufficient to cover the whole debt and he did not have any guarantors, 
then the &7ioypatpf| would be brought against his property, although it was 
insufficient for the debt. Since the amount which it would raise would not be 
enough to pay off the whole debt, it would be merely reduced by that amount and 
he would still remain a state debtor until he paid off the whole debt.
6. In the case where the value of a state debtor's property was not sufficient 
for the whole debt and he had nominated some persons to be his guarantors, then 
the 6c7ioypa<pf[ would be probably brought against the properties of both parties 
(debtor and guarantor). This seems to be implied by what is said in [Dem.] 53,27:
to o o u x o u  5f| Seoooxv ekxxvexv koc9’ & fiyyorioavxo, <bax£ K ai xc&v 
bpexipcov fyiqnaPTixoficn. koxxox ox ye vopox KeXEboucn xi)v o b a ia v  e tv a i 
S tipoaxav, 6<; &v eyyoriG dpevds xx xffiv xffc rcdXeax; pq  &no8i8<$ xi)v Eyyuryv 
(bax£ K ai £i xouxcdv flv x& 6cv8pa7io8a, rcpoaf]K£v aux&  8T|p6cna etvai, extiep 
xx xo&v vdpcov 6yeXo<;.
Although we can probably figure out the amount of Arethousios's debt which 
must have been two talents (one talent was the original fine which would be 
doubled after the ninth prytany), we do not know exactly the value of 
Arethousios's property which was included in the list of the fcrcoypatpfi. In other
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words, what concerns us here is whether the value of Arethousios's property 
included in the foioypoccpTi was sufficient to cover his debt, namely two talents, or 
it was less than this amount. Unfortunately we can not answer this question. 
However, in the dxTioypatpfj handed in by Apollodoros two slaves were stated to 
be the property of Arethousios and therefore liable to confiscation as a partial 
payment of his debt to the public treasury. But Nikostratos put in a claim to the 
slaves and Apollodoros had to show that they were really the property of 
Arethousios.
In sections 19-21 he brings evidence to prove that the slaves belong to 
Arethousios, but in section 27 his aigumentation follows a completely different 
way. He says that even though the two slaves were Nikostratos's property they 
should be confiscated, since he had guaranteed the payment of the fine and had 
failed to carry out his duty. The reader of the speech can easily get confused 
following Apollodoros's two different approaches to the issue, who tries to prove 
on the one hand that the two slaves belong to Arethousios and consequently they 
should be confiscated, and on the other hand that they should be public property 
if they belong to Nikostratos, one of the guarantors. The impression given is that 
the value of the two slaves (which actually was too little, 2.5 minai) was 
important in the sense that Arethousios's other property including the two slaves 
was sufficient to produce an amount equal to the debt, but it would not be 
sufficient without them. The controversial issue became the two slaves who had 
to be proven state property in one way or the other.
The guarantors guaranteed that Arethousios would pay the fine and therefore 
they themselves became responsible for its payment if he failed to do so. The 
phrase xooouxou 5f| Sfcooaiv exxiveiv kgc8’ a  r\yyvi\oa,vzo implies that they 
were expected or even required to pay off the debt in the failure of the debtor 
himself to do so. Arethousios had to pay off the debt by the ninth prytany,
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otherwise it was to be doubled; the procedure of ftnoypoupfi could be employed 
against him after the ninth prytany, but since there were guarantors, when were 
they supposed to accept responsibility for the payment of the debt?
The phrase roaxe xai x&v i>jiex6pa)v dcpqnoPqxoftax following the previous 
sentence implies that the (xTioypoupfi against Arethousios was brought after the 
date when the guarantors were expected to make good their guarantee.144 This date 
must have been the ninth prytany (the latest), a date by which the public debtor 
was expected to pay and if he failed to do so, then the guarantors themselves 
became public debtors who had to pay off the doubled debt. Consequently the 
&7ioypoi<pf| against the original debtor could have been avoided if the guarantors 
paid off his debt.
We might conclude that in the case where a person condemned to a fine as a 
result of a public suit had nominated three persons as his guarantors for the 
payment of the fine but he did not pay it until the ninth prytany, the procedure of 
&7ioypoc(pfi was brought against him after the guarantors had been required to 
accept their responsibility in paying off the debt themselves. Therefore the 
eyyuqxcd were required to fulfil the eyyOq before the &7ioypatpf| was brought 
against the actual debtor.
In Arethousios's case it seems that, although the guarantors were expected to 
pay off his debt after he had failed to do so, no legal action was taken against 
them by which they would be enforced to fulfil their responsibilities. ’ATioypaipq 
against the actual debtor (Arethousios) was the first legal action taken in order to
144 cf. section 28, eradfj 6e oi vopoi Keteixwow micavcw upecepa etvai, tiprixatka rcevTj*; tov 
paivetai o ’ApeOoucoo^  xai taw pev f| pfjxr)p dpquapryreT, m v 5e oi d&X<pol %ptjv 5’ a iyvonq, 
eircsp epofaovuo Sucalax; icpoocpepeoOai icpa; d«Jo6d a^vax<; anaoav Trjv ouoiav Trjv 
emvou, m  toutov avtaW ei tu; arceypapev, dppuypnteiv.
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settle his debt with the state. The guarantors seem not to be involved at this stage 
although the (XTioypatpfi against Arethousios took place after the date by which he 
was expected to pay and when the guarantors who had undertaken the 
responsibility of the debt's payment in the first place had now to accept this 
responsibility by paying off the debt. However a hint of a legal action against 
them is made in section 27. Apollodoros’s argument runs as it follows: the two 
slaves who had been claimed by Nikostratos as his own property should be 
confiscated even if they were Nikostratos's property since he had guaranteed the 
payment of the fine and had failed to make good his guarantee. A hint of a legal 
action against the guarantors is clear here and this legal action would be an 
dx7ioypa(pf| of their property (or part of it). The confiscation of the two slaves was 
unavoidable but it would be the same result of two separate legal actions, an 
dxTioypcxcpTi against Arethousios (the actual debtor), if the slaves were proven to 
be his property, or an faioypacpfi against Nikostratos (one of the guarantors), if 
the slaves were proven to be his property. In one way or the other the slaves had 
to be confiscated, but the legal base of their confiscation would be different, in 
the first case they would be confiscated as the property of the actual debtor, while 
in the second as the property of the guarantor. We do not actually know whether 
in such a case the prosecutor of the 6wtoypa<pfi had necessarily to bring two 
separate ftftoypaqxxi, one against the debtor and another against the guarantor, or 
for practical reasons he could bring just one ftnoypacpTj against both debtor and 
guarantor with a specification of each party's property in the list, although in 
theory they should be regarded as two separate legal actions since two different 
persons were prosecuted; both practices seem to be possible.
* ate *
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Kcrixoi of ye v6poi KcXe-boucn xf|v oooiav  e tvai Sxuioaiav, Sq av 
eyyuTiodjLevdq xi xc&v xffe iriXeuq pffc &xo5i5(p xf|v eyyfcqv, [Dem.] 53, 
27.
The law enacted that the property of persons who guaranteed the payment of a 
sum to the state, and failed to do so should be confiscated. This paraphrase of the 
law is very general and problematic. We hear that any man's estate should be 
confiscated, who, after guaranteeing any sum due to the state, did not make good 
his guarantee; but we are not told anything about the circumstances under which 
such a confiscation should take place, or whether this happened always or it 
could be avoided. What we are told here was definitely a possibility and refers to 
the case where neither the debtor nor the guarantor had paid off the debt by the 
time laid down for the payment. However, as this paraphrase of the law stands 
here, it is not difficult to be misunderstood in the sense that in the failure of a 
debtor to pay off his debt, his guarantors would necessarily suffer confiscation of 
their properties, if they did not pay off the debt, irrespectively of what happened 
to the debtor himself. Before we consider this problem it would be appropriate to 
quote three relevant passages from the orators, for a parallel reading, which refer 
to the confiscation of property which belonged either to a debtor or to the 
guarantors of a debtor:
a. [Dem.] 59 Neair. 5-7:
ypa\|/dcpevo< ; y& p 7 iap av 6 jico v  x 6  i |r f |q n a p a  E i£ (p av o c , o b x o a i  K a i  
e iaeX O tb v  ei<; x 6  S ix a a x f ip io v ,  . . . , e & e  1 6  \ j r f iq n a p a . . . . d & X  e n e iS f j  n e p i  
io$ x ijif |p a x o < ; e X d p P a v o v  xtfjv i|rf|(pov o i  S i x a a x a i ,  Seopfcvcov fipffiv 
a u y x c o p f l a a i  o $ k  f[0eX.ev, n e v x e x a iS e K a  x aX d v x o o v  e x ip f tx o ,  . . .  .
p £ v  y& p o $ a i a  o$5£ x p i© v  xc& & vxa>v 7i 6cvo x i  fjv , (b a x e  5 \)v q 0 f ]v a t  e x x e i a a i
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xoaobxov 5qjX.TTp.a- jxf| exxeia86vxo<; 5£ xoO 6q)A.fipaxo<; erii xf\c, evdcxrn; 
rcpoxaveiai;, 5inX.oflv lp8M.ev laeaGai x6 6qjX.Trpa xcri eyypaqjfiaeaGai 
’A7ioX .^65ajpo(; xpi&xovxa xd&avxa 6qjelX.a)v xq> 5iipoax(p- eyyeypap.}i6voi) 5£ 
x$ STTpoaicp, 6t7ioypaqjf|a8a8ax f-psX^ev fi im&pxouaa oi>aia ’A7ioX.X.o5<bp(p 
Srijiocyia etvai, npaGelaTv; 5’ afcxfy; exq xf|v eax&xrrv dcrcopiav 
xaxaaxfiaeaGai xod ai>x6<; x a i 7iat5e<; oi exeivoo Kai yovq x a i f|pei(; 
&navx8^.
Apollodoros has been convicted in a ypaqjfi napavdpojv and the prosecutor's 
estimation of the penalty has been 15 talents. The speaker says that if the jury 
accept this estimate and if the defendant has not paid up at the ninth prytany, the 
fine would be doubled and his name would be posted up as that of a public 
debtor, his property would be confiscated and sold. Apollodoros had not 
nominated any guarantors who would guarantee the payment of the fine, 15 talents 
which was going to be doubled if it was not paid off by the ninth prytany. After 
this date his estate would be liable to &7ioypaqjfr but still it was not enough (3 
talents) to cover the debt. If Apollodoros had nominated guarantors, then, 
according to the law, their property also would be liable to confiscation, not 
because that was the mle which happened always, but because, as we are told, 
Apollodoros's property was not sufficient to cover the debt. Apollodoros's 
property would be proposed for confiscation anyway regardless of the existence 
or not of the guarantors. Let us suppose that Apollodoros had nominated three 
persons as his guarantors, and let us suppose also that his property's value was 
more than 30 talents, say 31 talents. In his failure to pay the fine of the 15 talents 
up to the ninth prytany, his property would be confiscated and sold, and its value 
would be used for the payment of the debt which would be now 30 talents. But 
since, as we have supposed, his property's value was 31 talents, the remaining 1 
talent should be returned to him. At least this practice is implied by a passage of
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Demosthenes ( 40 Boiot.ii.22) which shows that after an enforced sale any excess 
of the proceeds over the debt was repayable to the debtor or his family.145 
Therefore, if Apollodoros had nominated guarantors and his property's value was 
more than his debt, and since any surplus of his confiscated property was to be 
returned to him, I do not think that the property of the guarantors would be 
confiscated.
b. Andok. 1 M yst 73:
oi 5£ ftxipoi lives fjoav, xori xiva xp6nov f-xaaxoi; eycb i>p&<; 5i56^cd* oi 
p£v fcpybpiov 6<peiX.ovxe<; xcj> 5ripoaicpf 6ti6ooi euGbvas a><pX.ov Scp^avxes 
dcpX^S- $  e^obX.as ypatp&s emPoX.&£ 5)<pX.ov, f[ <bv&s rcpi&pevoi ex xofi 
Sijpoaioo pfi xax£paX.ov x& XP‘S1P-0CTCX- ^ syyf>ot£ fjyyufiaavxo 7tp6<; x6 
5r|p6(nov, xouxois fi p£v Ixxeiaxs fjv errl xfjs evdxirs apuxaveias, ei 5£ piy, 
5inX.&aiov 6<peiX.eiv xcd x& xxfjpaxa auxcov neTipdaOai.
Andokides giving a catalogue of classes of ftxipoi starts with those who owe 
money to the treasury: those who were convicted at their e\)0uvcx as magistrates, 
in a 51x t |  e^ouX.ris, in a ypatpfj and had to pay a fine to the state; those who were 
condemned to a fine (emPoX.fi), payable to the state, imposed by magistrates or 
juries (see Ar. Wasps 769, MacDowell, AndokidesX 09); Those who had 
purchased the right to collect taxes and were in arrear with the purchase money, 
and those who had stood guarantors for the payment of a sum to the state (f[
145 e&v yap Xeyn <ix; t| pev epfj pijxriP oi>K ^veyxaTO rcpoTxa, n fie roikaw ejcnveyxaxo, 
ev(h>peio6e an. rcepupavaix; yeufienxu xpakov pev yap o ndpcpiXoc; o naxrip try; xoikov piTtpa; 
icevxe xaXavxa *wp finpooup cxpe&oov ex^Xeikrioev, xai xoooikov efierjaev rcepiyeveadai a  xoiq 
exdvov raiciv Try; ovoiat; arcoypacpdory; xai firpeudeuny^ axrte oufie xo cxpXripa ndv vnep 
avtov exreteicraxi, a X K ’ eu xai vuv o ndpcpiXa; cxpdXaw *wp firjpooup eyyeyparciai.
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eyY\>a<; f|YYuftaavxo 7ip6<; x6 5t]p6axov). The orator says that these men had to 
pay in the ninth prytany, if they failed to pay, then the sum owed was doubled and 
the debtors' and (or) the guarantors' goods were sold.
Here we have two categories of public debtors: those convicted in a judicial 
process and those owing under a contract. The phrase eYY^ on; fiYYufioavxo 
7ipo<; x6 5rip6aiov refers to persons who might have stood sureties for the public 
debtors of both categories; namely, persons who had been convicted to a fine 
payable to the state in their euGbva, in a 5 i k t |  or in a Y P a ( R  might have
nominated guarantors for the payment of this fine. Other persons also who had 
bought the right to collect a given tax had to furnish sureties for the payment of 
the tax to the state; these sureties became liable if the &pxtf)VT]<; himself defaulted. 
The genitive ai>x&v in the phrase xod x& xpf|paxa auxftv 7i£7ipao0ca refers as 
much to the debtors as to the guarantors. Although it does mean in theory that all 
the guarantors were liable to the confiscation of their property, it should not 
however be deduced from here that this must have always happened in practice 
without any conditions. The property of a guarantor would be confiscated only 
when the person for whom he guaranteed that this person would pay either an 
inposed on him fine which was payable to the state or a tax which he undertook 
to collect on the behalf of the state, did not pay it until the appointed term of 
payment, and at the same time when he did not have any property to be 
confiscated by duoYpatpfj or when the confiscation of his property failed to 
produce the requisite sum for the debt. In this case the guarantor's property was 
the next target. We might conclude that "xai x& xxfipaxa auxa>v 7i87ipSo0ax'' 
refers as much to the confiscation of the debtors' property as to the confiscation 
of the guarantors' property. But these confiscations could not take place 
simultaneously in the same cases unless the value of the debtor's property was 
insufficient for the payment of the debt.
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c. Dem. 24 Tintokr. 40:
x<p 5£ KaxaaTfjoavxi xoxx; eyyuTixdct;, &tio5x5<£ xfi rcdXex x6 
fcpybpxov ecp <p x a x ^ a x iia e  xoxx; eyyuTyEdc^, &(pexa8cxx xofi Seapofl. e&v 5£ p.f| 
xaxapdt^x] x6 &pyf>pxov f[ ai>x6<; f\ o i eyyorixcrt eiti xf[<; &v6xt]<; rcpuxavexat;, 
x6v p£v e5syyx)T|86vxa 5e56a8ax, xSv 5£ eyyxjqxmv 5Tjjioaxav etvax xf^v 
o ix n a v .
This passage is not very helpful. There is a reference to the confiscation of the 
guarantors' property, but we are not told what happened to the debtor's property, 
if he had any. The only information we get is that he would be inprisoned if he 
failed to pay off the debt until the ninth prytany. We might suppose by analogy 
that his property also would be liable to confiscation.
Inscription no. 10 in Hesperia V(1936) 397ff., lines 115 ff., provides us with an 
example of the confiscation of a piece of property which belonged to a guarantor. 
Euthykles, son of Euthymenides, of Myrrinous, registered for confiscation an 
apartment house in Peiraeus which belonged to Meixidimos of Myrrhinus. 
Meixidimos had gone surety for various public contracts and neither the 
contractor nor he had paid up. The purchaser was Telemachos of Achamai who 
bought the house for exactly the sum of the doubled debt, which implies that 
confiscation of the property of the actual debtors never took place, probably 
because they did not have any property to be confiscated; this is the only way in 
which we can explain the reason why the whole debt was eventually paid off by 
the proceeds of the sale of the guarantor's property, since we know that the 
property of a state debtor, even when he had nominated sureties, was also liable 
to confiscation (And. 1,73). We should also notice here that the same person
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could stand as a guarantor at the same time for more than one persons who had 
made any contract with the state.
Finally, the case of Arethousios shows that when payment of a debt to the state 
was not made in time, neither by the debtor nor by the guarantors, it was possible 
for the procedure of dnoypatpfi to be employed against both the debtor and the 
guarantors, but it also shows that the order in which this procedure was brought 
was first against the debtor and afterwards against the guarantors. Apollodoros 
first brought an fimoYpatpfi against Arethousios without having taken any legal 
action against his guarantors. However he implied that an duioypacpfi against 
Nikostratos was still possible (section 27).
Conclusion
The law enacted that the property of persons who guaranteed the payment of a 
sum to the state, and failed to do so, should be confiscated. However, it seems 
that a guarantor's property was confiscated only when the debtor who failed to 
pay ofiFhis debt did not have any property which could be confiscated in order to 
provide the sum required for the payment of the debt, or even when he had some 
property which however was not enough to meet the debt.
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Professional eyy\)fixr|q ?
Sealey in his article, "The Tetralogies ascribed to Antiphon", TAJPhA 114 
(1984) 71-85, concludes that the Tetralogies diverge from Athenian law and 
practice, and that they are not sufficient testimony to Athenian law and practice, ;  
unless there is additional evidence from less suspect sources (p.85).
The first speech for the defence of the First Tetralogy contains a reference to 
eyytiq ( peyd&oci; 5£ un£p aoM.ffiv eyyticct; faioxivovia ), but since Sealey has 
doubted the legal accuracy of the Tetralogies, I think that it is appropriate first to 
examine his objections and decide whether the Tetralogies reflect Athenian law 
and practice; and if we decide that the law discussed in the Tetralogies is Attic, 
then we will proceed to discuss this reference to the ayyuT].
I am not concerned here with the question about the authorship of the 
Tetralogies. There is disagreement among scholars whether the author of the 
Tetralogies was Antiphon of Rhamnous - another Athenian - or a foreigner 
(maybe Ionian). Dover examined the Ionicisms of diction and he inferred that they 
are deliberate imitation by an Athenian who wrote the Tetralogies in imitation of 
an Ionic genre of forensic oratory. He concludes that "given the existence of 
eiocpoport in the Pentecontaetia, all the evidence is consistent with the hypothesis 
that the Tetralogies were written bv Antiphon, in imitation ultimately of Ionic 
models, at a stage of his career earlier than his writing for real litigants; but if the 
existence of eicnpopax in the Pentecontaetia is denied, then Antiphon cannot be
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held to be author of the Tetralogies", [KJ.Dover, "The Chronology of 
Antiphon's Speeches", CQ 44 (1950) 44-60, p.59]. Maidment following 
Dittenberger [W.Dittenberger, "Antiphons Tetralogien und das attische 
Criminalrecht I", Hermes 31 (1896) 271-77; II, Hermes 32 (1897) 1-21; ID, ibid. 
21-41; "Zu Antiphons Tetralogien" Hermes 40 (1905) 450-70] aigued that the 
author was a foreigner who spent some time in Athens [K.J.Maidment, Minor 
Attic Orators I  (Loeb Classical Library, Cambridge, Mass. 1941) 46-47]. 
Arguing against Maidment, A.W.H. Adkins, Merit and Responsibility (Oxford 
1960, reprinted Chicagol 975)113-14, n.27, insisted that the author was an 
Athenian but held that he was not Antiphon and assigned him to the last quarter of 
the fifth century. Gagarin takes the view that the Tetralogies are the work of 
Antiphon [M.Gagarin, "The Prohibition of Just and Unjust Homicide in 
Antiphon's Tetralogies", ORBS 19 (1978) 291-306, esp.306].
Since the authorship of the Tetralogies is not going to affect any of my 
arguments about their legal accuracy and consequently my discussion about the 
eyyuT], I do not take here a view whether the Tetralogies are authentic or not, and 
whenever I need to refer to the person who wrote them I will use the term 
"author".
Sealey puts the question whether the Tetralogies actually reflect Athenian law 
and court-practice. His starting point is Dittenberger's work on the Tetralogies 
who claimed to find divergences both in diction and in law from Athenian 
practice. Many of the alleged discrepancies between the Tetralogies and Athenian 
law were explained by Lipsius [Berichte Leipzig 56 (1904)191-204], but in his 
reply to criticisms from Lipsius, although he withdrew some of his claims, 
Ditteriberger continued to assert two of them.
The first legal point
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Dittenberger's main argument which he continued to claim even after Lipsius's 
criticisms was that in two of the Tetralogies we hear about a law that forbids both 
"unjust" and "just" homicide (3.2.9; 3.3.7; 4.2.3; 4.4.3). On the other hand we 
know of an Athenian law that recognised that homicide under special 
circumstances specified in the law was justified and did not carry any penalty. 
Consequently, Dittenberger denied that the law stated or assumed in the 
Tetralogies was Attic.
There is a prohibition in the Second and Third Tetralogy that states pqie 
Stxcrtax; jiqie &51xa><; fcnoxxeiveiv. It has been argued that this prohibition is 
inconsistent with Athenian homicide law because, as we know from Drakon's law 
and hear from Dem. 23.60, the Athenian homicide law recognised that certain 
cases of homicide were lawful and went unpunished. The prohibition pfp;e 
SiKodcDc; pfjie 6c5ixax; dtfioxieiveiv literally translated means "the law forbids 
killing whether justly or unjustly". This word by word translation was the reason 
which led some scholars to conclude that the law mentioned in the Tetralogies 
does not correspond to the Athenian homicide law which was enforced since the 
time of Drakon and continued to be in force until the end of the classical period.
Gagarin, however, argues [ORBS 19 (1978) p.293] that the full arguments of 
the Second and Third Tetralogies and in particular the context within which the 
prohibition against Just and unjust homicide is introduced have not been taken 
into consideration. A closer look at the context of this prohibition reveals that the 
adverbs Sixaiax; and &51xco<; here do not actually take their normal meaning 
"justly" and "unjustly" respectively, and therefore the alleged prohibition against 
justly and unjustly homicide found in the Tetralogies remains groundless.
Let us try now to examine the prohibition pf|xe Sixcdax; pfjxe &51xa><; 
&7ioxxdveiv in the context of the Second Tetralogy first.
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The Second Tetralogy is concerned with the accidental death of a young boy 
struck by a javelin. A youth was practising with the javelin in the gymnasium; the 
young boy ran in front of the target just as the youth was making a cast, and was 
killed; the young boy's father prosecutes the youth who threw the javelin for 
unintentional homicide, (exdvxa p6v ouv otix £7txxo&& &7ioxxExvax, dfcxovxa 56 
- 2.1.1). In the first speech for the defence, the youth's father argues that the 
victim himself was responsible for his own death and that the youth who threw the 
javelin is not at all guilty of homicide, not even of unintentional homicide. After 
this argument he continues: dwioMex 56 xai 6 v6po$ <p maxefccov,
elpyovxx jiTjxe 6c5xxcoi; pfjxe Sxxalax; ficnoxxeivexv, <b<; <pov6a  pe Sxdbxex. i)7i6 
p6v y&p xffc afcxofi xo$ xeOvef&xoq &papxxa£ 85e dtnoXvexca pq56 &xoooia)£ 
fcnoxxetvax ai>x6v  im6 56 xo$ 5xdbxovxo<; ou5’ eTUKaloupevoc; 6 <; 6xd»v 
<X7i 6x x e x v e v , tyupoiv &7l0X.f)£XaX xotv Eyx^rijldxorv, < p f p  &X00V> p f |X £  6xd)V 
5c7ioxx£ivoci. furthermore the law acquits us upon which the plaintiff relies in 
charging me with the boy's death, [the law] forbidding killing dtSiKo&g or SiKcdmg. 
For on the one hand, by the error of the dead boy himself this youth is acquitted 
of having unintentionally killed him; and on the other hand not even being accused 
by the plaintiff of killing intentionally, he is acquitted of both charges, of killing 
unintentionally and intentionally." ( 2.2.9). It becomes clear here that aSxxoo  ^and 
Sxxocxax; are associated with dcxouotcoi; and exdbv (exouaxax;) respectively, and 
they must be equivalent here to &koov/ e k 6 v . Therefore the terms & 5xxcd<; and 
Sxxaxcoc; in this passage must be taken to designate unintentional and intentional 
homicide.
In his second speech for the accusation, the plaintiff also mentions the 
prohibition pfpe Sixcdco  ^ pfpe dcSxxax; foioxxexvexv where the terms 
Sxxaxax^&Sxxax; must be understood as equivalent to ftxcov /6xd>v: ek&v p 6v 
oux 6ni6xxexve, pcftA.ov 56 exdbv fj obxe 6paX.ev obxe &ti6xxexvev. 'AKOvai&g
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5£ of>x flooov f[ eKoooiax; faioiaeivavifcg poo x6v nai5a, x6 napdnccv 5£ 
dcpvoopevoi pft faioxxeivai aox6v, 008’ bn6 xoft v6pou xaxc&apP<5cveo8ori. 
qxxaxv, 8<; faiayopeoex pqxe 5iKcda>g jifjxE dcSiK&g dtrcoxxeiveiv. It is clear that 
the plaintiff here takes the terms Sixaiax; and dcSixax; to designate intentional and 
unintentional homicide.
The Third Tetralogy deals with a case of homicide in self-defence. The facts 
are the following: An old man quarrels with a young one as they sit drinking. 
They come to blows and the old man is seriously injured in consequence. He 
receives medical attention, but ultimately dies. The relatives of the dead old man 
prosecute the young man for intentional homicide.
That the charge here is intentional homicide becomes clear in the first speech 
for the prosecution: ri, p£v y&p ftxcov foifcxxeive x6v ftvSpa, ftfyog &v fjv 
aoyyv6pTi<; xuxetv xiv6<; (3.1.6), "If he had killed his victim unintentionally, he 
would have deserved some measure of mercy", which implies that the accusation 
is one of intentional homicide for which the penalty is death (see: 3.1.5, where the 
death penalty is suggested by the plaintiff).
The defendant in his turn, in the first speech for the defence, refutes the 
accusation of intentional homicide first and then he declares his innocence by 
saying that he did not kill the old man at all. Before he starts his arguments in 
order to prove his innocence, he makes a significant point: the victim himself is to 
blame for his own death since he started the fight first. His arguments run as it 
follows: otpai p£v o$v Sycoye ofixe 8ixaxa xohxoax; oW  6axa Spdv 
eyxaA,ofivxa<; epoi. x6v y&p ftp^avxa xffe 7iXqyq<;, ei p£v oi8fjpq> AA0<p 
Zfiktp fipovdpqv aox6v, fiSixaov p£v <&v > 068’ abxax; - oi> y&p xaftxft 
ueiCova xod nA.£iova Sixaioi oi ftpvovxac 6vxiirdtav£%v piai -• tq£c 8£ 
Xepai xwix6pevo<; i>n aoxofi, xai<; x^P0^  &nep fcrcaaxov &vxi8pffiv, ndxepa 
flSixoov;
214
The defendant here, in the first place, tries to repulse the accusation of 
intentional homicide. He refers to the victim by putting for emphasis at the 
beginning of his sentence a participle (x6v y&p &pi;avxa xffe T&nyfte) which 
reminds that the victim himself started the fight. He then continues with the 
hypothesis that even if he had used any kind of weapon in attacking the victim, he 
f|Sixouv p&v <&v> o65’ ofrtox;, because an aggressor deserves to be answered 
with, not the same, but more and worse than he gave; but he did not use any kind 
of weapon apart from his hands and closes his argument by putting the question 
"n6xepa f\5iKoa)v;". I have left the verb fiSixouv untranslated; the normal 
meaning of the verb &5ixeSv is "to do wrong", but I think that such a translation 
here does not reveal the actual meaning of this context. Aristotle gives us a clue 
as far as the meaning of the verb dSxxeiv in a certain context is concerned.
Arist. Rhetor. 1368b: xepl 6k Kaxqyopxai; Kai &7io2.oyia<;f ex 7i6oa>v xa i 
noicov 7toie\o0on 8et xob£ auXXoyxapob^, exfyievov kfcyeiv. 5ei 5f|
Xa^eiv xpia, Iv p&v xivcov xai ndacov gvexa ftSixoficn, Sebxepov 5£ xc&c; 
abxoi Sxaxeipevoi, xpixov 6k xob<; noiou^ xai 7ta><; gxovxaS* Siopiadcpevoi 
ouv x6 &5ixeiv A.gyaHiev gaxa> 6i[ x6 ftSxxexv x6 px.dnxeiv exdvxa napdt 
x6v v6pov.
Therefore Aristotle defines x6 &8ixetv as "intentionally causing injury contrary 
to the law”. If we try now to translate the verb t\51xouv in our text adopting the 
meaning which Aristotle gives to it, then the defendant's argument will be as 
follows: "and even if I had used steel or stone or wood to beat him off, I would 
not intentionally cause injury contrary to the law; an aggressor deserves to be 
answered with, not the same, but more and worse than he gave. Actually, when he 
struck me with his fists. I used mv own to  retaliate for the blows which I received. 
In which of the two cases above was I intentionally causing injury contrary to the 
law?"
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Here we have to remember that the defendant is accused of intentional 
homicide. He does not only try to justify his act but also to prove that the 
accusation of intentional homicide laid above him is groundless. He has been 
accused of a murder and not only of an attack, therefore he does not need only to 
justify his attack but also to reject the accusation. By only justifying his attack he 
is not cleared from the accusation of intentional homicide. He dismisses the 
charge altogether but admits that he attacked the victim. His main concern is to 
prove that he did not kill the man either intentionally or unintentionally. But since 
the charge is intentional homicide he feels that he has to reject it with arguments, 
and even after he has done so to go further and reject a possible alternation of the 
charge by the plaintiff, namely that he killed at least unintentionally. And having 
proved that he did kill neither intentionally nor unintentionally, this leads him to 
his main argument that he is not the killer at all, but someone else is to blame for 
the victim's death; and in this case he accuses partly the victim himself (who 
started the fight and consequently received the blows by the defendant) and at the 
end he names the man who is responsible for his death, the doctor (who did not 
treat him sufficiently).
You can justify an intentional murder, but you cannot justify an unintentional 
murder.
ex p£v y&p imo x<5v 7iXqy6v 6 &vf\p Tiapaxpfjpa 6tn60avev, bn epoO p£v 
Sxxaxax; 5* &v exe0vfpcex - on y&p xai>x& pex£ova x a i 7iX.eiova oi
&pi;avx£<; Sxxaxox &vxxa6axexv exai.
He would try to justify his murder, only if it was intentional. It would be a 
murder if the victim died immediately when he was attacked. He would have died 
immediately if the defendant had used a weapon in attacking him. The phrase b& 
epoft jjl&v Sxxaxax; 8’ &v exeGvfpcex, with the explanation that the starter of a fight 
deserves more and worse than he gave, refers to the previous argument that even
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if he had used a weapon it would still be justified, but in this case it would have 
been an intentional attempt to kill him. There is a link, which is hard to discern, 
between the following arguments:
1) i 6v 6p5avxa xffe TiXny^, ei p£v a\5f[pq> f\ Xi8q> f\ flp.ov6p.Tiv 
afcxdv, f|8iK0ov p&v <&v> oi>5‘ obxax; - ob y6p xafcxfc 6X2.6 pei^ova xai 
nXeiova Stxaiox oi dp/ovxe^ dot-*
and
2) d  p£v y6p x&v aXTjyffiv 6 6vf|p aapaxpflpa 6ji60avevf bn epo$ 
p&v Sixaxco  ^ 5’ 6v exeOvfpcei- oo y6p xaf>x6 6XX6  pd^ova xod rcXeiova oi 
&p!;avxe<; Sixaioi 6vxui6axeiv dai--
Actually the second argument is an expansion of the first. Both arguments refer 
to a hypothetical outcome of the fight between the old man and the defendant. The 
old man would have died immediately if the defendant had used a weapon; his 
death then would be justified but the defendant in that case would have attacked 
intentionally. The adverb Sixaiax; in the sentence bn epoO p&v Sixaia)^ 5’ 6v 
exedvfpcei in the second argument justifies the hypothetical immediate death of 
the victim and at the same time conveys that the homicide would be intentional. 
As I have said above, one who has committed intentional homicide can justify it 
for himself as an active subject, but one who has committed unintentional 
homicide cannot justify it in the same way, he might justify the result (death of the 
victim) in another way. When someone starts to justify a killing of which he has 
been accused -(of unintentional homicide)- then he refutes the accusation itself, 
namely that he has committed unintentional homicide. There is the difference 
between intentional and unintentional homicide which allows an attempt for 
justification for the first, but does not allow the same for the second. In 
intentional homicide the active subject of the act has decided to kill and, if he 
wishes, he can try to justify his act. In unintentional homicide although there is an
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active subject of the act he has not decided to kill and therefore he cannot attempt 
to justify his act as the active subject of it. He might still, though, attempt to 
justify only the killing not as a result of his act but as a result of something else, 
such as negligence from the victim's part, or an error he made.
Therefore, when the defendant in our case here says that ei p&v y&P bn6 xffiv 
riki\y(bv 6 &vf[p Tcapaxpfyia &7i60avev, bn epob p£v Sixaiax; 8’ frv exeOvfpcei 
he refers to the case where he would have killed him intentionally and then he 
would try to justify his murder. The argument goes as it follows: " If the victim 
died immediately from his wounds caused by me, then it would have been me 
(bn epob) who killed him Sixaiax;. But what actually happened was that he died 
after several days because of the incompetence of the doctor who treated him". 
We have a hypothesis of what could have happened and a statement of what 
actually happened. According to the hypothesis the victim would die bn6 xcov 
t&tjy&v immediately, the wounds were caused by the defendant, therefore the 
victim would be killed by him (bn epob). According to the statement of what 
actually happened the victim died Side xf|v xob iocxpob pox0tipiav after several 
days. In the hypothesis above the prepositional adjunct of the cause- bn6 xfiv 
T&TiY&v- in the protasis becomes the agent in the apodosis- bn epob- (the 
wounds were caused by him). Now, the statement which consists of two parts, 
like the hypothesis above, the participle emxpe<p0eii; and the verb &n£0ave 
combined with the prepositional adjunct of the cause, 5i& xfjv xob iaxpob 
poxOT]piav, corresponds to the previous hypothesis in terms of reasoning:
1) Condition— ei p£v y&p bn6 x<Sv i&Tvyci&v 6 6cvf|p Jiapaxpfjpa 6wi£0avev , 
- [it entails that] - bn’ epob p£v SiKoiax; 5’ exe0vfpcex — Result.
2) Fact— pox0T]p$ iaxpco e7nxpe<p0ei<;, - [it entails that] - 8x6c xfiv xob 
iaxpob pox0T]pxav . . .  &n£0ave — Result
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In the hypothesis above we have seen that the bn6 xcov tiA.t]y<dv in the protasis 
becomes i>n’ ejiofc in the apodosis. Now in the statement the Side xi^v too iaxpoft 
po%6Tipiav implies that the victim died xofi iaxpou, which we can probably 
use to replace the prepositional adjunct of the reason- 5i& xfjv xoo iaxpoO 
pox0T]pxav- and even add to it the adverb ftSixax; in order to make it equivalent 
to the structure of the apodosis of the conditional clause of the hypothesis above. 
Therefore the defendant’s statement might be expanded as follows: 5i& xt)v xoft 
iaxpofc poxQilpiav . . . &7t60ave, - [equivalent to] - tind rofJ iarpoD p iv
dcSiKog Si &ni$av£.
If this interpretation is correct and the defendant has actually this kind of 
reasoning in his mind (something which cannot be proved, of course), and since 
he is accusing the doctor of homicide which obviously must be unintentional 
homicide, then, while in his hypothesis he puts Sixaiox; to (let us say at the 
moment) justify his act only, the adverb ftSixax; (which, according to our 
hypothesis, might correspond to Sixorico  ^ above) does not seem to have the same 
use, for the reasons explained earlier concerning the justification of an 
unintentional homicide. In other words, the defendant would never mean that the 
doctor killed the victim &8ixa)<; (= unjustly). *A5ixa>9 seems rather to take the 
meaning of dxouoxco^ (= unintentionally) which sounds quite logical IP the 
defendant accuses the doctor of unintentional homicide.
Therefore if the adverb &5ixa)£, which allegedly corresponds to Sixctiooi;, 
means frxouoiax; in this context, then Sixaiax; can also take the meaning of 
exooox©<;, without however losing the meaning "justly”. The argument then takes 
the following form: "If the victim died from his wounds immediately [which 
means that I used a kind of weapon to attack him and cause to him such a wounds 
from which he died immediately, (see how he starts the aigument in section 2: ei
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ji£v oiSqpcp f| XA8q> f[ £i>A,(p fipuvdpTiv ai>x6v. . .)], then it would be me who 
killed him Sixaiax; = intentionally and justly”.
Having in mind the discussion above, let us try to see the whole argumentation 
of the defendant. I think that there is only one main argument here consisting of 
four parts which I will briefly mention later. This main argument is that the 
defendant, who is accused of intentional homicide, is not guilty either of 
intentional or unintentional homicide. The defendant tries to discuss every aspect 
of this accusation without leaving any side of it aside. The accusation is 
intentional homicide - homicide based on an attack. He splits the accusation into 
two parts: 1) intentional, 2) homicide. According to the plaintiff the homicide was 
caused by the attack. The defendant rejects the accusation of homicide but 
accepts that he attacked the victim. Since the accusation of intentional homicide 
is based on the attack which is accepted by the defendant, he has first to prove 
that the attack was unintentional and justified at the same time. He does so by 
saying first that he did not use any weapon in attacking the victim and second that 
he was in self-defence, and that is why he attacked. He has proved then, in 
section 2, that the attack was unintentional and justified, but having admitted that 
he attacked the victim, even unintentionally, he feels that the plaintiff then might 
accuse him of unintentional homicide, since he associates the victim's death with 
the attack. Then, according to the defendant, the plaintiff might say that the law 
forbids pijxe Sixaxax; ptjiE &5xk(D£ ticnoxxeiveiv. This is put in quotation marks 
to indicate the possible answer of the plaintiff to the defendant's question "ndxepa 
tjSiKoov;”. We have said above that Aristotle in his Rhetoric defines the verb 
6c5 i k e i v  as "loxoo 5f| x6 &5i k e i v  x6  p^dcuxeiv exdvxa nap& x6v v6pov", and if 
we accept that f|5iicoov here can take this meaning, and in combination with what 
has just been said above, then the alleged answer of the plaintiff does still make 
sense in such a context: 'If  you, as you say, attacked him not intentionally, as I
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say and based on it my charge of intentional homicide against you, but 
unintentionally, then, since the attacked man died, you are still guilty of 
unintentional homicide, since the law forbids either intentional or unintentional 
homicide”. Then the defendant moves to the other part of his argument saying that 
he did not kill the man at all, neither intentionally nor unintentionally, and he 
proves it by saying that the man did not die immediately when he was attacked 
but after many days when he was under medical attention, and he uses this fact as 
a proof that he did not attack him intentionally.
In the second speech for the defence of the Third Tetralogy the speaker says:
IIp6<; 5£ t6  jnjre Sucaiog jtrjre dcSixcog d n o K re ive iv  &7ioxfcxpxxccv oi> y&p 
im6 xaW hX.t]y©v 6&V bird xofi iaxpott 6 &vfip &7i68avev, 6<; oi p&pxupe^ 
papxopofioiv. "Eaxi 5& xai xb/T] xo$ ftp^avxoi; xcri ofc xo$ fcpuvopfcvoo. 6 
p&v y&P dncovoicog n6cvxa 5pdoa<; xort 7ia0<bv 6&XoxpiQc x(>XTl xfcxpTT1**1' & 
ejcovoi&g ndcvxa 5pdaa^, ex x6v abxofi §py<dv vt\v xbxT]v 7ipoaaYOCY6pevo<;, 
xft abxob 6cxuxiqc fjpapxev.
Here the prohibition pfpe Sixaico^ pf^xe 6c5ixax; &7ioxieiveiv is not further 
discussed because it has already been discussed in the first speech for the 
defence. The only comment made is that for the victim's death the doctor is 
responsible, which is the conclusion of the defendant's argument when he 
discussed the prohibition pf^xe Sixatax; pfpe &5ixa><; dcnoxxeiveiv. We should 
notice here that there is the same kind of syllogism as in the Tetralogy 3.2.3, 
which is not repeated because an answer has been given (&7iox£xpixai), and only 
the conclusion of this syllogism is given here again (the victim died because of 
the doctor). However, the speaker goes further to notice that the defendant has 
done ndvxa dcxoooiax;.
I conclude that the prohibition pf|X£ Sixoriax; pf|xe dtSlxcoq ticnoxxelveiv in this 
context should be understood as referring rather to intentional and unintentional
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homicide than to just and unjust killing. This meaning has also been attested in the 
Second Tetralogy where it is more clear. Therefore, I do not think that what is 
actually said here is inconsistent with the Athenian law of homicide which 
actually regarded intentional and unintentional killing as a crime.
The second legal point
The second legal point on which Dittenberger based his axgument about the 
divergence of the law in the Tetralogies from Attic law concerns the penalty 
imposed on someone found guilty of unintentional homicide. Athenian law 
imposed exile on a person convicted of unintentional homicide; the exile had no 
temporal limit but continued until the relatives of the victim, or select members of 
his phratry if no relatives survived, extended pardon (odSecns) to the killer. *46 
However, in the Second Tetralogy, according to Sealey following Dittenbeiger, 
the two parties, when they speak about the prospective penalty, do not explicitly 
mention exile. The defence refers to the penalty using the following wording: eat 
ie  Y&p ifi xobxoo 5ia(p6op9 ftffrcoxov x6 Xeuibpevov xou ffroo 
(Tetr. 2.2.10), cf. Tetr.2A.9: 6 5& Ka0ap6£ xfr; aixxac; 55e 6&v 5to«p0apfl. . . . 
He does not name the penalty but he says that the consequence of it will be 
"destruction"(§ia<p0op&).
The prosecutor, on the other hand, becomes more explicit and uiges the judges 
"not to look on without regarding" ftifi aepxopfrv (i.e.not to allow)] the whole city 
to be defiled by him, by keeping him away from things or places specified in the 
law:
. . sYpyovxa<; 3>v 6 vdpoq eTpye* ibv faioxxexvavxa pfi 
aepxop&v cfcnaaav xfiv a6fav bub xobxoo piaivopfcvxiv (Tetr.2.1.2), cf.
146 See: JO 12 115(13 104), lipes 10-19; Dem. 23.72; MacDowell, Homicide 117-121.
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Tetr.2.3.11: Kaxo&ap6vxe<; p£v y&p afcxbv xai elpl;avxei; 3>v 6 v6po<; etpyei 
Ka0apoi xffiv eyKX.Ti|idxa)v SosaQe.
Now, it is well known that, from the moment when a person was accused of 
homicide until his trial, he was "excluded from the things specified in the laws", 
(see Ant.6.36: 6 y&p v6po<; oftxm  ^ Sx21* erceiS&v xi<; 6c7ioYpa<pfl <p6voo 8 i k t ] v ,  
ETpyeaGai xfliv vopipoov), cf. IG i2 115, lin. 20-21; Dem. 47.69; Ar. A thP ol 
57.2. From the prosecutor's words {Tetr. 2.1.2) Sealey concludes that "the author 
[of the Tetrabgies] has mistaken the restriction put on a person accused of 
homicide for the disability inflicted on one judged to have killed involuntarily" (p. 
77).
If I have understood Sealey^ argument properly, he draws this conclusion by 
comparing the prosecutor's phrases, elpyovxa^ fi>v 6 v6po<; efpyei x6v 
&7iOKX£ivavxa {Tetr. 2.1.2) and eipydpevoi x<Sv TipoaipcdvxQv {Tetr. 2.3.11), 
with the phrase dfpyEoOai xcbv vopiprov (Ant. 6.35-36; Ar. A tk Pol 57.2) which 
is used to refer to the proclamation made first by the relatives of the killed person 
in the agora and then by the basileus after the relatives had submitted their chaige 
to him; this proclamation was addressed to the killer who was commanded "to 
keep away from the things specified in the laws". Sealey does not explain why he 
interprets the prosecutor's words as if they allude ("with variation") to the 
proclamation against an alleged killer. Probably the verb ElpYeiv/elpyeoOai used 
in both cases (i.e. the prosecutor's words referring to the prospective penalty, 
here, and the proclamation against an alleged killer, in general) made Sealey take 
the view that the author of the Tetrabgies confused the penalty imposed on a 
person convicted for unintentional homicide with the restriction put on a person 
accused of homicide.
However, on this point I have two objections to make:
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First, as far as the context is concerned (Tetr. 2.1.2) nothing dissuades us from 
understanding in the prosecutor's words exile as the prospective penalty proposed 
by him; a person found guilty of unintentional homicide in order not to defile the 
whole city was bound to go into exile.
Second, we leam from And. 1.94 that x6v pooXeuaavxa ev x$ aftx$ 
8V^ X2O0a i xcd x6v xfl x&pl fcpyaa&pevov, "a person who has planned is to be 
liable to the same treatment as one who has committed with his own hand"; the 
penalty imposed for bouleusis of homicide was the same as that for committing 
homicide with one's own hand. In Ant. 6 Choreutes 4, the khoregos accused of 
bouleusis of unintentional homicide says that if he is condemned he will be 
required "to keep away from Athens, holy places, games, and sacrifices" 
(Ant.6.4: efyyeaGai 7i6A.e<d<;, lEpc&v, &y6va>v, Goaiftv), just like a person found 
to have committed unintentional homicide with his own hand. The khoregos 
referring to the prospective penalty uses the verb EfyyEodai which is used again 
by him in sections 35-36 to refer to the restriction put on him when he was 
charged with the homicide. Therefore the verb efyyeoGoci has been also attested, 
in a real case, in connection with the penalty of exile.
On these grounds, I cannot see here (Tetr. 2.1.2 and Tetr. 2.3.11) any 
inconsistency with, or any inadequate knowledge of, the Athenian homicide law.
We have discussed the two legal points made by Sealey (following 
Dittenberger) and concluded that, as far as the first legal point is concerned, the 
prohibition ptjxe SiKociax; ptjxe &5ikon; ftnoxxeivEiv is a very general statement 
about the Athenian homicide law, which does not add anything substantial to it, 
and that we should understand the pair 5iKoi(D£/&5xKa)<; as corresponding to 
EKouoiax^&KouoioDQ in order to designate intentional/imintentional homicide. As 
far as the second legal point is concerned, there is nothing in the Second 
Tetralogy which can be taken as a proof that the author of the Tetralogies does
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not make good use of the Athenian homicide law, in the sense that when he writes 
about the prospective penalty for an unintentional homicide he confuses exile, 
which was the penalty in such a case, with another legal practice in Athenian 
homicide law, i.e. the proclamation of the basileus against the alleged killer.
Dittenberger's and Sealers arguments are not conclusive and, therefore, I do 
not see in the Tetralogies any inconsistency with the Athenian homicide law 
which should dissuade us from relying on the Tetralogies and using them as a 
testimony to Athenian law and practice.
Here we should probably quote some other points found in the Tetralogies in 
order to strengthen our view that the author of the Tetralogies was not ignorant of 
Athenian law, either on the subject of homicide, or on the Athenian legal system 
as a whole, and that the Tetralogies actually reflect Athenian law and Athenian 
court-practice:
1) Tetr. 1.1.6: xXoafi iepffiv xpqp&Tajv (embezzlement of sacred monies of 
which the person concerned was in charge) was made the subject of a ypoupfi and 
it was punishable by fine; from Dem.24 Timokr. 111,112, we leam that the penalty 
for xXorcf| iepfiv xptTP&todv was the repayment of ten times the sum embezzled.
2) Tetr. 1.2.7: fcrciaxoopfcvcov 5& xat x&v fi&Xcov 5o<ft.a>v ev 
•locpxupxax*; - ou yap ePaaavx^ojiev afrtoi^ - : Slaves can only give 
evidence under torture.
3) Tetr. 1.4.7: ol p£v (oi eXe*60epox = "citizens", in contrast with oi SoftXox) 
yap &xip.o\Wxori xe xai xpfjpaax ^qpLioOvxai, e&v pf| x6cA.t|0fl Sox&ax 
jiapiupfjaca: a citizen convicted of \|r£i)5ojiapxopia was fined, and disfranchised 
if he was convicted three times.
4) Tetr. 3.3.5: 6 p£v iaxp6<; oi> (poveix; afrtofi ecrriv - 6 y&p v6po<; 
faioMex a(>x6v, 8x6t 5£ x&£ xotixou 7iX.T]y&<; enxxpexirdvxcDV af>x$,
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&v 8&X6<; tic; f| 6 piaadcp.Evo<; fpfo; xpfl°®0tl cpoveix; Efri &v; The law 
absolved a physician from blame, if a patient died while under his care.
Therefore, all these passing references to laws other than those of homicide 
certainly seem to indicate that the author of the Tetralogies was acquainted with 
the Athenian legal system as a whole.
* * *
The Tetralogies ascribed to Antiphon are three groups of four short speeches 
each. Each group deals with a case of homicide, and each consists of two 
speeches for the prosecution and two corresponding speeches for the defence. 
They consist entirely of "artistic proofs" which are arguments from probability in 
a wide sense, as it is opposed to "artless proofs” which include laws, witnesses, 
testimonies, contracts and oaths, and they were not composed for real litigants 
since they were not intended for any actual law-suits.
However, since they seem to reflect Athenian law and court-practice, I think 
that they were probably written in the way their author would have used before an 
Athenian court at the time of their composition, and he tried to make them seem 
consistent with Athenian law and practice as if they were going to be used in an 
Athenian court for real litigants.
hi this sense, I think that the Tetralogies might have something to give to us 
about the practice of eyyhn which is mentioned in one of their speeches (Ant. 2 
Tetr. 1.2.12).
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*  *  *
In the first speech for the defence of the First Tetralogy, the speaker who tries 
to create a positive impression of himself says:
ep£ S£ c k  iftv Ttpoeipyaapfcvajv yv6aeo8e obx£ arciPoutefiovxa obx£ xffiv 
ox> TipoaTpcdvxcov 6p£y6pevov, x& evavxia xotxcov TioXXfo; p&v xod
p£ydXa<; riacpopdu; eia<p£povia, noXkb 8k xpxqpapxofcvxa, A,apnp6<; 8£ 
Xopqyofivxa, tioM,ox<; 8£ epavi^ovxa, payd&ai; S£ bufcp noM.t&v fcyytiai; 
dtnoxivovxa, xi)v 8& oi>aiav oi> S i k c c £ 6 j i £ v o v  d t i X  £pya£6ji£Vov KEXXTflifcvov, 
qnX.oQi)XTiv S£ xcrt vdpxpov 8vxa. (Tetr. 1.2.12).
We hear that he made several substantial payments to the Treasury, that he 
served as Trierarch more than once, that he furnished a brilliant chorus, that he 
advanced money to friends and finally that he paid laige sums under guarantees 
given for others.
It is this last mentioned activity of the speaker that concerns us here and rises a 
number of questions. The phrase p£y&A.aQ S£ bnfcp rco^ Xffiv eyytiat; faioxivovxa 
is the only reference to eyyuq in the whole First Tetralogy which tells us that the 
speaker had been a guarantor (eyyuqxfn;) for many persons in several different 
occasions.
There is not any hint of the (different?) circumstances under which the eyyfxxx 
took place or of the purpose of it, and, therefore, we are bound to speculate about 
all the possible kinds of ayyftq which could have been applied here.
* He might have guaranteed the appearance of an accused man in court for 
trial. This could have been applied here only in cases in which the prospective 
penalty would be a fine, and only when the accused man who did not turn up for
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trial was convicted by default to a fine for which, in this case, the guarantor 
became responsible.
* He might have guaranteed the payment of a fine.
* He might have guaranteed the full payment of a loan contracted under his 
influence; the guarantor would become liable for the full payment of the loan if 
the borrower did not repay it by the fixed date.
* He might have guaranteed the payment of a sum of money owed to the state 
by lessees of public property and tax-farmers.
The participle fotoxivovTa indicates how far the speaker played his role as a 
guarantor. The responsibility of the guarantor might have never become actual if 
the person for whom he guaranteed (let us name him, A) fulfilled his obligation; 
but if A failed to do so, then the guarantor would assume all the responsibility of 
doing whatever A should have already done. In a. number of cases the speaker 
(Tetr. 1.2) had to go as far as to pay the amount of money for which he had 
guaranteed. This means that A either failed to pay a fine for which the speaker 
had guaranteed, or did not appear for trial while the speaker had guaranteed his <- 
appearance, or did not repay a loan for which the speaker had stood surety, or did 
not fulfil his obligations towards the state as a lessee of public property or a tax- 
farmer. We are also told that he had to pay large amounts of money under 
guarantees (pey&Xac; eyytiai;) given for many people at different times (brc&p 
nokXGbv). This indicates that more than once he had stood surety for more than 
one person under, probably, different circumstances for each person (e.g. a fine or 
a loan).
Let us try now to draw an imaginary picture in outline of this guarantor here:
Let us imagine that a man (B) had been convicted in a ypaqrfi KXonffe iepSv 
XPTtyi&Toov and had either to pay a fine of two talents (one talent being the sacred 
money embezzled) immediately, or to be imprisoned until he paid it, unless
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someone guaranteed the payment of the tine at a future date. B could not pay the 
fine immediately but he nominated the speaker as his guarantor, he guaranteed 
that B would pay the fine in the future (normal^ by the ninth prytany of the year). 
However, B failed to pay it by then and consequently the guarantor became liable 
for its payment. Eventually the guarantor paid it.
After a year another man (C), who had been disfranchised because he owed 
money to the state (for example, a tax-farmer who failed to pay the price fixed for 
his tax-collecting privilege on the date when it fell due), was prosecuted by the 
procedure of ivSeigig because he was seen to be in one of the places which were 
forbidden to him. His prosecutor after delivering the charge to the magistrates 
(Thesmothetai) required that the accused man, C, should provide sureties, 
otherwise he should be kept under custody until his trial; the speaker became one 
of his sureties. However, C failed to appear for trial, and consequently his 
sureties took his place; they were tried on the original accusation made against C, 
and convicted to pay a fine. The speaker who was one of C's sureties paid his 
part to the fine.
After some time another man (D) was seeking to contract a loan, and the 
speaker stood surety for its repayment. However D was unable to repay the loan 
on the day when it fell due and, therefore, the speaker became liable for the 
payment of the loan which eventually was paid by him.
Before we put a question, it is appropriate first to recall some general 
observations concerning the nature and the function of eyytiT]. ’Eyyori was the 
means for the attainment of an act at a future date. The guarantor undertook the 
responsibility that the person for whom he guaranteed would do something in the 
future (either that he would pay a fine, or that he would appear for trial, or that he 
would repay a loan). If the person for whom the guarantor had guaranteed failed 
to fulfil his obligations, then the guarantor himself became liable and had to
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perform whatever the other person failed to do. The risk at which the guarantor 
put himself voluntarily could be extremely big sometimes.
In our case here (Ant.2 Tetr. 1.2.12) we hear that the speaker not only had 
stood surety many times before, but also had paid the amount of money for which 
he guaranteed. More than once he had to confront an unpleasant situation where 
he had to pay money (a fine, or a loan) without originally having done anything 
wrong himself.
The question which arises here is the following:
Since he had obtained a very bad experience as a guarantor when he first had 
to pay the why did he put himself at such a risk again by guaranteeing
later other sums for other persons? He could have stood surety for a person who 
eventually failed to fulfil his obligation; then he would pay the but having
such a bad experience he could have refused to play again the role of the 
guarantor for someone else in the future. But the author of the Tetrabgies puts 
the speaker to have stood surety, who paid the more than once. But what
was it which would make an unlucky guarantor to repeat the same "mistake" more 
than once?
Before we attempt to answer this question, it would be helpful to gather all the 
possible information about the person of the guarantor, as we get it from the First 
Tetrabgy.
We hear that he was a wealthy man who had undertaken many lit urgies which 
he completed successfully. We also hear that he had held a public office, 
probably being a loqriac, xcov iep&v xPTVi (^X0)V» treasurer of the sacred 
m o n i e s .  *47 He had a riotous life by being involved in a number of lawsuits. The
147 Every temple of any importance had a treasure which was composed of offerings, and the surplus of 
the amount of the sacred property, together with other receipts which belonged to the particular deity, and
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circle of his friends was wide enough and he was probably a member of an 
ipocvog association.
The fact that he was a very wealthy man, although it did help and support his 
behaviour as a guarantor (namely his willingness to stand surety more than once, 
especially after the first time that he did so and had to pay the eyyhTi) does not 
explain this behaviour.
The wide circle of friends that he had, although it created a higher possibility 
that some of them might have needed his help at some point, did not necessarily 
compel him to undertake the role of their guarantor when need arose.
His membership of an £pavo<; association might have demanded his financial 
help towards other members in the form of a contribution with others, but such a 
membership alone would not compel him to stand surety for one of the members 
of this association.
And finally, although for being a wealthy man the price that he had to pay was 
to undertake lit urgies which were compulsory and distributed among the richest 
members of the Athenian society, nothing could compel him because of his wealth 
to be a guarantor for other people unless he himself decided to do so.
It is hard to believe that a man, no matter how rich he was, was motivated only 
by his generosity and philanthropy in showing such a willingness to pay eyyuai 
for others because they failed to fulfil their responsibilities. It is also hard to 
believe that such a guarantor would be particularly happy for behaving in this way 
since he would have to pay significant amounts of money, unless he was to be
these treasures were under the managment of the treasurers of the sacred monies (ixx|uai ta>v iepaW 
xpnp&wov)
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benefited in one way or another. Therefore there must have been something else 
which would lead a wealthy man to this kind of behaviour.
I suggest that his concern about his social-political status might be the key in 
explaining this behaviour. In sections 5 and 6 of the first speech for the 
prosecution of the First Tetralogy we hear that ex TiaXaxoo y&p ex0p6<; qv 
auxofi noM,&<; jifcv xod p£Y<5&ocq 5i6£a<; ooSepxav dXev, £xx 8£
p.et£oo<; xod T&exooq SxooxOsis of>5e7id>7iox’ 8t7io(puy6v ixavbv pfcpoq x&v 
8vxoov dnoP^pXrpce, x& 5’ &yxtai:a icpfiv xXoTiffc Sooxv xaXdtvxoxv 
Y£Ypapp^vo(; xm aftxofi. A man who was involved in many law-suits either as a 
defendant or as a plaintiff would definitely need the support of others in dealing 
with all those law-suits. This support would practically mean the appearance of 
persons in court who would act either as his witnesses (especially when they 
would provide the court with a false testimony) or as prosecutors of his enemies. 
And nobody would be more willing to support such a man than one who had been 
benefited by him in the past. This might explain the way in which a professional 
guarantor could have thought: "I help you financially now (by being your 
guarantor, willing to pay the zyyi>x\) because I have the financial strength to do so, 
but when need arises (a law-suit) you will help me in another way (by being one 
of my witnesses)".
The creation of a core of permanent supporters might be exploited on other 
occasions as well. We know that any Athenian man of citizen status might be 
appointed by lot or by election to hold some public office. But before entering 
upon the office he had to undergo dokimasia by a jury in a court under the 
presidency of the Thesmothetai. During the dokimasia he was examined whether 
he was legally qualified for the office for which he had been selected. An 
accusation against him could be made by anyone who wished, on the ground that 
the candidate was not legally qualified for the office, and as we see from several
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surviving speeches composed for dokimasia proceedings (Lys. 16, 25, 26, 31), 
the question whether the candidate was a good and patriotic citizen was very often 
put forward. Furthermore, once a man had entered upon a public office, legal 
proceedings were available for use against him if he misused his authority or 
neglected his duties. One was a vote in the Ekklesia (epikheirotonia) on the 
question whether the holders of public offices seemed to be peiforming their 
duties well. And if the vote went against anyone, he was deposed from his office; 
this was called apokheirotoma. The speaker of Tetr. 1.2 is said to have held a 
public office (probably being a treasurer of the sacred monies).
Another way in which we could explain the behaviour of a professional 
guarantor might be the following: Although in Athens there were not political 
parties in the modem sense, the existence of political groups is d o u b t l e s s .  *48 
Such a professional guarantor could perfectly well be, if not the leader of a 
political group, at least one of the minor politicians (eX&xxovas ^xopeq). We 
know that each political group had its leader who was surrounded by his close 
followers and supporters whose task was to promote their political ideas and 
influence other citizens in order to enlarge their political group.149 one of the 
means of attaining this goal might have been the creation of a sense of obligation 
in citizens who were benefited by their generosity which could be also expressed 
by an eyyf q when it was needed. Even many of the great politicians of the middle 
fifth century performed lit urgies, which were an important means to influence in 
public life, were dedicators and great benefactors, but private philanthropy also
148 See, W.R. Connor, The New Politicians o f Fifth-Century Athens (Princeton, 1971) p. 64; 
S.Perlman, "The Politicians in the Athenian Democracy of the 4th century B.C.", Athenaeum 41 (1963), 
pp. 327-55.
149 See, Hyper, con. Dem., col. 12; Aesch. 2. 64,68,71; Dem. 18.143; Isokr. 16.7; Plut Per. 11.2.
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was used by them for the same purpose of their political growth as can be seen by 
the following account of Cimon's generosity:
Theopompus. FGrH 115 F89 :
Kipcov 6 ’A0qvaio£ ev xov; &ypoi£ *od xoi£ xfjnai£ ob5£va xob xapnob 
xa0iaxa qrf>X.axa, 5 ticd<; oi pouX.6pevox xa>v noXAxffiv eiaxdvxe^ 67i<Dpi£a)vxcn. 
xcd XapP&vaxnv et xivo<; Sfcoivxo xftv ev xoi£ xrop*01^ - Suewa xfjv oixiav 
Tiapexxe xoxvfiv Snaav xcd Sexrcvov aiel ei>xeA.£<; Tiapaaxendt^eaQai 7ioM.oi<; 
&v0p&7ioi<;, xcd xoix; &n6poo<; [npoaidvxa^] xffiv ’AOqvcdcDV eiai6vxa<; 
SexTivexv. eOepdxeoev 8& xod xoi)£ xa0’ ex&axqv fyiSpav abxob xi Seopfcvoxx;, 
xcd A.6yoocnv dx; xepifiyexo p&v &ei veaviaxoxx; 5b’ f[ xpei£ gxovxaS 
xfcppaxa xobxoii; xe 8i86vax npoafcxaxxev, 6n6xe xi£ 7ipoa6X0ox abxob 
5e6pevo<;. xcd <paai p£v abxdv xod ei^ xatpfiv eia<p£peiv. noietv 5£ xcd xobxo 
tioM .6cxi<;, 6n6xe xfiov 7ioX.ix0v xiva YSoi xaxax; fjpqneapfcvov, xs^ebeiv abicp 
pexap<pi&vvoo0ai xftv veavioxcov xiva x6v ai)vaxoA.oo0obvxa>v abxqr ex 5f| 
xobxrov &7«5ivxcov TyoSoxipei xod np(bzo<; fjv xfiv rcoA.ix&v.
The result of a politician's generosity to the citizens, as well as to the city, was 
the gratitude of his beneficiaries which could be easily converted into political 
support. And that that was the case can be seen by the last sentence of the 
account of Cimon's generosity (quoted above) which is a hint that the purpose of 
this generosity was political growth.
Now, eyybq could perfectly well be included, among other things, in a 
politician's generosity, having the purpose of creating a sense of obligation in 
those who were benefited by his undertaking to stand surety for them. The 
political support which he was to gain by his beneficiaries could be expressed by 
them in different v/ayacn several occasions, such as by voting for his proposals 
of decrees in the assembly, which was one of the characteristic tasks of the
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politicians who sometimes took precaution to have a probouleuma ready in case 
favourable circumstances arose for a vote in the assembly, (Dem. 23.13-14).
The citizens for whom a politician would guarantee could be naturally found 
among members of the hetaireiai which were dining or drinking clubs of men who 
met in private houses for, apart from dinner and drinking, entertainment and talk. 
Many politicians appeared to be members of a hetaireia (G.M.Calhoun, 
"Athenian Clubs in Politics and Litigation", Bulletin o f the University o f Texas 
(no. 262, Austin 1913)) where they talked politics, and from where they gained 
political strength and influence (see Plut. Aristides 2). Some of the members 
supported other members who were in trouble in the courts, and they helped each 
other out f i n a n c i a l l y . * ^  a  politician who played the role of an advocate or an 
accuser in  a law-court and by doing so recruited supporters ([Dem.] 59.43) could 
also play the role of a guarantor, even though he had experienced it badly in the 
past and knew that he was going to pay again an expensive price for either 
retaining already existing supporters or recruiting new ones. For the repeated 
eyy^k1 the motivation was his political career and the reward was a steady 
income of political support from his beneficiaries.
I conclude that the behaviour of an 8YY'0T1x I^<& p eY ^a ^ bnfcp noXA.6v 
eyyua^ aTioxivovia cannot be explained as a result of his philanthropy and 
generosity only, his concern about his social-political status must have been a 
significant factor which would motivate him to undertake peydtXa^ urcfcp noXktbv 
eyytai; which he would eventually pay.
We should also notice here that the author of the Tetralogies puts the 
defendant to place the eyY^ **1 ride by side with the lit urgies undertaken by him. 
Wmirpypr  ^ thp lit j iirorigo could not bs avoided since they were compulsory and
150 S. Perlman, Athenaeum 4-1 (1963) 343 a82.
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distributed among the wealthy members of the Athenian society, whereas the 
eyyuTi was totally voluntary and depended on the willingness of the person who 
would decide to undertake it or not. And although we can understand the reason 
why an Athenian would demonstrate his performance of litourgies in a law court, 
it is not however very clear what was the purpose of the use of his function as an 
eyy\)T]xfi<;.*5* In this context here, however, the mention of the eyyhai has the 
purpose of supporting his main argument; the defendant argues that his wealth is 
the fruit of hard personal work and that he not only never claimed anything which 
did not belong to him, but also he had frequently paid large sums under 
guarantees given for others.
But what concerns us here is that the defendant who has been an eyyuqxfn; on 
several occasions in the past is put by the author of the Tetrabgies to use as a 
positive for himself argument his function as a responsible eyy‘DTixf|<; who 
eventually paid the eyyixxi. Now if we are to suppose that all these eyytiai paid 
by the guarantor were either for a fine payable to the state, or for a loan, or for the 
appearance of an accused person in court, then the possible use of the payment of 
the eyyuoci by a guarantor in a law-court in order to give an extra positive 
impression concerning his personal record seems to be awkward in the following
151 As a client of Lysias says: Terpvnpapxrim te yap rcevtdxi^, xai xerpaKu; vevaujiaxnm , m i  
eio<popd<; ev noXqup rooWxxq daevnvo%a, m i •vfiiXXa ^ n ro u p y irm  ou&vcx; xeTpov xa>v 
rcoXiT&v. mvuoi 5id uovro i&euo xa>v vie6 tt>; rooteo; icpootaTxoneva>v e5arcava>tiTyv, iva m i 
peXxuov ixp’ ujjuov vq^oqirrv , m i  ei rocm poi tu; a\)p.cpopd 'yevowo, atiavov ayo)vi^oiM.Trv. (Lys. 
25. 12-13). The reason why he was spending more than he was expected to spend was that he wanted to 
create a good reputation for himself, so that if he was ever involved in a trial he would stand a better 
chance in court Many other examples of the same Tonxx; can be found in the orators, e.g. Lys. 3.47,6.46, 
7.30-31; Isokr. 7. 53,18. 58; Is. 4. 27-31,5. 35-38; Dem. 20.151,21.153,38.25, etc.
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sense: Let us suppose that a person was accused of an offence for which he had 
to be tried in a law-court at a future date and had to nominate sureties for his 
appearance in the court; eventually he turned up for the trial, where he was 
convicted of a fine which he paid. And let us suppose that the same person after 
some time had also to nominate sureties for contracting a loan; he took the loan 
which eventually was repaid by him in time. In both cases the guarantors would 
not have any further implications in paying the eyyuq since the person for whom 
they guaranteed fulfilled his obligations. And let us imagine now that the above 
person was involved in a trial as a defendant having to defend himself in the same 
way as the author of the Tetralogies puts his defendant to do so. In this case, I do 
not think that we would expect such a defendant who would be at pains to create 
a positive impression for himself to claim that "among many lit urgies that I have 
undertaken and successfully completed so far, peyc&a 5k bn&p ejioQ xipf[jiaxa 
(or) Saveia faioxivovxa”. However, a guarantor could possibly do so, probably 
because he would not feel that he had committed an offence for which he was 
punished. Furthermore he would probably use his action as an eyyuqxfis as a 
sample of his philanthropy and generosity.
Now, as far as the Attic legal system itself is concerned, it appears that what 
was at stake, of course, was justice which in any case had to be done. The 
concept of justice seems to be associated with the idea that since an offence had 
been committed by someone a penalty should definitely follow, the offender 
would normally suffer this penalty. That was, in the first place, actually required 
by the law which, however, recognised in some cases the possible appointment of 
ayyuTixat whose role was first to secure that a certain person would actually do, 
at a future date, what he was required to do, and second, in case of his failure, to 
become responsible themselves for what he should have done but he did not. In 
this case, if the eyyuqxf^ undertook his responsibilities and completed his
237
function as eyYUTyifu; by doing, paying, or suffering in the other person's place 
what he should have done, paid, or suffered, then justice was regarded as having 
been done, although the real offender was not punished himself. To give an 
example, let us take the case where someone was accused of an offence and the 
accuser demanded either sureties for the accused person's appearance in the court 
for the trial, or that he should be imprisoned until his trial; eyYvt1X0^  were 
nominated but the accused person, who remained free as the result of his 
guarantors, did not appear for the trial. He would be tried by default and, if he 
was found guilty, then the £YYVTlxod would have to suffer in his place exactly the 
same penalty which he would have suffered, and the story probably would close 
there. Justice has been done, although someone else and not the real offender 
suffered the penalty. The eYY"01!10^  should not be taken as if they were punished 
for the act of the zyyx>T\ which led to the failure of the real offender's punishment, 
but they should be seen as the substitute for the real offender. The charge on 
which they would be tried would be the same charge brought against the real 
offender and they would suffer the same penalty which would have been imposed 
upon him.
To the best of my knowledge, there was not an extra penalty imposed upon the 
guarantors who were tried and convicted instead of the person for whom they had 
guaranteed. The fact that, in the case of the public debtors, their guarantors were 
liable to the payment of double the amount of the original debt after the ninth 
prytany should not be seen as an extra penalty directed to the guarantors, since, in 
any case, the original debtor had to pay it himself in the first place.
Neither can we say that a guarantor was debarred from undertaking an eyY^Tl 
again in the future, if he had already done so three times in the past and had been 
convicted in the place of the original offender, even though he had eventually paid 
the e y Y ^  m analogy with what happened to a person convicted in a 5 i x t ]
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\|re\)5opapxupicov who after his third conviction was automatically 
d i s f r a n c h i s e d , ! ^ o t h e r w i s e  the defendant of the First Tetralogy would not 
have been able to stand surety several times, (jieydAai; S£ brcfcp 710A.A.&V eyY^0^  
dwroxivovxa).
152 Ant 2.4.7, And 1.74, Hyp. Philippides 12.
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CONCLUSION
The verb eyyoftv has the basic meaning "to pledge" or "to promise" with an 
etymological connection to a ritual gesture involving the hand or hands - either 
pledging by putting something into the hand of someone, or promising with the 
seal of a handshake. It also means "to guarantee" and the noun eyy wrycfis denotes 
the guarantor.
The noun EyyoT] means "suretyship", "guaranty" and denotes the act of 
suretyship, i.e. someone's undertaking to stand surety. Sometimes it is used to 
refer to "the sum guaranteed" and in this case the word is identical with an amount 
of money.
As a legal term, EyyhTi refers to an oral contract made between two parties. 
The situations in which the term eyy<)T] was used were marriage and suretyship.
*Evvbn in the context o f marriage
Marriage was essential for the preservation of the otxoi, because it ensured the 
continuation of the family through legitimate children, and the preservation of its 
property through proper inheritance procedures.
The essential element of marriage during the classical period was the eyyhT] 
(the "promising" or "pledging of the bride"). The "living together" (ouvoikeiv) of 
a man and a woman was recognized as a valid marriage only when it was based 
on the eyyhrt so, eyyhri was a prerequisite, without which a marriage was not 
valid (except in the case of an eniKXqpot;).
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The Eyyori was an oral, legally valid, private contract of marriage concluded 
with the bridegroom by the woman's Kopiot; (father, brother or nearest male 
relative).
The Kupio^'s act at the eyyuri was to pledge or engage (eYY^ftv) the woman to 
the bridegroom as wife, to promise her in marriage; the eyY^] resulted in the 
woman's becoming a ynvft eYYnTixfj * a pledged or promised woman.
The eyy^H was a necessary step towards a full marriage, but it required to be 
followed by £x5ooic, in order actually to become a valid and legal marriage.
Witnesses were not necessary for giving validation to the act of the eYY^q; 
however, the absence of them was often used in court to argue that a woman had 
not been given in marriage by So, it was customary for both parties to
bring their own witnesses to the transaction. They were needed not to validate the 
act of the eyy^H but to prove, if the need arose, that the eyY^q had taken place.
The dowry was not obligatory at Athens and it was a matter of custom rather 
than a legal requirement; it was the social and moral responsibility of a K*0pio<; of 
a woman to give dowry with her to the prospective husband, and the natural 
moment for the bestowal of the dowry was when the zyyx)i\ to°k place.
The most important effect of marriage, the legitimacy of children, depended on 
the existence and propriety of the eyY^- The connection between the eYY^n and 
the legitimacy of children is clear. According to the law Yvqoioq is that child who 
was bom from a ynvfi eyY™]^, (cf. Dem. 44.49). The kyyi>x\ was the legal 
means of establishing that a woman would be the mother of a man's legitimate 
heirs.
Phratry membership was dependent on an man3jbeing bom from a marriage 
contracted by The content of the oath, sworn by the father on presenting
his son to his phratry, seems to be that the son was bom to him by a woman who 
was a citizen (&gtt|) and married to him under a contract of eyY f^t- N60oi were
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not only excluded from their father's phratry, but also from the possibility of 
adoption by another citizen and enrolment in his phratry. They were also excluded 
from all rights of inheritance. I tend to believe also that illegitimate birth was a 
bar to citizenship, in the period of the orators.
*Eyv<)ti as surety
1. *EyT^t1 f°r appearance in court.
For each offence there was a certain type of legal procedure which should be 
followed in order the offender to be brought to trial. A prosecutor needed to know 
what kind of legal procedure he could bring for the offence with which he was 
concerned, and to which magistrate he should apply. Some legal procedures could 
involve eYY^ Ti as the substitute of precautionary imprisonment which could be 
imposed on the alleged offender from the time of the initiation of the case until the 
trial itself. Legal procedures which could involve eYY^ H were the following:
a. EioaYYeXia
From some unknown date, but probably after the reforms of Ephialtes 462/1 
B.C., any person accused of an offence dealt with by the procedure of 
eiaocYY2^ 01 before the boule had the right to provide sureties that he would 
appear for trial and so he could avoid precautionary imprisonment imposed by the 
boule. But if he did not provide sureties, then imprisonment until trial seems to 
have been the rule. However, persons accused of very serious offences (such as, 
treason, conspiracy against the democratic constitution, and misappropriation of 
public money) did not have the right to nominate sureties in order to avoid 
imprisonment but they had to be held in prison until their trial. The sureties had to 
be three persons from his own property class who guaranteed that the accused
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man would appear for trial. They would suffer in the defendant's place the 
punishment due to him, if he failed to appear for trial and found guilty.
b. ’'EvSei^i?
When a person was prosecuted by &v5ei£i£ and until the day of his trial arrived 
there were three possibilities:
1) he could either be at liberty, or
2) be kept in custody, or
3) he could avoid arrest by providing sureties.
In an the arrest until trial seems to have been optional and the
accused, if arrested, could avoid imprisonment by providing sureties for himself, 
only if the prosecutor accepted it.
c. <D6o
A <pdcn<; could be brought before the boule at least in the fifth and early in the 
fourth century. As far as the posibility of arrest and remand in custody until the 
trial is concerned the traditional view is that <p&cn£ neither entailed arrest and 
custody nor otherwise the defendant was compelled to find sureties. But there is 
not evidence in support of these statements.
I think that in a case of <p6cn<; arrest and custody of the accused as well as 
release on bail could be a possibility. It is hard, however, to determine the criteria 
used by either the boule or the other magistrates to whom (pdccm; cases were 
brought to order arrest and custody (and in this case release on bail was an 
option) or to accept the case and simply refer it to a court.
d. Aikti &qxnp£aEa>£
When a person was wrongly seized as a slave by someone claiming to be the 
owner, he might be hauled into freedom (6upaipe?o6ai or e^aipeiaOai d.<; 
eleuOepiav) by a third party who claimed that the enslaved person was a 
freeman/woman. But if the alleged owner denied the validity of that "removal to
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freedom” and still claimed to own the person in question as a slave he could bring 
a 5 i k t ]  &qxxipea8<Di;-8i;aip6aE(D<; against the adsertor who prevented seizure, for 
having wrongfully asserted the alleged slave's liberty. The charge was originally 
laid with the Polemarchos before whom the alleged slave had to provide sureties 
to guarantee his/her appearance for trial, ([Dem.] 59.40).
e. In cases also where a prosecutor had a reasonable suspicion that the accused 
would run away and evade trial]^bould demand sureties for the accused man's 
appearance in coutr^ ( the case of Kittos in Isokr. 17.14). Especially, in cases 
where the defendant was a metic or a privileged alien the prosecutor could take 
him by force before the Polemarchos and could then demand sureties for his 
appearance in court up to a sum related to the matter in dispute, otherwise the 
defendant was imprisoned until trial, (Isokr. 17.12).
2. Lessees of public property - Tax farmers.
*EYYUT]xai were also required when the lessees of public property and persons 
who bought the right to collect a tax on behalf of the state made the agreement 
with the state. These EYYUTytai became public debtors themselves and 
responsible for the payment of the sum due, in the event that the debt was not 
paid off by the original debtor himself.
Persons also who had guaranteed the payment of a fine payable to the state 
became liable to the same penalties as the public debtors themselves. The law 
([Dem.] 53.27) enacted that the property of persons who guaranteed the payment 
of a sum to the state, and failed to do so, should be confiscated. However, I have 
concluded that a guarantor's property was confiscated only when the debtor who 
failed to pay off his debt did not have any property which could be confiscated in 
order to provide the sum required for the payment of the debt, or even when he 
had some property which however was not enough to meet the debt.
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3. Athenian Bankers.
Athenian bankers, who were almost without exception metics and did not have
the right to own or put any claim on real property, made loans to Athenian citizens
on the security of a piece of real property. These loan transactions involved
(apart from the metic banker-lender and the borrower) other Athenian citizens who
were called £YYUTlX0£i x*te and who would take legal action against the
cm
debtor ’who defaulted on repayment of the loan. They would foreclose the 
security, would sell it and would return the amount of the loan to the metic 
banker.
However, ’when the loan transaction was between a metic banker and a metic 
person or a foreigner, then £YT‘0Tlxai seem also to be necessaiy. But these 
eYY^TlTai should not be confused with the £YY^nxo^  xflS xpaa^^Tn;. The latter 
would not be responsible themselves for the repayment of the loan, if the debtor 
failed to repay it (a piece of real property had been put down as security for the 
loan), while the former, in the failure of the debtor to repay the loan, were 
required to repay it themselves, (case of Apatourios, Dem. 33).
4. Arbitration proceedings.
’EYYuqxai seem also to be necessary in arbitration proceedings. The rules for 
an arbitration were written in a contract which arranged who was going to be the 
arbitrator(s), what the matter was, and who was surety for each party.
Each guarantor undertook the responsibility that the arbitrator's judgement 
would be binding for the person for whom he stood surety, and, if that person was 
the losing party, that he would carry out the award; otherwise* each, of them. 
undertook to pay any sum that might be awarded against the person for whom he 
was the guarantor.
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5. A1kt| eYY^Tte.
The 5ikt] eyy^rn; was the legal means by which a guarantor was compelled to 
fulfil the eyy\)T\. It was brought against the guarantor by the winning party of a 
case who had not received what had been agreed when the eyybti took place. The 
5ixT\ eyybT^ was employed after an unsuccessful demand for the eyybT] had been 
made to the guarantor.
’EyybT] was the means for the attainment of an act at a future day. The 
guarantor undertook the responsibility that the person for whom he guaranteed 
would do something in the future (either that he would repay a loan, or that he 
would pay a fine or a debt to the state, or that he would conform to a decision 
taken in arbitration proceedings, or that he would appear for trial). If the person 
for whom the guarantor had guaranteed failed to fulfil his obligations, then the 
guarantor himself became liable and had to perform whatever the other person 
failed to do.
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